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ABSTRACT 
 
 This project examines state environmental policy and its effect upon state 
economic growth.  State policymakers actively pursue policies intended to positively 
impact state economic growth.  A policy area surrounded by controversy regarding its 
affect upon economic performance is that of environmental regulation.  Prior research 
indicates that policymakers believe state environmental regulations influence business 
decisions to invest in certain areas.  In this research I seek to determine whether states 
which deliberately enact more lax environmental regulatory standards succeed in 
increasing state economic growth.  State economic growth is modeled as a function of 
environmental policy variables and range of national economic and state demographic, 
policy, financial, and institutional variables.  Variables used to measure environmental 
policy are critical to the results of the model estimations.  When pollution abatement 
compliance costs of business and industry are used as the measure of environmental 
policy, state economies appear to suffer a detrimental impact as a result of more stringent 
environmental policies.  When state spending on environmental and natural resource 
programs is used as the measure of environmental policies, state economies appear to 
receive a positive impact as a result of more stringent regulations.   
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
What I am suggesting to you today is that federal land management and the 
implementation of federal environmental laws in the West does not have to be a 
contentious, win-lose, zero-sum game.  This is not about sacrificing economic 
benefits for environmental health -- it is about working together as a region to 
have both.   
--John Kitzhaber, Governor of Oregon, Federal Land Management Speech 
Boise, Idaho, June 1, 2000.  
State environmental regulatory policy and state economic development policy are 
frequently viewed as policies with objectives that are in conflict with one another.  Many 
believe that in order to ensure a high level of environmental quality, sacrifices must be 
made in the area of economic growth.  In order in have a safe, clean environment, 
industrial development must be kept to a minimum.  By the same token, there are those 
who believe that to grow a state economy, policymakers must be willing to lower 
regulatory burdens in order to entice industry to remain or move into a state.  These 
individuals hold the view that some level of environmental degradation is acceptable in 
order to attract industries that have the potential to affect a state economy in a positive 
manner.  Policy development is thus viewed as a competition between economic and 
environmental goals.  But the question remains as to whether these are in fact competing 
policies.  Must the environment be sacrificed in order to garner strong economic growth?  
Do states that choose to enact strict environmental regulations pay a price in terms of 
economic development?  Do states that trade lax environmental policies for economic 
development reap the rewards of strong economic performance?  Broadly speaking, is 
there a tradeoff between economic development and environmental quality?  I seek to 
answer these questions in this dissertation.  
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State officials, along with those seeking state offices, frequently list economic 
growth as their top priority.  Elected officials often cite successful economic development 
programs as reasons they deserve reelection.  Candidates seeking state offices often run 
on a pro-growth, pro-business platform.  Finding ways to enhance economic development 
through income and job growth are tasks toward which officials purport to work 
endlessly.  Indeed, various organizations and think tanks provide enumerable resources 
for state leaders in their efforts to improve the economic growth of their home states (e.g., 
Council of State Governments, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Corporation for 
Enterprise Development).  Tax incentives for businesses, better public schools, low crime 
rates, and healthy environmental conditions are just a few of the suggestions often 
proposed to improve a state’s economic growth potential.  Great attention is centered on 
efforts to develop effective methods for improving state economic growth and 
development.  
However, questions remain as to whether these pursuits have any merit.  Many 
state officials offer businesses lucrative financial incentives to consider locating within 
their borders.  These incentives can take on many forms, including tax breaks, cash 
assistance, loan forgiveness, and low regulatory burdens.  In order to attract and/or retain 
business and industry, many states are willing to forgo immediate economic rewards in 
the hopes of attaining long-term economic growth and development.  It is unclear, 
though, whether states do indeed achieve the economic benefits that they hope for when 
adopting these policies. 
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Economic Development 
A quick perusal of any state or local newspaper makes it quite evident that, 
whether or not economic development policies actually work, state leaders believe it is 
important to their constituencies to pursue such policies.  News stories are often filled 
with promises of potential new businesses and the jobs they bring with them.  Leaders 
must be viewed as working aggressively to improve state economic conditions.  To be 
considered effective, state officials work to bring jobs and, thus, economic prosperity to 
their states.  State websites generally have direct links on their homepages listing 
information on how to start, locate, or expand a business within their borders.  Many 
states follow the examples of California and Alabama and list the economic incentives 
readily available to businesses relocating or expanding within their borders.  Indeed the 
state of New York proudly has a “NY Loves Business” link on which it declares itself a 
“pro-business, pro-growth state” in order to attract businesses.  Oregon asserts that it is a 
“small business state” ranking top in the nation in electronic commerce.  Even a 
seemingly rural state, such as Wyoming declares itself “Open for Business” on its 
business resources webpage.  The campaign to lure new businesses and encourage 
expansion by existing businesses is constant for state governmental officials.  Economic 
development is considered critical if a given elected official is to be viewed as a 
successful leader. 
“The objective of state economic development policy is to promote investment in 
a particular location” (Saiz and Clarke, 1999, p. 475).  State officials seek to convince 
business leaders that their particular state offers the best climate within which to conduct 
business.  States are under increased pressure to compete with each other for these 
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businesses (Brierly and Costello, 1999).  Saiz and Clarke point out that state leaders have 
very limited control of the movement of the objects of production through their borders.  
Officials cannot mandate that businesses locate within their states.  They do not have the 
ability to direct the location decisions of businesses.  Thus, state policymakers try to 
entice investment through the offer of incentives for businesses.   
Saiz and Clarke (1999) identify three types of economic development strategies 
employed by the states: strategies for infrastructure, locational incentives, and 
entrepreneurial strategies.  Strategies for infrastructure focus state attention and resources 
on the physical infrastructure of a state, such as roads and highways (p.481).  
Entrepreneurial strategies focus on developing opportunities for growth and innovation 
within a state, such as providing seed money for business formation or research (p.491).  
Locational incentives focus on lowering the operating costs either for businesses newly 
locating to a state or for existing businesses considering expansion.  It is the locational 
incentive type of economic development strategy that is the focus of this study. 
Examples of states offering locational incentives or engaging in “smokestack 
chasing” are plentiful (Saiz and Clarke, 1999; Mahtesian, 1994; Mahtesian, 1996; 
Mahtesian, 1998).  State leaders try to convince businesses that they will reap more 
economic rewards by locating within their particular states.  In 1993 the governor of 
Illinois offered incentives to convince two companies to remain in the state.  Tootsie Roll 
industries was offered $20,000,000 in loans, $1,400,000 in tax exemptions, and $200,000 
for job training.  Nabisco was extended $30,000,000 in tax incentives and $700,000 for 
job training.  North Dakota held a special legislative session in 1994 for the sole purpose 
of changing tax laws in order to be able to offer tax incentives to lure a corn processing 
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plant to the state.  Over a six year period, New York offered $176,000,000 worth of tax 
breaks and concessions to NBS, CBS, and ABC television networks to prevent them from 
leaving for another state (Mahtesian, 1994).  Some Southern states have offered 
enormous incentives to lure automobile manufacturers to their areas.  In the 1980s 
Tennessee offered incentives to Nissan amounting to $11,000 per job created and offered 
Saturn incentives worth $26,000 per job created.  In 1985 Kentucky leaders convinced 
Toyota to locate a plant in their state with $150,000,000 worth of incentives.  A 
$300,000,000 incentive package won the state of Alabama a new Mercedes-Benz plant 
(Mahtesian, 1994).  In the past decade, much news has been made of the incentives 
offered to sports franchises to locate (or remain) within a state.  Maryland built a new 
stadium to successfully lure a football team from Ohio, Missouri received a football 
franchise after building a new $300,000,000 stadium, and many other states are willing to 
offer new facilities, free rents, and other incentives to secure their own teams (Mahtesian, 
1998).  In the 1980s states and localities spent $750,000,000 to lure sports teams to their 
areas, by the mid-1990s the amount dedicated to similar efforts reached $8,000,000,000 
(Saiz and Clarke, 1999).  It is clear that states are willing to invest significant amounts of 
money to entice businesses to move to or stay within their jurisdictions.  Economic 
development policies designed to lower the costs of business operations or directly 
provide aid to such operations are routinely employed by state leaders. 
However, it is not always guaranteed that such economic development policies 
will translate into economic growth within a state.  States that engage in “bidding wars” 
for businesses or sports franchises cannot be certain that winning the “bidding war” will 
win them economic growth.  Pennsylvania provided $71,000,000 worth of incentives to 
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Volkswagen to open a new plant in the state in 1978.  Within ten years, the plant closed 
down.  In the early 1990s Minnesota provided Northwest Airlines with a $270,000,000 
loan; however, the airline postponed the planned expansion.  Similarly, General Motors 
shut down a plant in Michigan even though it was under an agreement to remain open in 
order to receive tax breaks from the state and local governments (Mahtesian, 1994).  
Hence, while state leaders may be eager to provide inducements to retain existing or 
attract new businesses, there is no assurance that an economic benefit will be gained as a 
result.   
The Role of States in Environmental Regulation 
In this research I investigate whether a particular locational incentive used to 
attract businesses actually results in state economic growth.  Governmental regulation of 
business and industry affects the operational decisions that business leaders make.  Just as 
state leaders believe that offering tax breaks and other financial incentives will attract 
businesses to their states, leaders believe that environmental regulations effect the site 
location decisions of firms (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins, 1995).  Because of the 
intense economic development competition between states, officials may choose to lower 
regulatory burdens in order to be more competitive in attracting business and industry.  
Since a business can choose the state to which it will locate, it can choose which state 
will regulate its interests (Williams, 1999).  By lowering environmental regulatory 
standards, state officials can offer businesses reduced operating costs.  Lower standards 
can allow businesses to spend less money on pollution control measures, and thus, lower 
their operating costs.  A decrease in operating costs allows businesses to make more 
profits.  Consequently, states that adopt less stringent environmental regulations increase 
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the earning potential of businesses and may be more attractive to businesses than states 
with more stringent environmental standards.  Moreover, firms currently located in the 
state may be less prone to being lured to move to another state. 
Broad environmental regulation began with the federal government in the late 
1960s and early 1970s: the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments in 1972, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 
1976, and the Clean Air Act Amendments and the Clean Water Act Amendments in 1977 
(Bartik, 1988; McConnell and Schwab, 1990; Ringquist, 1993).  Until these major pieces 
of legislation were passed, the states exercised dominance in environmental 
policymaking, and there was much variation among the states.  Indeed, this variation 
caused some severe environmental problems, which prompted interests groups to push 
for federal involvement in environmental regulation (Williams, 1999).  Further, federal 
policymakers were concerned about states using environmental regulation as a weapon in 
their “bidding wars” with one another for businesses to locate within their borders.  A 
significant reason for the passage of this federal legislation in the 1960s and 1970s was to 
eliminate state variation and have the same rules for all to follow.  For instance, 
according to one House report: 
“The promulgation of Federal emission standards for new sources . . . will 
preclude efforts on the part of States to compete with each other in trying to 
attract new plants and facilities without assuming adequate control of large scale 
emissions therefrom.”  
(H. Report No. 91-1146 in Legislative History of the Clean Air Act [1979], Taken 
from Bartik, 1998, p. 24). 
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Many federal regulations were designed to prevent states from using environmental 
regulatory factors as a tool in their endless competition to secure economic growth. 
However, during the 1980s and the devolution movement of Ronald Reagan, 
states began to exert more control over their own environmental policies and regulations.  
Under our federal system of government, much power was restored to the states to 
manage environmental activities within their borders.  Supporters of devolution policies 
maintain the appropriateness of this movement since states and localities are most 
knowledgeable about environmental conditions in their areas and best able to respond to 
changing circumstances.  Detractors argue that states frequently do not possess the 
financial capabilities to address significant environmental problems in an adequate 
manner (Sabat, 2004).  It may also be true that some states do not find an economic 
advantage in certain environmental policies.  Increased authority over environmental 
policy allows these states some flexibility in their environmental programs.  While states 
cannot establish regulatory requirements below those set by the EPA, there is much room 
for variation above the EPA “baseline.”  Many states choose to go further with their 
regulatory burdens.  These states enact environmental policies more stringent than the 
EPA.  Other states choose to keep their regulations at the minimum level required by the 
EPA.  They maintain the federal requirements, but make no effort to enact environmental 
policies that are more restrictive than those of the federal government (Sabatier, 1973).  
Further, states can use procedural rules to help “loosen” environmental regulations.  
According to Gray and Shadbegian, (1998) “state regulators have substantial discretion 
when making plant level decisions, such as where to direct enforcement activity and how 
strict (or slow) to make the permit application (p. 238)”  Thus, states can maintain federal 
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requirements but act on them in a manner designed to give industry more leeway in 
fulfilling their environmental obligations. 
Some observers contend that this environmental regulatory competition among 
states is waning.  State officials have come to develop a cooperative view of 
environmental and economic goals, rather than a conflicting view (Fiorina, 2001; 
Graham, 1998).  State and industrial leaders have speculated about the economic benefits 
of preventing pollution on the front-end rather than controlling it later in the game.  
While it is certainly true that some states consider a “green” strategy as part of their 
overall incentive package to attract new industry, it is not clear that all states have 
embraced this philosophy.  The conflicts of “jobs vs. environment” and “growth vs. 
regulation” are arguments that are still waged.  Many state leaders believe that the costs 
of environmental regulation weigh into location decisions made by business and industry.  
This is especially true for states that have economies that are highly dependent upon 
polluting industries (Williams, 1999).  Leaders in these states believe that lower 
environmental standards will assist the industries that are so vital to their economies.  
Thus, they provide locational incentives in the form of lower regulatory costs to convince 
existing industries to remain within their borders and to attract new industries to locate to 
their jurisdictions.  
Organization of Research 
The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain whether state officials can effect 
state economic growth through environmental regulatory policymaking.  Different states 
have taken various approaches to secure “better” economic performance.  A controversial 
incentive in many states is that of environmental regulations.  Some states choose to have 
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strict regulations in order to ensure higher environmental quality; this is expected to make 
the state an attractive place to live and, hence, attract new businesses, though the strict 
regulations that create an attractive place to live usually impose some costs on businesses.  
Other states try a different approach.  They offer looser environmental regulations in an 
attempt to provide incentives for businesses to relocate within their borders or to remain 
in their state.  Of course, this approach reduces the cost of regulation but likely results in 
the very lower levels of environmental quality that some believe will draw new 
businesses to the state. 
In this project, I attempt to identify the effects of environmental regulations upon 
the economic performance of the states.  Do states that adopt more relaxed environmental 
regulations as an incentive to lure and keep businesses actually succeed in stimulating 
economic performance?  In order to answer this question, I explore the linkage between 
environmental policy and state economic performance.  The dependent variables are 
various indicators of state economic performance, including economic growth and 
unemployment.  The primary independent variable of interest is environmental 
regulation.  A variety of control variables are included in the analysis.  These control 
variables include state business incentive policies, national economic conditions, state 
fiscal conditions, state structural characteristics, and state demographic characteristics.  I 
utilize state data from 1977 to 2003 to determine if state economic performance is a 
function of environmental regulation. 
I review existing research and develop a model to estimate the effects of state 
environmental policy on state economic performance.  Chapter 2 consists of the review of 
research surrounding the topics of state economic growth and development and state 
 11
environmental policy.  I begin with an examination of the literature surrounding the 
determinants of state economic growth and the effects of state economic development 
policies upon state economic growth.  I then review the literature surrounding the 
determinants of state environmental policy and the effects of environmental policy upon 
state environmental conditions.  I conclude the chapter with an examination of the 
literature of the effects of environmental quality and policy upon productivity, site 
location decisions, job growth, and economic growth.  Chapter 3 provides a description 
of the theory driving this research.  I illustrate the reasoning that may lead policymakers 
to believe that they have to choose between economic growth or environmental quality.  
In Chapter 4 I address problems associated with available state environmental policy data 
and provide a description of the data to be utilized in testing my model of state economic 
performance.  Because of the complexities surrounding the measurement of 
environmental policy across states over time, various researchers have utilized different 
tools as a measure of environmental policy.  I examine these variables and determine 
which tool best captures the variable I seek to isolate in this research.  Chapter 5 
describes the research design used.  I describe all dependent and independent variables in 
detail.  Further, I present the full model used in the analysis.  In Chapter 6 I present the 
results of my empirical analysis.  I present the full findings of the analysis, providing a 
detailed examination of each of the models estimated.  Finally, in the concluding Chapter 
7 I summarize the findings of this research.  I attempt to answer the key question driving 
this research – does the level of environmental stringency adopted by the states have an 
effect upon their economic growth? 
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In general, the studies that attempt to analyze directly the effects of 
environmental regulations on trade and competitiveness are limited in 
number.  If one casts a wide enough net, however, by defining 
competitiveness rather broadly and by searching for indirect as well as direct 
evidence, it is possible to identify more than one hundred studies potentially 
capable of shedding some light on the relationship.  It is nearly the case, 
however, that no two of these studies ask the same questions or even examine 
the same problem.  (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins, 1995, p. 135) 
 
Political scientists have devoted much attention to the issues surrounding state 
economic growth and development policies.  Literature on the subject ranges from 
general explorations of determinants of state growth to the study of how states can 
deliberately affect their economic development to examinations of the effect of specific 
policies/regulations upon economic development.  I review this body of research in turn 
beginning with state economic growth and moving on to economic development.  I then 
shift the review to the topic of particular concern to this research – i.e., environmental 
policy and economic performance.  I first consider the literature discussing determinants 
of state environmental policy and then proceed to review analyses of the effect of 
environmental regulation upon productivity and state economic growth.   
State Economic Growth and Development Policies 
 Researchers have expended much effort examining issues surrounding state 
economic growth and economic development policies.  However, research on the 
determinants of state economic growth does not provide a definitive answer as to what 
factors are most critical in influencing the growth of state economies.  Further, research 
on the effect of state economic development policies does not clearly indicate whether or 
not states can influence their economies by pursuing specific development policies.  The 
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findings presented by various political scientists differ according to the variables used to 
examine the particular questions examined. 
Economic Growth 
A critical question in the area of state economic growth is exactly what factors 
exert the greatest influence upon state economies.  Researchers try to determine whether 
states even have the ability to effect their economic growth or whether factors outside the 
control of state policymakers are more important determinants of state growth.  
Moreover, different variables are used by researchers to measure state economic growth.  
State variables used include change in per capita income, change in value added by 
manufacturing, change in levels of nonagricultural employment, change in living 
conditions, change in total personal income, real total personal income, capital levels, 
labor resources, and technological resources.  The conclusions reached by scholars differ 
according to the variables used in their analyses. 
Brace (1991) examines influences upon state economic growth.  Working on the 
theory that state ability to influence economic conditions may fluctuate over different 
time periods examined, he seeks to determine whether states can have an impact on their 
own economic development or whether national economic conditions dominate state 
economies.  Using change in per capita income as the measure of economic growth, 
Brace (1991) finds that states’ abilities to affect their economic growth have changed 
over time.  From 1968 to 1979, states exhibit no effect on their economies with the 
development policies pursued.  However, Brace finds that this changes from 1980 to 
1985.  Changes in pressure placed upon the national economy from international markets 
have enabled states to exert more influence upon their economies.  This is particularly 
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true in states possessing the institutional characteristics of strong gubernatorial capacity 
and more professional legislatures.  State economic development and taxation policies do 
have an effect upon per capita income.  Further, states with more professional legislatures 
and more powerful governors were able to achieve greater effects.  Brace cautions, 
though, that during the 1980s the national economy was strained and this finding may not 
hold for long-term economic growth.  He notes that “while the role of states in shaping 
their economic growth is on the rise, there may be many reasons to question the 
sufficiency of state activity for sustaining long-term economic growth” (p.312).    
Brace (1993) confirms these findings in a further development of his model.  In 
addition to change in per capita income, Brace examines whether states can have an 
effect upon levels of nonagricultural employment and change in value added by 
manufacturing.  Again Brace finds that the ability of states to influence these factors of 
economic growth was altered during different time periods examined.  Changes in value 
added by manufacturing exhibit a similar pattern to changes in per capita income.  
National economic conditions display more of an influence than do state economic 
development efforts until the 1980s.  At this point states efforts begin to exert an 
influence upon economic growth.  Employment trends are a bit different, however.  Brace 
finds that state factors demonstrate more of an effect upon nonagricultural employment 
than do national conditions.  While Brace does note the dominant role of the states in 
influencing employment and acknowledges the growing role of the state in influencing 
economic growth during the 1980s, he holds that overall national conditions exert greater 
influence over state economic growth than do state efforts. 
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In his exploration of the volatility of state economies, Crain (2003) questions the 
theoretical argument that national economic conditions dominate state economies.  Crain 
examines national and state economic trends in the last half of the twentieth century.  He 
notes that while overall U.S. income growth declined from 3.8% in the 1940s to a rate of 
1.3% in the 1990s, there was not a similar pattern of slowdown in income growth in the 
states.  Crain holds that over half of state economies did not follow the national trend, 
“the economies of 28 American states departed from the “national” pattern and showed 
no significant slowdown in the last half of the twentieth century” (p. 9).  Indeed in 
examining different aspects of state economies (e.g., growth, living standards, volatility), 
Crain finds that there is much variation among the states’ economic performance.  He 
demonstrates that the individual states experienced very different economic trends from 
one other and from the nation throughout the twentieth century, thus, calling into 
question the idea that national economic conditions drive state economic growth.   
Conversely, Hendrick and Garand (1991) find that national economic conditions 
are becoming increasingly important to state economic growth.  They examine state 
economic data from 1945 to 1984.  The variables used to capture state economic growth 
are yearly changes in total personal income, real (deflated) total personal income, and per 
capita income.  By examining yearly means and standard deviations of state economic 
growth, they determine that immediately after World War II, deviations from the mean 
were high, but this has been decreasing since the 1960s.  This increased centering around 
the mean leads the authors to hypothesize that state economies are becoming more 
influenced by forces outside their control.  Indeed, when the authors then examine 
variation in growth, they find that, while conditions within states still account for much of 
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the variation, this trend has been steadily declining since the 1960s, as well.  Hence, 
Hendrick and Garand determine that national factors are becoming increasingly important 
to state economic growth and should be considered in future research. 
The findings of Brierly and Costello (1999) appear to support the theory that state 
economic growth is due largely to factors outside the control of state governments.  The 
authors examine the influence of state economic conditions upon gross state product from 
1963 to 1991.  They determine that state level capital (measured as the value of bank 
assets), state labor resources (measured as the total number of civilian employees), and 
technological resources (determined through use of an error correction mechanism) are 
critical elements for state economic growth and development.  This finding is supported 
by the research of Brierly and Feiock (1993) who examine the effects of state economic 
conditions and interest group organization upon state economic growth.  This study notes 
the significance of capital and labor as determinants of economic growth, “economic 
resources, rather than organization, appear to matter more in determining income growth 
rates” (p. 667).  Brierly and Costello (1999) posit that states actually have very little 
control over levels of state capital, labor, and technology.  The consolidation of the 
banking industry to the detriment of local banks leads to forces outside of the states 
determining the capital flow into the states.  The type of significant change in a state 
labor market that could effect economic growth is not likely to occur through state efforts 
alone.  This requires long-term commitments from political leaders that are unlikely to 
pay off within their tenures, and thus, are unlikely to occur.  Technological changes are 
not confined within state borders.  Innovations occur throughout the economy and are not 
likely to produce immediate economic improvement in particular states.  Thus, the 
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authors determine that while the state economic conditions of state level capital, labor, 
and technological resources are crucial components to state economic growth, they argue 
that these are exogenous variables outside the control of state policymakers. 
The literature on the dominant influences upon state economic growth does not 
provide clear answers as to which factors are most important for state economic growth.  
Much of the literature does point to outside forces, such as national economic conditions, 
as playing a significant role in state economic growth.  When change in specific state 
economic indicators and state level resources are used to measure state economic growth, 
variables outside of state control appear to exert greater influence over state economic 
growth than do state level variables.  However, these results are not conclusive.  When 
analysis focuses upon rates of growth within the states over time, variability does exist.  
Even during times when all states are subject to the same national economic conditions, 
their individual rates of growth differ.  This calls into question the notion that state 
factors are less important in determining state economic growth than are national factors.  
Further explanation is necessary to clarify the factors that drive state economic growth.  
Economic Development Policy 
Before specifically addressing the topic of economic growth and environmental 
policies, I conduct a more general examination of the literature on economic 
development.  The effectiveness of economic development policy is well-worn ground 
for political economy scholars. Researchers have examined issues surrounding the effect 
of local economic development policies, state locational incentive policies, state and local 
tax policies, state spending policies, and redistributional policies.  They seek to 
understand whether states and localities can have an impact upon their economic growth 
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and their overall economic “health” through the use of specific economic development 
policies.  Tools used to measure economic growth in the various analyses include 
unemployment rates, change in business indicators (e.g., number of firms), and changes 
in personal and per capita income.  These measures have allowed researchers to isolate 
the effects of state and local economic development policies. 
Feiock (1991) examines the effect of economic development policies upon local 
economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s.  He surveys city officials in 212 U.S. cities 
to determine the use of various economic development policies (e.g., loan guarantees, tax 
abatements, industrial development bonds).  His measures of economic performance 
focus on the manufacturing sector and include change in capital investment, change in the 
number of firms, and change in employment.  He finds that local policies do have an 
effect upon capital investment, some effect upon the number of firms, but no apparent 
effect upon employment.  However, Feiock does not include state policies in his analysis 
and as a result may be missing a large piece of the economic development puzzle by not 
including state factors such as regulatory policy. 
Ambrosius (1989), on the other hand, focuses specifically on state policies by 
conducting a time-series analysis of eight state economic development/locational 
incentive policies.  She examines the effect of state revenue bond financing, state funds 
for city/county development-related public works, accelerated depreciation of industrial 
equipment, tax breaks on equipment or machinery, tax breaks on land or capital 
improvements, state incentives for building in a high unemployment area, state supported 
training of the chronically unemployed, and state incentives to industry to train the 
chronically unemployed upon state economic health from 1969 to1985 (p. 285).  She uses 
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two measures of economic health: per capita manufacturing value added and percentage 
unemployed.  National measures of per capita manufacturing and unemployment are used 
as control variables.  Ambrosius finds that none of the state economic development 
policies have a statistically significant effect upon state economic health.  She finds no 
support for the use of these measures to aid a state’s economic health.  Consistent with 
the findings of Brace (1991) and Hendrick and Garand (1991), Ambrosius finds that the 
national economic control variables are significantly related to her measures of state 
economic health. 
Dye (1980) examines a different set of state policies.  He measures economic 
performance by examining growth in personal income, growth in employment, and 
growth in value added by manufacturing from 1972 to 1976.  Dye focuses on three types 
of policies that he hypothesizes might effect state economic growth: taxes, spending 
(specifically, spending on education, highways, welfare and health and hospitals), and 
redistributional programs.  Controlling for other state characteristics, Dye does not find 
that tax policies or redistributional policies have an effect upon any of his measures of 
economic growth.  Only one of the spending policies examined exhibits an independent 
effect upon each of the measures of economic growth.  State highway expenditures 
provide the strongest relationship with state economic growth.  He speculates that 
infrastructure investment is the most effective policy that states can pursue in their efforts 
to improve economic growth.   
Jones (1990) also examines how state spending affects economic growth.  The 
dependent variables he uses to measure state economic growth from 1964 to 1984 are 
changes in employment, net business establishments created or lost, changes in personal 
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income, and changes in per capita income.  The spending policies examined are 
education, highways, welfare, police/fire services, and health/hospitals.  He finds that 
spending on welfare and health/hospitals is negatively related to economic growth.  
Spending on education and highways produces mixed results during different time 
periods studied, with a significantly positive relationship between these variables and 
economic growth in evidence during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Surprisingly, 
spending on police/fire services is positively related to growth.  Jones speculates that the 
support he finds for the effects of police/fire services spending might be because these are 
generally locally-borne costs and these spending measures may be acting as a surrogate 
for other spending measures such as water, sewerage, etc.  If this is the case, this study 
may lend support to Dye’s infrastructure investment theory.   
Helms (1985) takes a different approach in his study of economic growth.  He is 
specifically interested in the effects of state and local tax policies on growth.  Noting, 
though, that tax policies should not be “studied in isolation,” he also examines state 
expenditures and characteristics of the labor force.  He examines data from 1970 to 1979, 
with state personal income as the measure of economic growth.  Consistent with research 
focusing on the effect of tax policies upon economic growth at the national level (King 
and Rebelo, 1990; Jorgenson and Yun, 1990), Helms finds that state tax policies do have 
an effect upon economic growth.  He finds that tax increases decrease economic growth.  
He takes the analysis further, however, by examining how tax money collected is spent 
by state governments.  Like Jones (1990), Helms determines that tax measures designed 
to increase spending on redistributional programs are negatively related to growth.  On 
the other hand, tax measures designed to increase spending on programs such as 
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highways and education are positively related to growth.  Helms speculates that the 
negative effects of higher taxes may be lessened if the taxes are used to fund (non-
redistributional) programs that will make a state a more attractive site for business 
(re)location.  He posits that such non-redistributional spending has a positive, 
“stimulative effect” upon a state’s economy. 
This body of research produces interesting results.  Those studies that use some 
measure of change in an economic indicator as the dependent variable are more likely to 
find that economic development policies can have an impact upon economic growth.  
Studies that do find support for the effectiveness of economic development policies seem 
to indicate that infrastructure development policies are the types of policies which can 
produce a positive affect on state economic growth.  State policymakers who wish to 
increase state economic growth are better served by implementing infrastructure 
development policies rather than redistributional policies.  Thus, this research suggests 
that the type of dependent variable used is critical to understanding the impact of 
economic development policies.  If the effect of economic development policies is to be 
understood, then dependent variables used to study these effects should be centered on 
understanding the change that these policies can produce.  Further, not all economic 
development policies are equal.  Some are more effective than others at producing the 
economic benefits pursued by state policymakers. 
State Environmental Policy/Regulation 
 I am interested primarily in studying the effects that state environmental 
regulatory policy have on state economic growth.  Researchers engage in various studies 
of environmental policymaking.  States employ different levels of environmental 
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policymaking and researchers seek to understand the causes of these differences among 
the states.  One area of research focuses on the reasons that states adopt specific 
environmental policies and the extent to which the states engage in environmental 
policymaking.  Another area of research centers on the effect that environmental 
regulation has on business productivity.  Still, other researchers specifically examine the 
economic effects of environmental regulations.  In this section I examine these 
explorations surrounding the determinants of state environmental policy, the effects of 
environmental policy upon business activity, and the effects of environmental policy 
upon the economy. 
Environmental Policy 
 Environmental policymaking varies considerably among the states.  Efforts are 
undertaken to understand what factors influence state policymakers in determining which 
policies are enacted.  Researchers explore broad environmental policies, specific 
pollutant policies, and enforcement policies within the states.  Various factors are 
examined to ascertain which have the greatest influence upon policymakers when 
choosing to adopt environmental policies.  These factors include environmental 
conditions, political influences, economic resources, ideology, federal activity, regional 
activity, and institutional characteristics.  Thus, a broad range of variables are 
investigated to understand the extent to which states engage in environmental 
policymaking.     
Hays, Esler, and Hays (1996) examine state influences upon the state level of 
commitment to environmental policies.  They review six possible influences upon state 
environmental policy: environmental conditions, economic resources, political pressure, 
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elite ideology, institutional characteristics, and federal activity.  They use the Green 
Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991) to measure state environmental commitment.  Hays et al. 
determine that the strongest influences upon state environmental commitment are 
political pressure (measured as state public opinion liberalism, state membership in 
environmental groups, and percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector), elite 
ideology, and legislative professionalism.  Of particular interest to the purpose of this 
research is the effect of political pressure.  State membership in environmental groups 
and percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector both show a positive 
relationship to environmental policy.  Hays et al. hypothesize that large businesses may 
have a competitive reason for supporting stricter environmental policies; stricter 
regulations may add to operational costs and keep smaller firms from entering the market.  
Thus, more stringent environmental regulations may add to the competitive advantage of 
large firms. 
 Another area of interest for researchers is that of the determinants of hazardous 
waste policy in the states (Lester, Franke, Bowman, and Kramer, 1983; Daley and 
Garand, 2002).  Lester et al. (1983) examine factors such as technological pressure 
(problem severity), state economic resources, political demands, bureaucratic structure, 
and legislative professionalism.  Using a 1979 survey of state toxic substances programs 
as a measure of state hazardous waste policy, the authors find that technological pressure, 
administrative authority, bureaucratic structure, and legislative professionalism are the 
strongest determinants of state hazardous waste policies.  States respond to technical 
pressure, i.e., problem severity.  These variables appear to interact with one another, 
though.  In states where the hazardous waste levels are high, the legislature takes the 
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initiative in hazardous waste policymaking.  In low hazardous waste states, the 
bureaucracy takes the initiative in policymaking.  Similarly, Daley and Garand (2002) 
investigate the effects of problem severity and economic resources on state hazardous 
waste policy.  They also test the effects of political influences, interest group influence, 
and regional influences upon hazardous waste policy.  Daley and Garand find that 
problem severity, prior pro-environmental policy activity of a state, economic resources, 
and regional influences have an effect upon state hazardous waste policy. 
 The effect of regional influences upon state environmental policy is further 
explored by researchers (Pashigian, 1985; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002).  In his 
examination of the policy of prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) – a policy that 
mandates that areas that exceed the minimum air quality standards cannot allow 
significant deterioration of their air quality – Pashigian (1985) finds that regions’ support 
of the policy reflect competitive self-interests.  Regions that have “dirtier” air are much 
more supportive of the PSD, thereby, ensuring that other “cleaner” regions can not 
engage in the economic development policies that cause their “dirtier” air.  Thus, the 
“clean” regions are not able to entice polluting industries to move from the “dirty” 
regions to the “clean” ones.  Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) examine whether states 
respond to the environmental policies of their neighbors – whether evidence can be found 
for a “race to the bottom” (or top) among neighboring states.  They determine that the 
neighbor effect moves in one direction – up.  States are moved to adopt more stringent 
regulations if their neighbors enacted such policies, frequently surpassing the stringency 
of their neighbors.  However, states do not follow their neighbors in adopting less 
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stringent environmental regulations.  An environmental “race to the bottom” does not 
occur among less stringent states.    
 List and Gerking (2000) question whether the stringency of states’ environmental 
regulations declined during the Reagan years when much authority over environmental 
regulation was passed back to the states.  Again, evidence does not support a “race to the 
bottom.”  List and Gerking do not find that states relaxed their environmental standards 
when given greater control over environmental regulations.  They note that “indicators of 
environmental quality on the state level either continued to improve or at least did not 
deteriorate” (p.454).  Additionally they find weak support for a positive relationship 
between economic growth and environmental regulation.  As income increases, there is 
an increase in environmental regulatory stringency.  The authors suggest that as income 
increases, people are more willing to pay the costs associated with pollution abatement 
policies.  However, there may something else at work here.  It is possible that the 
variables are endogenous.  Rather than income increases producing a willingness among 
people to pay for pollution costs, it may be that strong environmental regulations produce 
a business climate conducive to economic growth.  Thus, the causal flow may not be in 
the direction presumed by the authors. 
Crotty (1987) examines the issue of state primacy (authorization) under the Clean 
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.  The EPA allows states to apply for primacy in 
environmental enforcement.  Once approved, the state becomes the primary enforcement 
agency regulating national (and state) environmental standards.  Crotty outlines reasons 
why the federal government encourages state assumption of primacy: the federal 
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government wants the states to be the primary enforcement entity, the federal government 
wants to reduce the amount of money provided to states for pollution control, and the 
federal government hopes that states will enact even stricter environmental standards than 
those delineated by the EPA.  Crotty determines that states quickly began to assume 
primacy once the option was made available by the EPA.  Crotty further investigates the 
reasons state officials decide to assume primacy for the enforcement of environmental 
regulations within their states, finding that states with past histories of strong 
environmental regulation are quickest to apply for primacy.  One aberrant finding, 
though, occurs in Southern states, which seek primacy but do not have strong histories of 
environmental protection.  This is also consistent with the findings of Lester, et al. (1983) 
that Southern states are active in hazardous waste policy.  Crotty (1987: 65) hypothesizes 
that Southern states’ assumption of primacy has less to do with environmental protection 
and more to do with an interest in controlling the procedures of environmental regulation 
in an attempt to offer advantages to businesses within their states or entice new 
businesses to locate within their borders. 
 Sigman (2005) also examines primacy or authorization within the states.  Her 
study focuses on whether states that are authorized under the Clean Water Act engage in 
free riding behavior to the detriment of neighbors who share a common water stream.  
Sigman examines whether states that are downstream of an authorized state experience 
lower water quality than the authorized upstream state, suggesting that an authorized state 
is not vigilant in its enforcement/monitoring responsibilities.  She finds that “the 
coefficient on being downstream from an authorized state is negative and statistically 
significant, which is consistent with free riding [and] suggests a 4% reduction in the 
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water quality index” (p. 92).  Thus, the downstream state bears the costs of environmental 
damage and cleanup that should have been managed by the authorized, upstream state.  
Hence, Sigman determines that authorization does allow free riding to occur. 
 Helland (1998) studies influences upon enforcement efforts in thirty states in 
1990.  Enacting a policy is only part of the environmental puzzle; implementation of 
enforcement is a necessary part of ensuring environmental compliance.  A state may 
enact strict policies, but if these policies are not enforced, there is no need for industry to 
abide by pollution abatement requirements.  Using EPA data on state enforcement of the 
Clean Water Act of the pulp and paper industry, Helland determines that both budgetary 
and political factors influence enforcement efforts of the states.  States with smaller 
budgets conduct fewer inspections, but the inspections that are conducted are more 
comprehensive.  States that pay their environmental regulators larger salaries are likely to 
conduct fewer comprehensive inspections.  Local economic factors are taken into account 
when determining whether or not to conduct a rigorous inspection.  In economically 
depressed areas, if a plant is likely to shut down due to violations, a comprehensive 
inspection is less likely to occur (p. 244).  Overall, the enforcement decisions made by 
state regulatory agencies will take into account both budgetary and political-economic 
factors.  It is interesting to note that Helland finds that a plant that has recently undergone 
a comprehensive inspection has lower pollution levels than other plants that have not 
been recently inspected.  Related to this finding is that of Shimshack and Ward (2005).  
These authors determine that when a state regulatory agency imposes a fine on a firm for 
an environmental violation, both the fined plant and other plants under the authority of 
the agency will have reductions in violations.  Thus, firms react to the enforcement 
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decisions made by regulators, whether or not they are the firm directly affected by the 
enforcement action. 
 An examination of the determinants of state environmental policy indicates that a 
variety of factors influence state environmental policymaking.  Critical factors include 
political pressure, elite ideology, institutional capacity, environmental conditions (i.e., 
problem severity), regional influences, prior history of environmental policymaking, and 
economic resources.  State policymakers respond to both internal state pressures and 
external influences.  While internal pressures can result in policymakers going in either a 
more or less stringent direction in environmental policymaking, it appears that external 
regional pressures influence states to adopt more stringent environmental policies.  Also 
important to note is that states can only act when they have the ability to act.  Institutional 
capacity (e.g., legislative professionalism and bureaucratic authority) and economic 
resources are important determinants in state environmental policymakers.  Thus, state 
officials respond to a diverse set of factors when adopting environmental policy. 
Environmental Policy and Productivity 
More closely related to the issue of environmental regulation and the impact that 
state policies have on businesses are studies conducted on the effect that such regulations 
have on business productivity.  Researchers in this area examine the regulatory impact on 
specific industries.  They seek to uncover the effect that various environmental and 
workplace regulations have had on the industries examined.  This body of research 
focuses on whether businesses have experienced a decline in productivity and 
competitiveness as a result of regulations imposed by government. 
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Noting the decline in productivity in the U.S. from the mid-1960s and throughout 
the 1970s, researchers have sought to determine the effect of environmental regulations 
upon this decline.  Christainsen and Haveman (1981) conduct a time-series regression of 
the manufacturing sector from 1958 to 1977.  They determine that between 12% and 21% 
of the decline in productivity in the U.S. after 1973 was due to the introduction of stricter 
environmental regulations.  Gollop and Roberts (1983) examine the specific effect of 
regulations of sulfur dioxide emissions upon the electric power industry each year from 
1973 to 1979.  They determine that environmental regulations had a negative effect upon 
the productivity rate of the electric power industry.  They note that the initial effects of 
regulation result in larger negative effects on productivity, with the largest effect felt in 
1976 – the year EPA standards went into full effect – but negative effects are persistent 
even after the initial shock of the implementation of the more stringent regulations.  The 
authors find that “the annual average productivity growth for these firms would have 
been 44% higher had it not been for sulfur dioxide regulations” (p. 672).   
Similarly, Gray (1987) studies the effects of OSHA and EPA regulations on the 
manufacturing sector (450 different industries within the sector) from 1958 to 1978.  He 
estimates that 30% of the decline in productivity slowdown occurred as a result of 
increased regulations.  Indeed, the most highly regulated industries in the sector 
experienced the greatest slowdowns in productivity.  However, he does find that OSHA, 
rather than EPA, regulations have the greatest effect upon the slowdown in 
manufacturing productivity.  Gray and Shadbegian (1998) explore a different 
productivity question.  They examine the effect that a firm’s investment in pollution 
abatement technology has upon the firm’s investment in productive investment.  They 
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find a negative relationship between these types of investments by firms, “a dollar of 
pollution abatement investment reduces productive investment by $1.88 at that plant” (p. 
254).  Thus, adhering to more stringent environmental regulations may cause firms to 
invest less in improving production technologies. 
However, Barbera and McConnell (1986) have different findings when analyzing 
different sectors of the economy.  Using a factor demand analysis, they examine 
productivity in four sectors: paper, chemicals, stone, and primary metals.  The authors 
analyze the effect of environmental regulations upon these industries’ demand for capital.  
They find a greater impact of the regulations upon productivity slowdown from 1960 to 
1973 than from 1973 to 1980.  They suggest that sometime after the implementation of 
harsher regulations “the marginal effect of an additional dollar of abatement capital on 
productivity fell, either because of technological changes in abatement techniques or the 
gradual adjustment to pollution regulation” (p. 167-168).  Hence, Barbera and McConnell 
determine that since industries can adapt to regulations, for a productivity decline to 
result due to these environmental regulations the most heavily regulated industries must 
be faced with severe productivity changes.   
 Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins (1995) center their inquiry on the effect of 
environmental regulation on competitiveness and productivity of firms.  They review the 
costs associated with environmental compliance and conduct a review of the existing 
literature on the subject.  Jaffe et al. argue that little evidence has been produced to link 
industry slowdowns in competitiveness to increased environmental regulations.  They 
state that (1) stringency of regulations is hard to measure, (2) costs associated with 
compliance are generally small in comparison to total expenditures of firms, (3) evidence 
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has not shown that industries have migrated out of the country in large numbers to avoid 
regulation, and (4) when firms do locate out of the country they tend to build plants in 
line with U.S. standards.  Further, they also argue that regulations have actually increased 
the competitiveness of some firms.  The authors note that data in this area are poor and 
many researchers have failed to control for regulatory climate.  Hence, the efforts to find 
a link are constrained.  They conclude with the notion that the truth of the relationship 
may be somewhere in the middle of the two arguments.  Some competitiveness/ 
productivity may be lost as a result of environmental regulation, but some may be gained 
as well. 
 Other researchers examine the potential benefit of more stringent environmental 
regulations upon productivity.  Hart (2004) argues that strict regulations may lead firms 
to engage in new areas of production research designed to maximize profits.  He posits 
that when industries are forced to engage in cleaner production methods, industrial 
research efforts will focus toward techniques that will both benefit the environment and 
improve productivity, “hence measures penalizing dirty technologies may not only raise 
social utility, but also boost the growth rate of production” (p. 1097).  Porter and van der 
Linde (1995) contend that more stringent, “properly designed” regulations can lead to 
“innovation offsets” in industrial processes that improve productivity and lead to more 
cost effective methods of business operations.  They provide case studies to support their 
theory of a production benefit of strict environmental regulation, “[1] Ciba-Geigy’s . . . 
two changes in production process . . . boosted yield by 40 percent . . . annual cost 
savings of $740,000, [2] allowed 3M to reduce hazardous wastes by 10 tons per year at 
almost no cost, yielding an annual savings of more than $200,000, [3] Dow redesigned its 
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production process . . . change cost $250,000 . . . savings of $2.4 million per year” (pgs. 
102-103).  Thus, the authors make a case that environmental regulation can push 
industries toward innovations that will not only benefit the environment, but that also 
result in greater productivity and cost savings. 
 The literature examining the effects of environmental regulations upon business 
productivity produces mixed results.  Studies that focus on individual industries during 
the 1960s and 1970s (a period marked by increased federal regulation) find that 
regulations do costs businesses in terms of lost of productivity.  Increased regulations 
caused a decline in productivity.  However, studies that examine multiple industries after 
the initial increase in regulations in the 1960s and 1970s find a less severe impact of 
regulation on business productivity.  Indeed, some authors theorize that increased 
regulations actually force businesses to be more creative in research development and this 
may result in productivity increases for business and industry.  Research results in this 
area are dependent upon the number of industries included in the study and the time 
period examined.  
Economic Effects of Environmental Policy 
 Environmental policy can effect economic growth in a number of ways.  
Researchers attempt to identify the specific impacts that regulations have on business and 
industry and how these impacts affect the overall economy.  Regulations can have an 
effect on employment levels.  If businesses must assume greater costs as a result of 
increased regulations, they may lay off employees in order to offset these expenses.  
Regulations may also influence business decisions to either expand an existing facility or 
to locate in a new area.  Costs associated with regulations may be critical in making such 
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business choices.  These employment and site location decisions will ultimately affect the 
local economies in which these businesses operate.  Economic growth or economic 
decline can result from businesses deciding to hire or fire employees and whether 
business decide to remain in or leave a locality.  Research examines effects upon 
employment, plant location decisions, and overall economic performance.   
Predictive Models of Economic Growth 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) directly examine the link between environmental 
policy and economic growth.  However, they take a unique approach.  They consider the 
environment as a public good with two potential uses: consumption or production input. 
The authors consider factors of production such as technology, preferences, income, 
savings, knowledge, and man-made production factors in developing their endogenous 
growth model.  Ultimately, they determine that (in the long run) if the environment is a 
consumption good, then economic growth will decline as regulations prevent its use.  
Conversely, if the environment is a production input, then economic growth will increase 
as regulations enhance the quality of this input. 
 Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) model U.S. economic growth both with 
environmental regulations and without them.  They take into account historical 
exogenous variables, and based on past performance, project their future value.  They 
assume inelastic capital.  They use as a base case the economy with pollution regulations 
and simulate an economy without these regulations.  By focusing on three costs 
associated with environmental regulation – operating costs associated with pollution 
abatement, costs of investments to meet environmental standards, and cost of emissions 
controls – they determine that U.S. economic growth would have been 0.034% points 
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higher from 1973 to 1985 without environmental regulations.  Further, GNP would have 
been 0.074% points higher.  Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, thus, conclude that environmental 
regulations “lowered the long-run capital stock, reduced long-term consumption . . . [and] 
reduced the rate of capital accumulation” (p. 338). 
Effects upon Employment Levels  
In contrast to these predictive models, Goodstein (1999) examines the effect of 
environmental regulation on job loss.  He finds that environmental regulation has not 
hindered employment, pointing out that in the 1990s, when spending for environmental 
clean-up/regulation was at its all time high, unemployment was at its lowest since the 
1960s.  He finds that lay-offs directly attributed to increased environmental regulations 
account for less than one tenth of one percent per year.  Further, he does not find support 
for mass relocation of plants into weak regulated areas, so-called “pollution havens.”  
Finally, while he does find some support for environmentally created jobs, he discounts 
this other side of the environment-jobs debate by pointing out that, while environmental 
regulation does not cause drastic unemployment, it does not cure it either.   
Wagner (2005) proposes a theory that under different sets of conditions 
environmental regulation will have differing effects upon the employment sector.  In a 
setting in which environmental control efforts do not add significant costs to firms, there 
is no financial incentive for firms to move toward abatement efforts.  Thus, jobs will be 
kept at the expense of the environment.  In a setting that does place significant regulatory 
costs upon polluting firms, an abatement industry will develop to assist in pollution 
control.  Jobs will be created in this new abatement industry.  Thus, jobs that may be lost 
in the polluting industry as a result of increased pollution abatement costs may be created 
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in the new abatement industry, “aggregate employment and environmental quality are 
complementary goals” (p. 154).  In Wagner’s view, employment and environment are not 
in conflict, but instead will find a balance within the regulatory path chosen by 
policymakers. 
Effect upon Site Location Decisions 
 Other research examines how business location decisions may be affected by 
environmental regulations. Bartik (1988) investigates location decisions of Fortune 500 
companies from 1972 to 1978.  State spending devoted to environmental efforts are used 
to measure environmental stringency.  Specifically, Bartik uses spending on air and water 
pollution control efforts divided by state manufacturing employment (p. 28).  Using these 
measures, he does not find a statistically significant relationship between environmental 
regulations and site location decisions of new firms.  Bartik hypothesizes that pollution 
control costs are only a small part of the total operating costs for businesses, therefore, 
these costs only account for a small portion of the location decision calculus.  Thus, 
evidence does not support the theory that environmental regulations will negatively effect 
business location decisions because business leaders do not consider these costs to be 
large enough to have a strong impact upon their decision. 
 McConnell and Schwab (1990) focus specifically on location decisions within the 
motor vehicle sector in their analysis of the effects of environmental regulations upon site 
selection.  The authors examine environmental regulations at the county level.  They use 
measures of environmental conditions and industry pollution abatement costs to 
determine stringency of environmental regulations.  They do not find evidence to support 
the theory that strict regulations deter plants from locating in an area.  Further, they find 
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weak support for firms choosing not to locate in an area with poor environmental 
conditions.  Levinson (1995) reviews studies examining international and domestic 
business location decisions.  His examination supports the finding of McConnell and 
Schwab.  He notes that “the literature as a whole presents fairly compelling evidence 
across a broad range of industries, time periods, and economic specifications, that 
regulations do not matter to site choice” (p. 23). 
 Conversely, List and Co (2000) do find a negative effect of state environmental 
regulations upon location decisions by foreign firms.  These authors use state spending on 
environmental programs, industry pollution abatement spending, and an index of state 
policies to measure the stringency of environmental regulations.  They examine site 
location decisions of foreign firms from 1986 to 1993.  They determine that a “one 
percentage increase or decrease in the independent variable changes the predicted 
probability of a foreign firm choosing the most affected, median affected, and least 
affected state” (p. 10).  Interestingly, they find this effect for both pollution intensive and 
non-pollution intensive firms.  Thus, at least with regards to foreign direct investment, 
state environmental policy does matter in the business location decisions of firms.  
Becker and Henderson (2000) find similar results in their examination of air quality 
regulations at the county level.  The authors focus on plant location decision in four 
industries: industrial organic chemicals, metal containers, plastics, and wood furniture.  
Using environmental conditions as a measure of environmental policy, the authors 
determine that industries in these sectors will move to “less polluted areas to avoid 
stricter regulations in more polluted areas” (p. 380).  More highly regulated areas have a 
 37
35% - 45% less probability of having new firms locate within their borders.  Hence, strict 
environmental regulation deters the entry of new businesses.  
Effect upon Economic Growth 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) explore the economic growth/environmental 
quality question from a different angle.  They investigate whether countries that 
experience higher levels of economic growth experience deterioration in environmental 
conditions from 1977 to 1990.  Using four measures of environmental conditions (i.e., 
urban air pollution, oxygen regime in river basins, fecal contamination of river basins, 
and heavy metal contamination of river basins), the authors do not find that countries 
with higher levels of economic growth suffer greater levels of environmental pollution.  
Rather, “as nations or regions experience greater prosperity, their citizens demand that 
more attention be paid to the noneconomic aspects of their living conditions” (p. 372). 
 Templet (1995) presents the question from the perspective of the effect of 
environmental conditions upon economic growth.  Rather than focusing on regulation in 
his examination of the environment-economy debate, Templet analyzes environmental 
risks and economic conditions.  He finds that states which possess greater 
environmentally risky conditions (e.g., chemical plants with high emissions) exhibit 
poorer economic conditions.  Templet argues that “an impacted or diminished 
environmental base . . . reduces the long-term economic welfare because it can contribute 
to less service to the economy . . . environmental abuse will also result in lowered public 
welfare” (p. 38).  Specifically, environmentally poor states have lower personal income, 
greater income disparity, greater poverty, greater unemployment, poorer economic 
“health scores,” lower retail sales growth, and greater numbers of business failures.  
 38
Hence, Templet does not find that states with lower environmental standards are gaining 
an economic benefit.  Rather, these less environmentally healthy states become less 
attractive to potential businesses and economic growth does not occur as a result of 
business investment. 
 Similar results are found by Goetz, Ready, and Stone (1996).  Using the Renew 
America policy index of 1987 to 1989 and the Green Index ranking of environmental 
quality, these authors examine the effect of environmental policies and conditions upon 
economic growth in U.S. states from 1982 to 1991.  They determine that better 
environmental conditions had a positive effect upon per capita personal income growth.  
They do not find a significant negative effect of environmental regulations upon growth, 
“the coefficient estimate for environmental policies was positive but not statistically 
significant, suggesting that any impact of stricter policies on economic growth was 
negligible” (p. 104).  The analysis seems to suggest that stricter environmental 
regulations lead to better environmental conditions that, in turn, lead to higher economic 
growth. 
 Meyer (1992) examines the effect of state environmental regulations upon four 
different economic indicators: annual gross state product, state annual non-farm 
employment growth, state annual manufacturing employment growth, and state annual 
business failures.  He creates a state environmental policy score based upon two policy 
indexes from 1982 and 1990.  He conducts the analysis for two time periods: 1982 to 
1989 and 1990 to 1992.  For the 1982 to 1989 time period, Meyer does not find a 
statistically negative relationship between environmental stringency among any of his 
economic indicators.  Thus, he finds that the evidence does not support the contention 
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that strict environmental regulations depress economic growth.  In fact, while not 
statistically significant, his results hint at a weak positive relationship between 
environmental regulations and economic growth.  However, when examining the 
recessionary period of 1990 to 1992, Meyer finds that the coefficients do indicate a 
negative relationship between environmental regulations and growth.  However, once 
again the coefficients are not statistically significant and no conclusions should be drawn 
based on this finding alone.  This leads Meyer to conclude that the evidence does not 
support the contention that more stringent policies result in economic decline.  
 Feiock and Stream (2001) specifically examine the relationship between state 
environmental policy and economic development from 1983 to 1994.  Using new state 
capital investment as the dependent variable, the authors develop measures for state 
environmental policy using state spending on environmental programs, the cost of state 
regulations upon polluters, tax incentives for pollution control, and the stability of 
environmental policymaking institutions/decisions.  They determine that different 
policies have different effects upon economic development.  Regulatory policies that 
increase compliance costs for business have a negative impact upon new investment; 
higher pollution control costs have a negative effect upon private sector growth rates (p. 
318).  However, increased state spending on environmental programs and state efforts to 
establish clear administrative authority over and guidelines for environmental regulation 
appear to have a positive impact upon economic development.  When the uncertainty 
surrounding potential environmental regulations is removed, businesses are more likely 
to increase investments. 
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 The literature provides mixed results regarding the effect that environmental 
regulations have upon state economic growth.  Depending upon the time period studied 
and the variables used to measure levels of environmental stringency, research studies 
produce conflicting results.  While there does not appear to be a link between 
environmental regulations and unemployment, there is also no evidence to support the 
idea that environmental regulations create employment.  Research conducted in the early 
1990s exploring the relationship between environmental regulations and business site 
location decisions does not find that environmental regulations have an impact on site 
location.  However, more recent research finds support for the theory that environmental 
regulations can have an impact upon site location decisions.  Most of the research 
exploring the relationship between environmental regulations and economic growth does 
not find support for the theory that environmental regulation lowers economic growth.  
Typically measures of state spending, environmental conditions, policy indexes, and 
costs to business are used to measure environmental regulatory stringency.  When 
environmental policies are studied in isolation from one another, though, support is found 
for the idea that regulations that increase pollution costs can lower growth rates.  
However, environmental policies that increase state spending and clarify regulations are 
found to have a positive impact upon economic growth.    
Conclusion 
 The existing literature does not provide a conclusive understanding of the 
relationship between environmental policy and economic growth.  I have reviewed 
research that explores questions surrounding state economic growth in general, the ability 
of policymakers to affect growth through economic development policies, the 
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determinants of state environmental policy, and the impact that environmental regulation 
can have both on business productivity and economic growth.  Quite often, researchers 
focus their inquiries into specific sectors of the economy and caution must be used in 
making generalizations from these results.  When examining the relationship between 
regulation and the economy, researchers are hampered in their efforts by the poor 
measurement tools available.  Measures that are specifically policy measures are cross-
sectional and do not allow the authors to examine variance in policies over time.  
Alternative measures that are not policy-specific, but are longitudinal, serve as proxies 
for policy variables in these longitudinal studies.     
Missing from the literature is a longitudinal study that takes state characteristics, 
national economic conditions, state fiscal conditions, business policies, environmental 
conditions, and environmental stringency into account.  In order to understand how one 
variable affects another, all other possible variables that can affect the relationship must 
be considered.  To understand fully the potential effects that environmental regulations 
can have upon state economic growth, other variables with the potential to effect 
economic growth must be included in the study.  In order to develop a comprehensive 
model, the theory driving the environment versus economy debate must be examined in 
detail.  In Chapter 3, I explore the theory guiding this research project.   
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CHAPTER 3: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
We have . . . taken the position that the need for . . . stimulation to our 
economy justified . . . serious tradeoffs, where the environment became either 
totally or partially damaged.  None of us . . . in positions of authority in the 
state apologize for that.  We did what we thought was best for the people and 
the economy of Louisiana.  We accommodated industry where we thought 
we could in order to get the jobs and the developments, and in some instances 
we knowingly and advisedly accepted environmental tradeoffs. 
 
--Edwin Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, 1979 (Levinson, 
1995, p. 17) 
 
This quote by former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards is a perfect statement 
of the rationale behind enacting less stringent environmental regulations with the hopes 
of enhancing state economic growth.  Strong economic performance is viewed by 
government officials as necessary to ensure the prosperity of their states.  State 
governmental officials frequently make decisions designed to lure high income 
individuals and businesses to their states in order to stimulate economic growth.  These 
officials are rational actors participating in a competitive struggle with other states – in 
today’s global economy, even with other nations – to attract industries which will be 
boons to their state economies.  State officials actively seek corporate and individual 
citizens who will add to their tax base in order to augment the services government can 
provide.  The wealthier the tax base, the more resources government has, and the more it 
can provide to its citizens.  A wealthy tax base also provides another benefit to 
government.  With a populace consisting of more persons at the higher end of the 
socioeconomic scale, fewer government resources are needed to fund social welfare 
programs.  Wealthier citizens are less expensive to government than are poorer citizens.  
They do not need to ask as much of government.  Thus, strong economic growth reduces 
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the need for government services.  In pursuing individual and corporate citizens who will 
enhance state economies, state policymakers attempt to add to state coffers and reduce 
the need for government funded social welfare programs.  
Referring again to the state of Louisiana, Williams (1999) illustrates how this 
state pursued the chemical industry and successfully stole it from states such as New 
Jersey.  But while states like Louisiana, which generally rank at the bottom in 
environmental conditions and environmental policy stringency, have succeeded in 
attracting these businesses, have they succeeded in achieving the economic growth for 
which they hoped?  A quick perusal of the Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991) reveals that 
Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Texas rank last in environmental 
conditions/policies.  Another quick look - this time at the 2006 Statistical Abstract - 
shows that with the exception of Texas, the states with less stringent environmental 
regulatory venues ranked in the bottom eleven states on economic performance, as 
measured by per capita personal income.  As of yet, it appears that these state have failed 
to achieve the improved economic performance desired.   
Of course, it may be that these states have experienced growth but have much 
further to go to achieve the same level of economic performance of other states.  Indeed, 
according to Crain (2003), the very states mentioned above all ranked in the top 25 states 
for real income per capita growth from 1969 to 1999.  Further, they all rank in the top 20 
states for real income per worker growth in the same time period.  However, even with 
high rankings in these two economic growth indicators, these states still lag behind other 
states in overall economic performance.  Policymakers have not yet realized the 
economic benefits they hope to attain by enacting specific policies.  While strong 
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economic growth is the desired outcome of the decisions made by these state leaders, 
there are limitations to their ability to act effectively.  State economic performance is a 
function of a variety of influences, including national conditions, institutional capacity, 
state fiscal conditions, demographic characteristics of the states, and state policy choices. 
The Ability of State Policymakers to Influence Economic Growth 
 State policymakers are constrained in the options available to them to enhance 
state economic growth.  They make decisions in an imperfect world with imperfect 
choices.  In the environmental policy setting, it may seem illogical to think that any state 
policymaker would be willing to subject his or her state and its citizens to potential 
environmental hazards as a result of a less stringent regulatory setting.  However, given 
other factors that play into the decision calculus of state officials, it may be entirely 
logical to weigh the potential for environmental hazards against the potential for steady 
economic decline and decide that a healthy economy is worth the risk.  Policymakers 
arrive at such decisions based on their own preconceived notions about what is the best 
course of action and by evaluating outside forces that influence their internal state 
economies. 
 When policymakers engage in such a decision making calculus as this they are 
operating within the notion of bounded rationality.  They are limited from making 
perfectly rational decisions by their own cognitive limitations and their perceptions of the 
actions of others.  Arthur (1994) describes two reasons for perfect rational decision 
making to break down: “[1] beyond a certain level of complexity human logical capacity 
ceases to cope . . . [2] in interactive situations of complication, agents cannot rely on 
other agents . . . to be under perfect rationality” (p. 406).  Thus, policymakers are bound 
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in their decision making by both their own limitations and by the assumptions they make 
about the decision making of other policymakers. 
National Economic Effect 
Prior research (Brace, 1993; Hendrick and Garand, 1991) indicates that national 
economic conditions exert great influence upon state economic performance.  Growth in 
national economic performance determines, in large measure, growth in state economies.  
As the nation’s economy grows, so do most state economies.  Conditions that serve to 
stimulate national economic growth can also serve to stimulate state growth.  Indeed, 
because state economies make up the national economy this alignment in economic 
performance levels makes sense intuitively.  Similarly, as slowdowns in national 
economic growth occur, state economic growth will slow as well.  Brace (1991) finds an 
exception to this trend.  States with greater energy resources are less dependent upon 
national economic conditions.  These economies are not as responsive to the national 
economic environment.  States not reliant on the energy sector, though, do tend to follow 
national trends.  Thus, scholars suspect that states will follow similar economic 
performance patterns to that of the nation’s economic performance. 
State Institutional Capacity  
States are also limited in their ability to effect economic performance, both by 
their capacity to act and by the resources within their states.  Good intentions will only 
get policymakers so far.  Officials must have the ability to affect change.  Without the 
institutional capability to effectively institute the reforms needed to spur economic 
growth, governors and state legislatures are hindered from having an affect upon their 
economies (Brace, 1991).  For instance, if a governor wishes to grant incentive packages 
 46
to businesses in order to entice them to move into his or her state, the governor must be 
sure that these types of incentives can be authorized by the executive branch.  Without 
such authority, the governor would lack the institutional capacity to lure the business into 
the state.  In order to affect positive changes in economic performance, policymakers 
must be able to institute change.  Institutional processes or administrative rules that block 
policymakers from either proactively providing incentives to attract industrial 
development or prevent them from responding to changing external factors will limit the 
role of policymakers in pursuing economic growth.  Thus, the institutions of state 
government must possess the capacity to act in a manner able to influence economic 
performance.   
State Demographic and Economic Capacity 
State policymakers are also affected by their available resources in their ability to 
affect economic growth.  Demographic characteristics such as educational attainment of 
the citizenry, the urban-rural make-up of the state, and infrastructure capabilities all have 
the ability either to limit or expand the economic growth potential of a state.  A well-
educated workforce has a better capacity to grow and adjust to new and emerging 
industries and technologies.  Industries looking for new location sites or existing 
industries trying to determine if a change of location might be more cost effective may be 
more interested in states with an educated workforce since fewer industry resources will 
be needed to devote to training and development.  States with better educated populaces 
may be perceived as having lower training costs, and hence, lower business costs.   
Further, states that do not depend highly upon the agricultural sector may give the 
appearance of being more open to greater industrial growth.  While certain agriculture-
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related industries (e.g., insecticide producers, heavy equipment manufacturers, etc.) may 
be present in states with a large agricultural sector, the opportunity for large scale 
industrial growth may be greater in states that do not rely heavily upon the agricultural 
sector for the make-up of their economies.  These states may be perceived as being more 
“pro-business” since they are not as dependent upon the agricultural sector for their 
prosperity.  States with a historical tradition of dedication to agricultural endeavors may 
be perceived as more reluctant to make the changes necessary to encourage industrial 
growth (e.g., transforming farm land into sites for urban development).  Thus, businesses 
and industries looking for new location sites may be attracted to states that have a proven 
record of industrial development.   
Along these lines, states with strong infrastructures may be more appealing to 
potential new industries.  States and localities that have already dedicated funding and 
resources to strong infrastructure improvements may be perceived as committed to 
industrial development.  Further, businesses and industries will have lower costs if a 
strong infrastructure is already in place to supplement their activities.  Thus, the better 
resources that states possess to aid industrial development, the greater the likelihood of 
strong economic growth.   
Policymaking Capacity 
Of more interest to the purpose of this research is the ability of policymakers to 
have an effect on economic performance through the enactment of specific policies 
(Brace, 1991; Brace, 1993; Goetz, Ready, and Stone, 1996).  Many policies have the 
potential to influence economic performance.  Business, education, environmental, law 
enforcement, and transportation development policies are just a few of the areas in which 
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governmental leaders can enact changes with the hope of attaining better economic 
performance.  However, there is no guarantee that such policy enactments will produce 
the desired economic growth.  Outside forces can often have a greater impact upon a 
state’s economy than the internal efforts of policymakers.  While state officials may 
attempt to aid economic growth through policymaking, such efforts may produce limited 
results.  Officials develop policies hoping to make their states attractive to potential 
newcomers.  They want to provide an environment that is viewed as economically 
healthy.  These state leaders seek policy changes that result in economic growth in order 
to improve overall economic performance.  Though, it is unclear whether state 
policymakers have the capacity to exert the influence over economic conditions that they 
are seeking. 
The State as Marketplace, The Citizen as Consumer 
 Researchers have attempted to describe how the choices made by policymakers 
influence residency decisions of citizens (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 
1961; Schneider, 1989; Percy and Hawkins, 1992; Teske, Schneider, Mintrom, and Best, 
1993; Lowery, Lyons, and DeHoog, 1995; Teske, Schneider, Mintrom, and Best, 1995; 
Percy, Hawkins, and Maier, 1995; Lowery, 1998; Preuhs, 1999).  At the forefront of this 
literature Tiebout (1956) describes the mechanisms by which local governments attempt 
to provide their citizens with the optimum level of public services in order to gain and 
maintain the optimum population level.  Citizens are consumers of public services and 
will move to the location that provides their preferred level of services.  If leaders of a 
locality find that that the population is below an optimum level, they will attempt to 
provide services that will attract more residents.  For example, if leaders are hoping to 
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attract more young families to their area, they may devote more government resources 
toward funding the public school system.  By putting more money into schools, local 
leaders hope to have better schools than neighboring localities and entice young families 
into moving into their area with the promise of a better education for children.  Thus, the 
local jurisdiction is the market and the family is the consumer.  As a consumer, the family 
seeks to live in an area that provides its preferred services.  The family’s top priority may 
be the educational quality available for their children.  Thus, they may well move to a 
municipality that devotes a significant amount of its budget to funding public schools, 
hoping that the benefit of the greater level of educational spending will result in better 
schools.  However, the family may weigh the quality of the education against the taxation 
level required to pay for the education.  If the tax level becomes too burdensome, the 
family may prefer a locality that provides a “decent” school system in addition to a low 
tax burden.  Hence, citizen-consumers “vote with their feet” and move to the locality that 
provides their preferred level of government services and tax burden. 
 This theory extends to the present discussion of state environmental policy.  In the 
same way that individual citizens “vote with their feet” and choose to move to a 
particular locality based on preferred policies, corporate/industrial citizen-consumers can 
make similar calculations by which they choose the states within which to locate their 
firms.  States are the markets in which these corporate citizen-consumers “shop” for 
preferred environmental regulatory policies.  In efforts to spur economic growth, states 
will enact policies that will attract these corporate citizens.  State policymakers will 
attempt to provide the preferred regulatory climate of potential corporate/industrial 
citizen-consumers.  Borrowing heavily from Tiebout (1956), it is assumed that the 
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corporate citizen-consumer is “fully mobile.”  Corporate/industrial citizens will move to 
the state that offers the most preferred set of environmental regulations.  These corporate-
consumers have full knowledge of the environmental regulatory climate of all states.  
States will seek to attract new corporate/industrial citizens and retain existing corporate 
citizens in order to achieve the optimum level of economic performance.  States will 
provide the preferred environmental regulatory policies for corporate citizen-consumers 
so that these consumers will “vote with their feet” by either moving to or remaining 
within the state borders.   
 Both state policymakers and corporate/industrial decisions makers are rational 
actors within this theoretical framework.  State officials attempt to improve economic 
conditions within their states by appealing to corporate interests.  Policymakers hope to 
entice new industry to move into their states, retain existing industries, and spur the 
creation of new industries by adopting environmental regulatory policies which are 
perceived by corporate decision makers as business-friendly, and thus, are the preferred 
policies of businesses.  By appealing to industrial interests, state policymakers make a 
rational calculus designed to attract the corporate citizen that will be a boon to overall 
state economic growth.  By the same token, corporate/industrial decision makers (i.e., 
consumers) are rational actors calculating the costs and benefits of operating a firm 
within a particular state.  Part of the decision making calculus is the regulatory costs 
associated with environmental regulations.  The corporate decision makers/consumers 
weigh the policy options provided by a particular state when deciding whether to locate 
within a new state, retain a facility within a state, or create a new firm within a particular 
state.  Any number of policy options could affect the corporate consumer’s decision 
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calculus: tax laws, financial incentives, environmental regulations, infrastructure, etc.  
The corporate consumer will make a rational choice to locate to or remain within the state 
that offers the set of policies closest to the corporation’s optimum preferences. 
An Environmental “Race to the Bottom”? 
If state policymakers are rational actors responding to citizen-consumers that 
“vote with their feet,” these policymakers will engage in active competition with their 
neighbors to win the optimum number of citizen-consumers.  Much research has been 
conducted around the notion that states will enact policies intended to attract individual 
and corporate citizens who will enhance the potential for economic growth within their 
borders rather than retain or attract those who will be a drag on economic performance.  
States compete with one another for citizens who will be an asset to economic growth.  
Part of this competition may include policy options that lower benefits for the poorer 
producing segments of the economy.  Welfare reform is a prime example of a policy area 
in which state officials make decisions designed to enhance economic growth.  A great 
deal of literature focuses around the notion that in such a competitive environment states 
will “race to the bottom” in welfare policy development in order to achieve the end result 
of higher economic performance (Peterson and Rom, 1989; Piven, 1998; Rom, Peterson, 
and Scheve, 1998; Brueckner, 2000; Lurie, 1998; Schram, 1998; Schram and Soss, 1998; 
Beer, 1998; Piven, 2001; Allard and Danziger, 2000; Volden, 2002; Bailey, 2005).  The 
“race to the bottom” in the context of welfare policy involves the state lowering benefits 
to those who receive welfare payments in order to dissuade welfare recipients from 
residing within the state.   
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The policy of enacting lower welfare benefits may produce a variety of outcomes 
that could increase state economic growth.  First, lower benefits may discourage would-
be welfare recipients from moving into a state with low benefits.  Thus, there is limited 
possibility of those who would receive welfare moving into the state and draining state 
resources.  Second, lowering benefits may encourage the migration of recipients to other 
states with higher benefits.  In this scenario, those welfare beneficiaries who had 
previously been a recipient of state resources move to higher welfare benefit states and no 
longer consume the resources of their original state of residence.  The burden of 
supporting the welfare beneficiaries transfers to the state with the higher level of benefits.  
Finally, if lower benefits are in place then overall state taxes may be lower since the 
government need for revenue to fund welfare would not be as great.  Hence, those with 
higher incomes may be enticed to move to a state with lower tax rates.  Thus, the “race to 
the bottom” in welfare policy produces a population with the resources to enhance a state 
economy.   
States also compete to have corporate citizens locate within their borders.  A 
recent example of this competition is provided by the states of Louisiana, Alabama, and 
Arkansas (Baton Rouge Daily Report, October 24, 2006).  State economic development 
teams from all three states traveled to Germany to convince corporate leaders to locate a 
three billion dollar steel mill within their state.  No doubt all three states will offer 
incentives and government services to attract this new industry to their states.  Indeed a 
quick perusal of the economic development websites of all three states results in listings 
of the incentives and services that each state offers to businesses that locate within their 
jurisdictions.  States can go beyond services and incentives, though.  They may well 
 53
choose to promote a regulatory environment that will be attractive to new and existing 
industries.  
Thus, the “race to the bottom” theory can be applied to state environmental policy 
as well.  State officials may seek to attract industry by lowering regulatory costs.  While 
his discussion focuses on welfare policy, Piven (1998) depicts the conditions under which 
businesses can “pit one locality against another as they search for the most advantageous 
package of services and taxes” (p. 40).  In their efforts to improve economic conditions 
within their states, officials will try to provide business environments that will convince 
industries to move (or remain) within their jurisdictions.  As noted by Piven, state 
policymakers “depend for their electoral success on economic prosperity, which means 
they depend on investors . . . depend on revenues gained by taxing those who have assets 
. . . when those who have economic resources are mobile, they can bargain hard with 
political leaders over the terms on which they will agree to invest or to be taxed” (p. 39). 
Thus, state officials may perceive that in order to attract industries with the resources to 
positively affect state economies, they must lower the cost of doing business within their 
borders.  One method of decreasing economic burdens/regulatory costs on businesses is 
to lower the cost of pollution abatement by enacting less stringent environmental 
regulations. 
In making site location decisions, businesses (as most people) are always in favor 
of a ‘helping hand’ to get them started.  As noted by Jaffe et al. (1995), there exists “a 
widespread belief that environmental regulations have a significant effect on the siting of 
new plants in the United States . . . Public comments and private actions of legislators 
and lobbyists, for example, certainly indicate that they believe that environmental 
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regulations affect plant location decision” (p. 148).  One method chosen by some state 
leaders to achieve better economic performance has been to attract industry with the lure 
of quicker industrial growth due to less stringent environmental regulations.  These state 
officials believe that by enacting less stringent environmental policies, they will 
accomplish two goals necessary for strong growth: prevent existing firms from leaving 
their states and induce new businesses to locate within their states.  Conversely, by 
enacting strict environmental policies, states increase business costs within their borders, 
resulting in a slow down in business growth and development and, hence, decrease state 
economic growth and long-term benefits.  Thus, state officials may believe that the 
enactment of less stringent state environmental policies will make their states more 
appealing as a place to do business.  
 In addition to having an impact on site selection decisions, environmental policies 
also play a role in the productivity of existing businesses (Christiansen and Haveman, 
1981; Gray, 1987; Barbera and McConnell, 1986; Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stevens, 
1995; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990).  State policymakers who advocate less stringent 
environmental regulations believe that they are enacting policies that will allow 
businesses within their states to maintain higher levels of productivity.  According to 
Jaffe et al. (1995) “environmental regulations affect a firm’s cost of production, both 
directly through its own expenditures on pollution reduction and indirectly through the 
higher prices it must pay for certain factors of production that are affected by regulation” 
(p.138).  Jaffe et al. specify five effects more stringent environmental regulations may 
have on a firm’s productivity levels:  
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“[1] measured productivity of the affected industry will fall because measured 
inputs of capital, labor, and energy are being diverted to the production of an 
additional output – environmental quality . . . [2] when and if firms undertake 
process or management changes in response to environmental regulations, the 
new practices may be less efficient than the old ones . . . [3] environmental 
investments could conceivably crowd out other investments by firms . . . [4] many 
environmental regulations exempt older plants from requirements, in effect 
mandating higher standards for new plants . . . discouraging investments in new, 
more efficient facilities . . . [5] requirements that firms use the ‘best available 
control technology’ for pollution abatement may increase the adoption of these 
new technologies at the time regulation go into effect, but subsequently blunt 
firms’ incentives to develop new pollution control or prevention approaches over 
time” (pgs. 150-151).   
Thus, although less stringent regulations do not guarantee high productivity, they do not 
add additional costs to business operations.  Businesses are not forced to divert resources 
toward satisfying more stringent regulatory requirements and are able to maintain high 
levels of production without increasing their costs.  By ensuring that regulatory cost do 
not dramatically increase, state officials attempt both to protect the productivity levels of 
existing industries within their borders and to attract new industries with the opportunity 
of higher productivity levels, as compared to operating in states with stricter 
environmental regulations.  Hence, policymakers try to ensure economic growth by 
keeping the “cost of doing business” at a minimum. 
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Or a “Race to the Top”? 
 A contradictory theory regarding state environmental policy is offered by other 
scholars.  Rather than attract businesses with lax regulations, others propose that stricter 
environmental policies will benefit businesses (Porter, 1990; Meyer, 1992; Porter and van 
der Linde, 1995; Goetz, Ready, and Stone, 1996).  Again Jaffe et al. (1995) provide a 
good summary of this theory from the perspective of the firms affected:  
“Some sectors of private industry, in particular, environmental, will benefit 
directly from more stringent environmental regulations on their customers . . . 
some regulated firms will benefit competitively at the expense of other regulated 
firms . . . can provide some firms with ‘early mover’ advantages by pushing them 
to produce products that will in the future be in demand in the market place . . . 
can increase domestic efficiency, either by wringing inefficiencies out of the 
production process as firms struggle to meet new constraints or by spurring 
innovation in the long term through ‘outside-the-box thinking’ . . . [and] by 
forcing exceptionally inefficient plants to close” (pgs. 154-155).   
Thus, the benefits of stricter environmental regulatory policies are examined entirely in 
light of the operating effect on firms.  More strict regulations provide the opportunity for 
a new area of industrial growth.  Once stricter regulations are enacted, many existing 
firms need guidance in following the regulations.  Environmental service firms provide 
such expertise.  Further, the costs of complying with regulations differ among individual 
firms.  Larger firms may more easily absorb the additional costs than smaller firms.  
These firms that can more easily adjust to pollution abatement costs will benefit 
competitively against those that cannot.  Firms that can anticipate future abatement needs 
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and provide products to meet these needs will profit from the regulations that establish 
the need for these new products.  Finally, more strict regulations may cause the shutdown 
of firms that were operating inefficiently.  The additional costs for improving pollution 
control can force inefficient firms to recognize that their processes are too unproductive 
to keep up with innovations.  Thus, from a purely operations perspective, stricter 
environmental regulations can have a positive affect upon the marketplace. 
Scholars focus their research around the notion that stricter environmental 
regulations produce environmental conditions within states that actually attract business 
and industry to the states that enforce such policies.  Goetz et al. (1996) argue that while 
states that choose stricter environmental regulations may suffer a temporary economic 
slowdown, in the long run the benefits of a “greener” environment will be beneficial to 
states; specifically, “a region that imposes stricter environmental regulations may (at least 
initially) experience slower economic growth.  However, if regulations result in higher 
levels of environmental quality over time, growth rates may subsequently increase” (p. 
100).  States that have more stringent environmental regulations and enforcement policies 
should reap an environmental reward for such policies.  It is assumed that states that are 
more proactive with their environmental regulatory powers will have cleaner air to breath 
and cleaner water to drink than states that choose to be more lax with their environmental 
regulatory authority.  Businesses and industries looking for a new location site may be 
attracted to a state that offers a more environmentally safe place to live.  States with 
healthier environments offer the employees of businesses a better quality of life than do 
states that become “pollution havens” in their efforts to attract industry.  Thus, by 
choosing to locate in states with more stringent environmental regulations, industrial 
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employers provide a better home for their employees.  This could actually serve as a 
benefit to businesses in recruiting higher quality employees.  As noted by Tannenwald 
(1997) and Gray (1997) some employees may even be willing to work for less pay if the 
location that they live in has a higher quality of life.  Just as states may be willing to 
sacrifice short-term economic benefits in favor of long-term environmental benefits, so 
may individuals.  Thus, employers may find that locating in a “greener” state will aid in 
attracting high quality employees.  Since businesses often claim that employees are their 
most valuable asset, providing a pleasant and safe place to live for these employees may 
be a critical factor in the site location decision making process.   
In addition to offering a quality of life benefit on the front end, states with more 
stringent environmental policies may also offer a long-term economic incentive to 
businesses and industries as well.  With all else being equal, states with more stringent 
environmental regulations should have better environments than states with less stringent 
regulations.  A better environment may not only result in more satisfied employees, but it 
also may translate into healthier employees.  If a business locates in a state with a good 
environmental backdrop, it may expect that their employees will be at a lower risk for 
certain environmental-related illnesses.  With lower risk factors come lower insurance 
and healthcare costs for the employer.  Thus, while businesses may pay higher pollution 
abatement costs as a result of more stringent environmental regulations, these businesses 
may save on personnel costs associated with insurance and healthcare as a result of 
choosing to locate within a state with overall better environmental conditions.  As noted 
by Graham (1998), “environmental measures that contribute to critical infrastructure, 
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attract skilled workers, or satisfy the needs of particular businesses are rightly seen as 
having economic value” (p. 4).   
Further, by choosing to locate in “greener” states, businesses and industries may 
actually lower some of their production costs.  Jaffe et al. (1995) point out that 
“environmental regulations can reduce costs for some firms or industries, by lowering 
input prices or by increasing the productivity of their inputs” (p. 138).  Thus, if a business 
locates in a state with stricter environmental regulations, the resources they utilize for 
production (e.g., water) will be less likely to be polluted.  These unpolluted resources will 
lower the cost of production since the business will not need to spend additional 
resources cleaning the inputs of production.  Hence, while some state policymakers may 
argue for the economic benefits of less stringent environmental regulations, other state 
policymakers may make the same economic benefits argument in favor of more stringent 
environmental regulations.   
A Model of Economic Growth 
Goetz et al. (1996) illustrate how environmental regulations and conditions may 
effect economic growth in Figure 3.1.  In the first section of the figure, the authors 
indicate that better environmental conditions will influence four areas that can have an 
impact upon economic growth.  First, better conditions may serve to attract firms to an 
area.  These firms are drawn to an area that offers its workers a better quality of life 
and/or provides cleaner inputs of production.  Better environmental conditions may also 
attract a more skilled labor force.  Individuals may choose to locate and find employment 
in an area that offers a “cleaner” setting.  Similarly, wealthy retires may be drawn to 
settle in areas perceived as more healthy to live.  These better environmental conditions 
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affect more than people and the decisions they make.  Conditions also have an impact 
upon productivity.  If the inputs into productions are clean, time and money is not wasted 
on making these inputs ready for use.  Better environmental conditions can reduce costs 
to businesses leading to higher productivity.  These potential benefits of more firms, 
more skilled workers, more wealthy retirees adding to the tax base, and increased 
productivity can all contribute to increased economic growth. 
The second part of Figure 3.1 illustrates how environmental policy can have a 
negative impact on economic growth.  Stricter regulation can increase business costs.  
Firms may be forced to purchase specific equipment pollution abatement equipment that 
can drive up their costs.  They may be forced to hire additional technical staff to ensure 
compliance with complicated regulations.  Further, regulations may force them to change 
processes toward more abatement-related activities, forcing businesses to spend more 
money.  Such a diversion of resources away from production and toward pollution 
abatement processes can increase the cost of production.  This type of diversion of 
resources can also lower output.  When time and money are spent in areas other than 
production, output declines.  Thus, while spending more on pollution control activities, 
businesses may end up producing less.  Such a scenario of increased costs and lowered 
output could result in a negative impact upon economic growth.  
Of course, the theories of environmental regulation and economic development 
discussed above are not necessarily in competition, but instead may be applicable under 
different sets of state circumstances.  There may be intervening variables that have effects 
that cause states both to choose a specific set of policies and to see a different set of 
results from those policies.  State socioeconomic conditions matter in efforts to 
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Figure 3.1. Relationship between Environmental Conditions and Policies and Economic 
Growth.  Taken from Goetz et al. (1996, p. 99). 
 
encourage economic growth.  States with demographic advantages, such as a more highly 
educated workforce, may not feel compelled to lower regulatory costs in order to make 
their areas more appealing to potential corporate residents.  These states may believe that 
they have a great deal to offer industry without needing to add the enticement of lower 
regulatory costs.  
On the other hand, officials in states with fewer demographic advantages may feel 
compelled to lower the regulatory burden on businesses in order to compete with other 
states that may appear more attractive at first glance.  Since these states may not have the 
advantages of skilled workers, for example, they will use policy to create an attractive 
regulatory environment.  Williams (1999) points out that “states with lower per capita 
income and less educated workforces have pursued an economic development strategy 
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that depends on attracting industrial facilities with more severe environmental impacts 
that are attracted by less stringent environmental oversight . . . among these states, 
devolution of responsibility leads to a “race for the bottom” in environmental 
protections” (451-453).   
However, competition does not drive all states to lower regulatory costs.  State 
policymakers who operate in states with more resources (e.g., better educated workforce, 
lower poverty levels) may perceive that better demographic and economic conditions 
enhance their position, i.e. enhance their competitive edge, and therefore, enact more 
stringent environmental policies.  With state socioeconomic conditions working for them 
in attracting new businesses and industries, there is less pressure to lower regulatory 
standards in order to appeal to industry.  Conversely, policymakers that are faced with 
fewer advantages as compared to other states, thus, choose to have less stringent 
regulations in order to compete for business and industry.  By lowering the cost of doing 
business within their states, they are able at least to “level the playing field” when it 
comes to competing against better educated and more wealthy states.  One could argue 
that a “race for the bottom” occurs between those states that already find themselves at 
the bottom.  
 Thus the model provided by Goetz et al. (1996) can be refined to include a 
calculus that leads state policymakers to either enact less stringent or more stringent 
environmental policies.  When choosing which type of environmental policies to enact, 
state policymakers will be influenced by their internal resources and by policies being 
offered by their neighboring states.  Figure 3.2 illustrates the effect that these factors will 
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have on the environmental policies chosen and in turn how these policies will effect 
economic growth, measured as income per capita.   
As illustrated in the lower left-hand portion of Figure 3.2, when states do not 
possess demographic characteristics that can be used to either retain or attract industry 
(e.g., highly educated workforce, strong infrastructure), they will feel compelled to lower 
regulatory burdens upon industries in order to compete with other states to have 
industries locate within their borders.  The consequences of less appealing demographic 
characteristics may be less stringent environmental regulations.  Conversely, states that 
posses better characteristics will not feel pressured to lower costs to compete and will 
enact more stringent environmental regulations. 
As the “race to the bottom” theory suggests, a further factor for states to consider 
is the environmental policies enacted by their neighbors.  Since states are indeed in 
competition with one another, they will be aware of what types of environmental policies 
that other states are enacting.  Figure 3.2 shows this element factored into the policy 
decision making calculus.  Critical to a state’s environmental policy decision will be the 
policies enacted by neighboring states.  If a neighboring state enacts less stringent 
regulations, then a state will not want to enact environmental policies that are more 
stringent, and thus more costly to businesses.  After all, why should a business locate in 
state A when state B, located right next door, has a lower regulatory burden in effect?  A 
state that does enact more stringent environmental policies than its neighbor risks its 
ability to compete for industry by adding costs to both existing industries and potential 
new industries to locate within the state. 
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Figure 3.2. Factors Affecting the Enactment of Environmental Policies and the Subsequent 
Relationship Between Environmental Policies and Environmental Conditions upon 
Economic Growth. 
 
By the same token, when a neighboring state has stricter environmental policies in 
effect, a state will not feel pressured to lower environmental standards in order to 
compete.  State policymakers are free to choose to enact stricter environmental policies 
without worry of losing their ability to compete with their neighbors.  In fact, if the first 
part of this model is correct and better environmental conditions do result in a net 
attraction of firms, then states with neighbors that have stricter environmental policies 
may feel compelled to be just as strict with their environmental regulations.  In such a 
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case, a state does not want to be viewed as having a less pristine environment than its 
neighbors, thus, losing its ability to compete with its neighbors over quality of life issues.  
Hence, instead of a “race to the bottom,” these states may engage in a “race to the top” 
when enacting environmental policies.   
Conclusion 
Still, Brace (1993) finds that states are limited in their ability to effect economic 
performance within their borders.  States do not operate in a vacuum.  In addition to the 
competition they face from neighboring states, state economies often fluctuate according 
to national economic conditions.  This fluctuation is determined by how dependent a 
state’s economy is upon the national economy.  Brace finds that the ability of states to 
influence economic development seems to be limited to their influence over per capita 
personal income.  He indicates that this may come at the expense of employment, though, 
since income and job growth are inversely related.  He concludes by reiterating that states 
are limited by national constraints in their ability to effect economic changes. 
 Thus, while state officials may enact weak environmental laws with the best 
possible motive -- to ensure economic growth -- states may only possess limited ability to 
effect such changes.  States exist in a much broader world than the one drawn by their 
boundary lines.  State capacity to act effectively towards greater economic growth is 
hampered by national economic conditions.  This study attempts to discover whether 
there is a significant relationship between state environmental policies and state 
economic growth.  Are policymakers making reasonable decisions in enacting specific 
environmental regulations/policies with the hope of having an effect upon state economic 
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growth?  Do states which enact strict environmental policies sacrifice economic growth 
while states which enact less stringent environmental policies reap an economic reward?       
 I develop a model for analysis to discover the relationship between environmental 
regulation and economic growth.  Factors that can constrain policymakers’ abilities to 
influence growth are included in the model.  In addition to environmental policy 
variables, I include variables to capture the effects of business policies, national 
economic conditions, state fiscal conditions, and state demographic factors.  The full 
model is described in Chapter 5.  Before discussing this model, it is necessary to review 
issues concerning environmental policy variables.  The selection of a measure for 
environmental policy is problematic.  Concerns related to this variable are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
EXAMINATION OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL DATA 
 [S]tudies struggle with the issue of how to measure regulatory stringency.  This is 
perhaps the most difficult problem encountered. Measures of regulatory 
stringency often are not comparable across states, are highly industry-specific, or 
partially reflect state-specific characteristics that have nothing to do with 
stringency.  (Tannenwald, 1997, p. 86) 
 
 A review of the literature of environmental policy reveals that researchers 
continually struggle to develop an adequate measure for state policy stringency.  Some 
researchers focus on state environmental spending as a measure of state policy (Bartik, 
1988).  Others use various policy indices as their measure (Goetz, Ready and Stone, 
1996; Meyer, 1992).  State environmental conditions is the measure selected by some 
researchers (Templet, 1995; Grossman and Krueger, 1995).  Other studies utilize the 
Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Control Expenditure survey (Gray and 
Shadbegian, 1998; Levinson, 1999).  Specific industry costs are used in other studies 
(Gray, 1987; Gollop and Roberts, 1983).  Still other studies use some combination of 
these measures (Feiock and Stream, 2001; List and Co, 2000; Barbera and McConnell, 
1986; Daley and Garand, 2002; McConnell and Schwab, 1990; Bacot and Dawes, 1997).   
There is no “ideal” measure available to study state environmental policy 
stringency.  In a data “perfect” world, a longitudinal measure tracking the multiple 
dimensions of environmental  policy in all fifty states would exist.  This measure would 
consistently examine state environmental policy and provide a value of regulatory 
stringency for state policies.  While cross-sectional measures do provide a measure of 
stringency for a single point in time, no such measure exists over time.  Thus, researchers 
use rather imperfect tools to arrive at an adequate measure of state environmental 
stringency. 
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Each of the measures noted has advantages and disadvantages.  Spending 
measures provide a level of the commitment that states have toward environmental 
programs, but it is an imperfect proxy for policy goals.  The use of a policy index is a 
good cross-sectional tool but does not allow for the study of states over time.  
Environmental conditions illustrate the need for policy, but do not address whether states 
are addressing the need.  The Pollution Abatement Expenditure (PACE) survey describes 
industry costs but does not control for state specific industry characteristics.  Specific 
industry costs studies only provide results in the particular area studied.  Whether the 
results of these studies can be considered reliable in other sectors is subject to some 
debate.   
In this chapter, I consider a variety of measurement tools.  However, a refinement 
of the PACE survey created by Levinson (1999) is the primary tool I use to measure 
environmental stringency.  This Levinson Index best captures the main variable of 
interest in my study.  The measures to be used in the model are discussed in turn. 
State Environmental Spending 
State policymakers can enact any number of policies, but commitment to 
particular polices is reflected by the amount of resources they dedicate to the policies 
with budgetary measures.  Bacot and Dawes (1997) note that environmental programs are 
“only as effective as their funding levels allow them to be” (p.366).  Hence, budget 
information can reveal the level of a state’s commitment to environmental regulation.  
The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) and the Council of State Governments 
(CSG) have collected state environmental and natural resource spending data in the years 
1986, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2003.  Initial collections of state budget data 
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were conducted by the Council of State Government, but these have been conducted by 
the Environmental Council of the States since 1998.   
To be included in the ECOS budget survey, funds must be directly included in the 
state budget bills to operate state and federal environmental and natural resource 
programs (Brown and Keifer, 2003).  Budget categories included in the spending survey 
include water, land management, fish and wildlife, waste management, and air quality.  
Budget allocations in the water category consist of state spending for water quality, water 
resources, drinking water, and marine and coastal issues.  Allocations in the land 
management category include state spending on forestry, soil conservation, mining 
reclamation, land management for state-owned resources, pesticide control, and 
geological surveys.  The fish and wildlife category includes state spending for all efforts 
to protect state fish and gaming resources and to enforce state fish and gaming laws.  The 
waste management category encompasses state spending on hazardous, solid, and nuclear 
wastes management programs.  The air quality category includes all state spending to 
administer the Clean Air Act.  
The drawback in relying on spending levels as a measure of environmental 
stringency is that certain states may have characteristics that spending measures will not 
capture.  For example, a state may have a history of not encouraging industrial growth, 
instead choosing to preserve lands and the environment.  Such a state would not have the 
need to spend a great deal on pollution control efforts since its pollution levels would be 
lower than states with large industrial sectors.  Alternatively, a state with a large 
industrial sector may be forced to spend greater levels on pollution control.  However, 
this spending could be a result, not of state policymakers’ preferences, but of federal 
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mandates.  Until federal environmental legislation was passed in the 1970s and 1980s, 
some states did not choose to allocate significant funds toward environmental policies.  
Increased environmental spending in these states occurred as a response to federal action, 
and not as a result of state initiative.  
Further, state spending levels may be a function of the overall state economy.  
Some states may spend more on environmental programs because they have more money 
to spend.  Other states, with fewer financial resources, may spend less on environmental 
programs, not due to a lack of will, but due to a lack of funds.  Compounding this 
problem for some states is the fact that, if they do experience budget shortfalls that 
require a reduction in environmental budgets, they may become ineligible for federal 
monies due to a lack of matching state funds.  Such states may spend less on 
environmental efforts because they have less to spend generally.  Thus, the use of budget 
allocations as a measure of environmental stringency may be complicated by specific 
state characteristics. 
However, the study of state budget allocations for environmental and natural 
resource spending can demonstrate state dedication to these programs.  Funding provides 
state agencies the ability to implement policy programs.  If state policymakers are truly 
interested in carrying out effective environmental programs, they must provide the 
monies necessary to run these programs.  Without adequate funding, no action can be 
taken by agencies charged with executing environmental programs.  Budget allocations 
are indicators of the importance policymakers give to the programs they develop.  
Through the dedication of state funds to environmental programs, state regulations are 
put into practice.  Thus, budget data can reveal intent to implement environmental policy. 
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State Environmental Conditions 
As explained by Bacot and Dawes (1997), “states with less environmental 
legislation, and consequently fewer programs to assure environmental protection 
regularly, likely will experience higher levels of pollution production in their state”(p. 
362).  Higher levels of pollution can be indicative that state policymakers are not 
enacting strict environmental standards.  More lax environmental policies would create a 
setting in which industries prone to heavy pollution levels could more comfortably 
operate.  This could lead to poorer environmental conditions within a state.  States with 
more stringent environmental standards should have mechanisms (policies) in place to 
ensure lower pollution levels.  Thus, a state’s environmental conditions can provide a 
clue as to the environmental regulatory venue. 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act passed in 1986 
provided the EPA with the authority to collect information regarding potential hazards in 
communities.  Under this act, businesses and industries are required to report the type and 
amount of chemicals stored at their facilities.  They are also required to report any toxic 
transfers or releases into the environment.  This information is collected annually by the 
EPA in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) which was developed in 1987.  In 1990 The 
Pollution Prevention Act added the requirement that waste management and source 
reduction activities also be reported in the TRI.  Currently, the TRI provides information 
on the release of approximately 650 chemicals into the environment by industrial 
facilities.  This industrial pollution information provides data on what chemicals are 
released into the environment so the public can understand the environmental risk factors 
evident in their areas.  Thus, it is a comprehensive listing of industrial polluting activities.   
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There are limitations to the use of TRI reports as a measure of environmental 
conditions.  The TRI report only tracks industrial emissions/releases.  Other releases, e.g., 
vehicle emissions, are not included.  As a result, overall state pollution levels are not 
completely captured by the TRI data.  Only pollution as a result of industrial activity is 
reported.  Also, as noted by the EPA, the TRI does not provide an estimation of exposure 
risks to the public.  The focus is on releases, not potential harm as a result of the releases.  
Nor does the TRI differentiate between most and least harmful chemicals (Bacot and 
Dawes, 1997).  For the purposes of this study, though, release information is useful in 
determining state environmental conditions.  It is not necessary to know the immediate 
risks of a particular release to have an understanding of broad environmental conditions 
within a state.  Finally, some express concerns that the TRI relies on industry self-reports 
for the data collected (Bacot and Dawes, 1997).  Industry is expected to fully disclose all 
releases that occur within a year.  Thus, while the TRI does provide a thorough data 
source for industrial pollution, there are limitations to the information available.   
However, the TRI is strictly monitored by the EPA in its regulatory efforts 
regarding the states.  The report clearly tracks industrial pollutants in communities.  
These releases are valuable in order to understand environmental hazards that exist in a 
given community.  Therefore, it will be utilized as a measure of environmental 
conditions.  Concerns that the TRI is limited because it provides pollutant information 
solely on industrial activities are not a worry of this study.  I am particularly interested in 
industrial activities and how these activities are affected by state environmental policy.  
Information of industrial releases can be an indicator of how strictly these industries are 
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regulated.  The TRI provides insight into how proactive a state may be in ensuring 
“good” environmental conditions.  
State Environmental Policy Data 
Longitudinal measures of state environmental policy are not available.  However, 
researchers have developed a few good cross-sectional measures of state environmental 
policies.  The years for which such measures are available are 1983, 1987, and 1991.   
Three different indices are constructed looking at various environmental policies at these 
different points in time.  The first index was created by the Conservation Foundation.  
The second index was created by the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment.  
The third index is the Green Index created by Bob Hall and May Lee Kerr at the Institute 
of Southern Studies.  All three serve to capture the “greenness” of the fifty states at the 
time period they study.  Each study takes into account policies and conditions at the time 
of observation.  As these three indices are frequently used in studies of state 
environmental policy, I discuss them in detail here. 
The Conservation Foundation Index   
In 1983 the Conservation Foundation created a ranking to determine the level of 
effort each state puts towards ensuring a quality environment (Duerksen, 1983).  The 
focus of the study is to rank the intensity with which states approached their 
environmental programs.  Two main indicators are used in developing the index: 
environmental and land-use.  Table 4.1 provides a listing of the indicators used to 
compile this state ranking.  
Under this index created by the Conservation Foundation, states can earn up to 63 
points.  At the time of the study, no state achieved a score this high.  Minnesota earned  
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Table 4.1.  Environmental Indicators used to Compile Conservation Foundation Ranking, 
Including Score Ranges for each Indicator  
 
Environmental Indicators      Score Range 
Congressional Voting Record on Environmental Issues   0 – 4 
Existence of a State Environmental Impact Statement Process  0, 2, 4 
State Legislature’s Commitment to Environmental Protection  0 – 4 
Tax-Check Off for Wildlife & Fisheries Funds    0, 1 
Per Capita Spending on Air, Water, & Land Pollution Programs  0 – 6 
RCRA Authorization       0 – 2 
Single Oversight Agency for Monitoring Air, Water, Hazardous  
Waste, & Noise Pollution     0, 1 
Tax Breaks for Solar Energy      0 – 2 
Protected Rivers for Wildlife, Scenic, of Recreation Purposes  0 – 2 
Per Capita Spending on Noise Control Programs    0 – 2 
 
Land Use Indicators 
Legislation Protecting Wetlands or Endangered Species Habitats  0 – 2 
Power Plant Siting Law       0 – 3 
Environmental Protection as Specific Land Use Goal   0 – 2 
Required Comprehensive Land Use Plans    0 – 4 
Surface-Mine Reclamation Program     0 – 3 
State Floodplain Laws and Development Rules    0 – 2 
Extent of State Involvement in Land Use Decision Making  0 – 6 
Adoption of Aesthetic Rationale for Eminent Domain   0 – 2 
Per Capita Spending on Natural Resources, Parks, Sewerage/ 
Sanitation, & Housing and Urban Renewal   0 – 2 
Approved Solid Waste Plan under RCRA    0 – 2 
 
the highest ranking in the index with a score of 47.  Alabama ranked last with a score of 
10.  Only five states achieved a score of over 40.  A majority of states failed to earn a 
score greater than 31.  The study provides a breakdown of the range of scores.  Five 
states scored 40 or higher.  Six states scored within the range of 35-39.  Nine states 
scored in the 30-34 range.  Eleven states scored in the range of 25-29.  Thirteen states 
earned between 30-24.  Six states scored a 19 or lower.  Thus, at the time of the first 
comprehensive ranking of state environmental effort, states appear to have limited 
commitment to widespread environmental programs.  Each state’s rank in the 
Conservation Index is found in Table 4.4.  This index uses a variety of indicators to 
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measure state environmental effort.  These include environmental related expenditures, 
enactment of specific policies, conservation-related tax breaks, political support for 
environmental policies, and authorization for specific environmental programs. 
The FREE Index   
In 1987 the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment (FREE) compiled 
an index of environmental program strength within the states.  The FREE index considers 
issues surrounding air pollution, soil conservation, solid waste, groundwater protection, 
hazardous waste, and energy conservation.  A score of 0-10 for each of these six 
indicators is possible.  This index takes into consideration states’ existing environmental 
conditions and subsequent responses to these conditions in assessing environmental 
program strength.  A matrix for each environmental area is developed.  The states are 
ranked within each matrix.  This study is another attempt at a comprehensive review of 
state programs to address environmental concerns.   
Table 4.2 presents the indicators used in the development of each matrix.  Using 
these six matrices, each state is awarded a score from 0-60 on the FREE index.  The 
higher a state scores on the index, the “greener” the state programs.  The state of 
Wisconsin ranked highest on the index with a score of 49.  Mississippi ranked last with a 
score of 14.  Ten states earned a score of 40 or higher.  Fourteen states scored within the 
range of 30-39.  Sixteen states scored within the 20-29 range.  Ten states scored below 
19.  FREE Index rankings of the states are found in Table 4.4.  The Conservation 
Foundation and FREE Index use different indicators to create their rankings, and thus, 
cannot be compared directly.  However, it interesting to note that in the Conservation 
Foundation index a majority of states (31) failed to reach a score of half of the index 
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total.  In the FREE Index, calculated four years later just under half of the states (24) 
achieved a score greater than half of the index total.  As a whole, the states appear to have 
improved their environmental scores on the FREE Index.  Again, the two indices measure 
different polices so caution is taken when making assumptions based on the scores.  
However, while not directly comparable, the states’ performances on these two different 
indices appear to indicate that state environmental programs are growing stronger. 
Table 4.2.  Environmental Indicators used to create FREE Index Matrices 
 
Air Pollution Matrix: Indicators       
Number of Counties with State Implementation Plans (SIP) Deficiencies 
Criteria Pollutants Exceeding Primary Standards One or More Areas 
Total Number of Monitors for Criteria Pollutants 
Total Enforcement Action 
EPA Sanctions Imposes as Consequence for SIP Deficiencies 
Toxic Pollutant Control Program in Place 
Acid Deposition Control Program in Place 
Research on Acid Rain 
1982 Total Air Program Budget 
1985 Total Air Program Budget 
 
Soil Conservation Matrix: Indicators 
Statewide Conservation Program 
Erosion and Sediment Control Laws 
Established Soil Loss Limits 
Approved Plan Required before Soil can be Disturbed 
Provisions for Enforcement and Penalties 
Cost-Sharing for Soil Conservation 
Average Tons Lost Per Acre on Total Cropland – 1982 
Percentage of Cropland Needing Erosion Control 
Percentage of Total Cultivated Tillage – 1982 
Funds Appropriated by State & Local Government for Soil Conservation – 1985 
 
Solid Waste & Recycling Matrix: Indicators 
Solid Waste Management Plan 
Regulations for Landfill Safety and Control 
Recycling Program 
Total Monitoring of Groundwater 
Total Inspection 
Frequency of Inspections  
Number of Groundwater Violations 
Number of Subtitle D Landfills 
Number of Subtitle D Surface Impoundments 
Estimated Solid Waste Tonnage 
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Table 4.2 (continued).   
 
Solid Waste & Recycling Matrix: Indicators 
State Superfund Statutes 
Small Quantity Generator Regulations 
Underground Injection Restrictions 
Pre-HSWA Final Authorization 
Community Right to Know Laws 
Incentives to Reduce/Recycle 
Household Hazardous Waste Collection 
Number of National Priority List (NPL) Sites 
Number of ERRIS List Sites 
Ranking by Hazardous Waste Generation 
 
Groundwater Protection Matrix: Indicators 
Legislative Authority to Implement Strategy Management Plan 
Groundwater Strategy Management Plan in Place 
Strategy Plan Includes Mapping 
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Legislation 
Non-Degradation or Limited Degradation as State Policy 
Monitoring for Pesticides, Salt Water Intrusion, Hazardous Waste & Non-Hazardous Waste 
State Policy for Controlled Land Use Areas 
Percentage of Population Served by Groundwater 
Groundwater Withdrawal Per Day  
 
Energy Matrix: Indicators 
Least Cost Provisions & Regulations 
Income Tax Credits for Solar and Renewable Energy Systems 
Tax Credit Expiration Date 
Percentage of Available Solar Energy & Energy Conservation Bank 1982 – 1986 
Building Code Provisions 
Appliance Efficiency Standards 
Construction Work in Progress Policy   
 
The Green Index  
Arguably the most comprehensive index of state environmental program ranking 
is developed in 1991 with the Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991).  This study takes into 
account 256 indicators of state environmental health, including measures of 
environmental conditions, spending on environmental programs, state congressional 
leadership on environmental programs, and state environmental policy initiatives.  
Specific environmental factors examined include air pollution, water pollution, energy 
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use, automobile emissions, toxic and hazardous waste, workplace environment, 
farmlands, forests, and wildlife.  The Green Index covers much of the same ground as 
previous studies, but goes into greater detail.  When specific environmental conditions 
are examined, many more indicators are used to rank a state’s health.  The Green Index is 
much more inclusive in the indicators examined.  It is a more comprehensive ranking of 
state environmental health.  Table 4.3 provides a listing of the numerous indicators used 
to create the Green Index. 
The Green Index provides a detailed snapshot of the states’ environmental effort 
in 1991.  Table 4.4 shows the state ranking in the Green Index.  It also provides the 
ranking of states according to the two main categories of the Green Index: environmental 
policies and environmental conditions.  According to the overall composite index score, 
Oregon ranks highest in environmental health.  Alabama ranks last.  The index ranks 
states according to environmental conditions and policy initiatives.  Some of the states 
with poor environmental conditions responded to these conditions with aggressive policy 
initiatives (p. 135).  On the other hand, some states that rank high on policy initiatives 
rank low on spending.  These states do not provide the funding needed to follow through 
with policy implementation.  Thus, the Green Index presents a comprehensive picture of 
state environmental conditions and state response to these conditions.  The limitation of 
the Green Index is that it only provides this picture at one point in time.  While it serves 
as an excellent tool for a cross-sectional study, it does not allow for studying states’ 
environmental effort over time. 
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Table 4.3.  Environmental Indicators used in the Green Index 
 
Air Pollution       
Population with Air Violating Standards for Ozone 
Population with Air Violating Standards for Carbon Dioxide 
State Per Capita Spending on Air Pollution 
Density of Motor Vehicle Traffic & Pollution 
Toxic Chemical Releases by Industry to Air 
Toxic Emissions without End-of-Stack Controls 
High Risk Cancer Facilities 
Ozone-Depleting Emissions 
Acid Rain 
Air Emissions from U.S. Electric Utilities 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from all Fuels 
 
Water Pollution 
Total Chemical Underground Injections 
Public Sewers in Non-Compliance 
Investment for Sewer Needs to Year 2008 
Miles of Rivers, Streams, Lakes, & Reservoirs 
Percentage of Rivers, Streams, Lakes, & Reservoirs Unusable 
Spending on Water Quality & Development 
 
Water Pollution (continued) 
People Served by Groundwater 
Households Served by Own Wells 
Households with Septic Tank Only 
Pesticide Contaminated Groundwater 
Surface & Groundwater Systems Failing SDWA 
Percentage of Water Systems in Significant Non-Compliance 
Population with SDWA Violations 
Percentage of Water use for Drinking & Cooking 
 
Congressional Leadership & Policy Initiatives 
State Congressional Votes on Energy Bills 
Contributions Received by Congressmen from Energy-Related Groups 
Recycling Programs 
Landfill Requirements 
Toxic Waste Plans 
Acid Rain Plans 
Water Quality Monitoring 
Agricultural Monitoring 
Energy & Transportation Monitoring and Tests 
Place & Pollution Management Plans 
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Table 4.3 (continued).   
 
Toxic Waste 
Toxic Chemical Releases to the Land 
Toxic Chemical Transfers Off Site 
Cancer-Causing Chemicals Released to the Environment 
Birth Defect Toxins Released to the Environment 
Nerve Damaging Toxins Released to Environment 
Total Toxic Chemicals Releases to Environment 
Personal Income from Chemical Industry 
Hazardous Waste Generated 
Hazardous Waste Remaining in State 
Hazardous Waste RCRA Generators 
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities 
Hazardous Materials Transport Accidents 
Military Hazardous Sites 
State Spending to Manage Solid & Hazardous Waste 
Superfund NPL Sites 
Cleanup of NPL Sites 
Non-Superfund Waste Sites 
Non-Hazardous Subtitle D Impoundments 
Municipal Solid Waste Generated 
Municipal Waste Recycles 
Curbside Recycling Programs 
Open Municipal Landfills 
Municipal Incineration 
 
Energy 
Coal Production 
Oil Production 
Natural Gas Production 
Gross State Product from Energy 
Pipelines in Non-Compliance 
Oil Spills in State Water 
Oil & Gas Injections Wells 
Growth of Carbon Emissions (1966 - 1986) 
Carbon Emissions (Tons Per GSP) 
Growth in Per Capita Energy Consumption 
Energy Growth vs. Population Growth 
Low-Income Homes Weatherized 
Percentage of Electric Capacity in Nuclear Power 
Citations at Nuclear Plants 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste sent for Disposal 
Total Radioactive Waste in State 
Gasoline Use Per Capita 
Miles Per Gallon Gas Consumed 
Highway Deaths per Billon Miles Driven 
Persons Per Motor Vehicle 
Cars Per Transit Buses 
Dependency on Vehicle & Related Industries 
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Table 4.3 (continued).   
 
Highway Spending as a Percentage of Vehicle-Related Revenue 
Mass Transit Spending as a Percentage of Highway Spending 
Mass Transit Used in Urban Areas 
Renewables as a Percentage of All Energy 
Renewables as a Percentage of All Electricity 
Non-Hydro Renewables of Electricity 
Energy from Municipal Waste 
Solar Collection Systems 
 
Community & Workplace Health 
Cancer Cases & Deaths 
Premature Deaths 
Population in Underserved Areas 
Population without Insurance 
Public Health Spending 
State Medicaid Program 
Households without Plumbing 
Infant Mortality 
Workplace Deaths 
Workers in High-Risk Jobs 
Workers in most Toxic Industries 
Workers in High-Injury Industries 
Hazardous Waste Workers 
Maximum Unemployment Benefits 
 
Community & Workplace Health (continued) 
Unemployment Rates 
Population with Workplace Insurance 
Union Membership  
Laws for Workplace Safety  
 
Farms, Forest, Fish, & Recreation  
Number of Farms 
Farms Gained or Lost 
Farmland in State 
Fertilizer Use Per Capita 
Herbicides per Acre 
Pesticide Use Per Capita 
Pesticides Tainted Ground water 
Unsafe Nitrates in Wells 
Cropland Irrigated 
Cropland Erosion 
Conservation Tillage 
Acres in Conservation & Reserve   
Agriculture as a Percent of State Gross Product 
Forest Products 
Forest as a Percent of all Land 
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Table 4.3 (continued).    
 
Forests Owned by Timber Firms 
Change in Forest 
Private Tree Farms 
Lumber as a Percentage of Gross State Product 
Paper Mills 
Wetlands Lost 
Shellfish Fishing Water Limited 
Commercial Fish Landings 
Fishing Licenses 
Adults who Hunt of Fish 
Registered Motorboats 
Recreational Waters 
Total Land  
Land Owned by Federal Government 
Land Owned by Fish & Wildlife Services 
Land in State Park Areas 
Budget for State Parks 
Natural Resources as a Percentage of State Gross Product 
Population 
Conservation Members  
 
Environmental Stringency – The Levinson Index 
After conducting a thorough examination of state environmental policy measures, 
it becomes apparent that the effort to study the economic effects of environmental policy 
across states over time is problematic.  While there has been research specifically focused 
upon state environmental policy, none of this research is longitudinal.  The most cited 
environmental policy measures are cross sectional, thus only provide a snapshot of 
environmental policy in the states at single points in time.  In order to select a measure 
that accurately provides a representation of the variable that I am most interested in 
isolating, it becomes necessary to revisit the theory driving this research. 
 Some states approach the development of environmental policy from an economic 
perspective.  These states hope that by enacting environmental regulations that are less 
stringent than other states, they will entice businesses to locate new facilities or expand 
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existing facilities within their borders.  By providing a lower regulatory burden, states 
hope to lower operational costs for businesses.  Businesses are not forced to divert 
resources to pollution abatement measures, and thus, have the potential to reap greater 
profits by locating in states with weaker environmental policies.  Less stringent 
environmental regulations lower business costs and make the states more attractive as a 
siting location.  Thus, environmental stringency directly affects business cost. 
 Levinson (1999) develops a longitudinal measure that directly addresses the issue 
of business costs in an environmental regulatory setting.  Levinson begins with the 
Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey.  This 
survey was conducted from 1977 to 1994 (excluding 1987 when PACE data were not 
collected) and again in 1999.  Manufacturing industries are surveyed regarding their 
pollution abatement operating and capital costs.  Thus, the very factor that can influence 
industry location decisions is specifically asked of industries in this survey.  While some 
researchers use the PACE data as a longitudinal measure of environmental stringency, 
they fail to control for the fact that some states having higher numbers of polluting 
industries.  States with greater numbers of polluting industries will have greater amounts 
spent on pollution abatement costs by those industries.  This does not necessarily reflect 
greater environmental stringency of the states, however.  Greater levels of pollutions 
abatement spending is a function of greater numbers of polluting industries.  By the same 
token states with a lower concentration of pollution intensive industries will have overall 
lower industrial pollution abatement spending.  These states are not necessarily less 
stringent in their environmental policy, they just have fewer polluting industries within 
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their jurisdictions.  The industrial composition of the state is simply not considered.  It is 
a state characteristic that is not controlled for in the measure of the variable. 
 Levinson creates an “industry-adjusted index” in order to control for the industrial 
composition of a state.  According to Levinson (1999) “the index compares the actual 
pollution abatement costs in each state, unadjusted for industrial composition, to the 
predicted abatement costs in each state, where the predictions are based solely on 
nationwide abatement expenditures by industry and each state’s industrial composition” 
(p. 3).  Levinson accounts for both the pollution abatement spending by industries within 
a state and the industrial composition of the state.  His index is a reflection of what 
industries in each state are spending for pollution abatement purposes yearly, while 
controlling for the overall industrial composition in each state.  This index provides a 
measure of pollution spending in the states without “punishing” states that contain large 
numbers of polluting industries with poor scores on the index.  Essentially this index 
takes into account what similar businesses are spending in different states.  Levinson does 
not just tally up the cost of pollution abatement to businesses in each state.  He 
determines industrial pollution costs across the nation and then uses this to establish what 
these same industries spend in each state on pollution abatement.  By controlling for 
industrial composition, the Levinson Index resolves which states are costing businesses 
more for pollution abatement efforts.  Thus, he provides a measure of the environmental 
costs of conducting business within a particular state.   
This measure allows for the comparison of industry environmental costs across 
the states.  If environmental costs are higher in some states than in others, there must be 
reasons for this.  Industries would all build the most cost effective plants with similar 
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operating costs in every state in which they were located if their were not external factors 
causing them to do otherwise.  These external factors are state environmental policies.  
More stringent policies can increase the environmental operating costs of industries.  
Thus, states that have industries spending greater amounts on environmental/pollution 
abatement expenses are likely to have more stringent environmental policies/regulations 
in place.  However, Levinson does caution that factors other than stringency may also be 
affecting pollution control costs.  Labor costs for environmental workers may vary across 
states and have an effect upon pollution abatement costs.  Further, age of facilities is not 
taken into account.  New facilities are often subject to higher environmental standards 
than existing plants, adding to their pollution abatement costs.  This measure does not 
take these other factors into account.  While these limitations are important, the Levinson 
Index does provide a useful tool for evaluating industry environmental costs across the 
states.  These costs can be affected by state policy decisions.   
 Table 4.4 illustrates how the states rank in environmental effort/stringency 
according to the most frequently used cross-sectional measures and Levinson’s industry-
adjusted index.  The ranking of the Conservation Foundation Index, FREE Index, and the 
Green Index are presented.  The Green Index ranking is also divided into its component 
parts of state environmental conditions ranking and state policy ranking.  A quick glance 
at Table 4.4 shows that while the three “conventional” indices have similar ranking 
patterns, there are some large differences between these and the Levinson Index.  For 
example, California is ranked in the top four of the “conventional” indices, but ranks 29th 
on the Levinson Index.  Mississippi has rankings of 48, 28, and 47 on the “conventional” 
indices, but ranks 7th on the Levinson Index.  Levinson runs correlations on the indices  
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Table 4.4.  Rankings of State Environmental Effort/Stringency According to Various 
Indices 
  Conservation  FREE  Green Green Green  Levinson  
  Foundation Index  Index  Index Cond. Policy  Index 
Alabama  50  26  50 47 49  14 
Alaska   33  25  34 18 47   
Arizona   32  19  35 26 39  9 
Arkansas  26  25  48 40 50  15 
California  2  2  4 19 1  29 
Colorado  27  21  16 10 26  20 
Connecticut  14  4  11 23 4  44 
Delaware  21  21  24 27 25  11 
Florida   17  7  18 30 13  13 
Georgia   29  20  39 38 29  28 
Hawaii   12  24  12 1 24   
Idaho   47  25  19 11 36  1 
Illinois   23  7  31 42 17  26 
Indiana   11  10  43 49 27  17 
Iowa   21  8  20 29 16  24 
Kansas   33  17  42 43 28  38 
Kentucky  12  18  41 39 33  22 
Louisiana  43  21  49 50 34  5 
Maine   14  10  2 4 5  4 
Maryland  7  12  13 14 15  16 
Massachusetts  4  7  6 6 9  43 
Michigan  18  5  17 32 11  19 
Minnesota  1  9  5 5 7  46 
Mississippi  48  28  47 44 46  7 
Missouri  49  15  30 33 23  35 
Montana  7  22  21 15 31  6 
Nebraska  39  31  29 24 30  31 
Nevada   39  22  22 9 43  47 
New Hampshire  43  14  15 8 20  39 
New Jersey  3  3  14 28 3  34 
New Mexico  46  22  28 20 38  2 
New York  7  5  8 17 8  36 
North Carolina  29  6  23 37 18  33  
North Dakota  39  26  25 16 37  37 
Ohio   18  12  37 46 19  32 
Oklahoma  45  17  40 31 42  48 
Oregon   5  11  1 3 2  12 
Pennsylvania  23  14  26 34 21  27 
Rhode Island  27  16  7 7 10  41 
South Carolina  29  15  36 35 32  21 
South Dakota  18  22  27 12 48  42 
Tennessee  33  17  45 45 40  18 
Texas   39  20  46 48 35  8 
Utah   33  26  33 22 41  25 
Vermont  14  18  3 2 12  45 
Virginia   23  13  32 36 22  23 
Washington  6  17  9 13 14  6 
West Virginia  33  27  44 41 45  3 
Wisconsin  7  1  10 21 6  30 
Wyoming  33  26  38 25 44  40 
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and finds that the Conservation Foundation Index, FREE Index, and Green Index are 
highly positively correlated.  However, these indices are negatively correlated with his 
index.   
 Levinson suggests reasons for a lack of correlation with the “conventional” 
indices.  The “conventional” indices all include state environmental conditions in their 
measures.  Levinson’s index is based on industry expenditures.  These expenditures may 
be higher in states with poor environmental conditions because they are mandated to 
meet federal requirements.  Thus, poor conditions which lead to a low ranking on the 
“conventional” indices can cause increased industry spending which leads to a higher 
ranking on the Levinson Index.  Further, Levinson points out that the other indices 
frequently include policies that have nothing to do with industry costs (e.g., curbside 
recycling).  Consequently, the indices are measuring different concepts.  The 
“conventional” indices focus on state environmental effort and policy.  The Levinson 
Index focuses on the costs of state policies upon the industries they regulate.  As stated 
by Levinson, the “index measures how much it costs to locate a manufacturing facility in 
any one state, relative to others, in terms of pollution abatement costs” (p. 12). 
Conclusion 
Researchers have used many ways to measure environmental policy in the states.  
State environmental spending levels, state environmental conditions, and state 
environmental policy/effort indices are commonly used.  In this study I seek to determine 
if states can spur economic growth by getting new industries to locate within their 
borders or by having existing industries expand their operations with the inducement of 
lower environmental costs.  In other words, can states reap an economic reward by 
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enacting environmental regulations that will result in lower operating costs for business 
and industry?  The Levinson Index provides a measurement tool that specifically 
examines the environmental/pollution abatement costs of industries in the states across 
time.  Since this is the variable I am most interested in isolating, it is used as the main 
independent variable of interest in this study.  The next chapter presents the model used 
in this analysis.  All dependent and independent variables are thoroughly examined. 
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CHAPTER 5:   
THE MODEL 
Existing studies tend to focus on one or two regulatory measures, and a single 
econometric specification.  One worthwhile project would involve trying out a 
variety of these differences to see which matter the most.  (Gray, 1997, p. 103) 
 
In this research I attempt to discover whether state environmental policy has an 
impact upon state economic growth.  Two conflicting theories are prevalent in the 
environment versus economy debate.  The first theory posits that stringent environmental 
regulations increase the operating costs of businesses, thereby, decreasing the likelihood 
that businesses will locate (or expand operations) in states with more strict regulations.  
Without business expansions to stimulate growth, state economies will suffer.  Moreover, 
stringent environmental regulations lower the efficiency of state businesses by imposing 
costs on their production activities.  The second theory holds that states with more 
stringent regulations have better environmental conditions that serve to attract both 
businesses and high quality workers needed by these businesses.  Thus, environmental 
regulations improve state characteristics that are appealing to potential businesses.  As a 
result, businesses locate in these “greener” states, stimulating the state economies and 
enhancing state economic growth.   
In this study, I model state economic growth as a function of state environmental 
policy stringency.  Three variables are used as measures of state economic growth.  
Because of limitations of the availability of the data used as measures of environmental 
stringency, separate models are estimated for the time periods of 1977 to 1994 and 1986 
to 2003.  Data for this study are drawn mainly from the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, although other sources were 
used for specific variables.  All fifty states are examined in the analysis.  The data is 
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analyzed to determine whether environmental policies enacted by states effect state 
economic growth.  The dependent and independent variables utilized in this study are 
discussed in turn. 
Dependent Variable: State Economic Performance and Growth 
The dependent variable of interest is state economic performance, measured 
primarily in terms of state economic growth.  I seek to understand the impact of 
environmental policy upon state economies.  State policymakers who support more lax 
regulations generally argue that a less stringent regulatory environment will encourage 
business development and result in overall economic growth.  Three different measures 
are used in an attempt to capture the basic elements of the concept of state economic 
performance.  I estimate separate models for each of the three variables.  
State economic growth can be measured in a number of ways.  I focus on 
measures related to state income and employment.  The first measure of state economic 
growth is change in state total personal income.  I collect data on real (deflated) total 
personal income by state for each year.  To capture change in personal income, I lagged 
this variable by one year and calculated the percentage change from year t-1 to year t.  
This was done in order to reflect growth in income that might have come about as a result 
of state policies enacted in the prior year.  The use of a lagged dependent variable allows 
for the capture of change in economic conditions (Brace, 1991).  The second measure of 
state economic growth is change in state per capita income.  I collect data for real 
(deflated) state per capita income and, as with the first measure, this variable is lagged by 
one year in order to attain a measure of growth in per capita income.  The final measure 
of state economic performance is state unemployment rates.  If state economies grow as a 
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result of growth in new or existing businesses, more citizens should be able to find work 
in these businesses.  The measure is simply the unemployment levels in the states for 
each year.  This variable is the unemployment rate measured as the number of 
unemployed persons in the state as a percentage of the civilian non-institutional 
population over the age of 16 in each state for each year.  These three variables provide 
an illustration of different factors that encompass a state’s economic growth.  Thus, these 
three state economic indicators that focus on change in state income and unemployment 
rates are used as measures of state economic growth.  
Independent Variable: Environmental Policy 
As discussed in the previous chapter, many different indicators are used by 
researchers as measures of state environmental policy.  In this study, I emphasize the 
Levinson Index, since this measure focuses on the environmental regulatory costs for 
businesses in the states.  However, since this measure is only available from 1977 to 
1994, two other commonly used (but less valid) measures are examined for the time 
period from 1986 to 2003.  State spending on environmental programs and state 
environmental conditions will also be included in the analysis in separate models 
accounting for a different time period.  In the full analysis presented in Chapter 6, I also 
present a brief model examining the effects of the Green Index and the Green Policy 
Index, the cross-sectional policy indexes discussed fully in Chapter 4.  Since these 
indexes are described thoroughly in the preceding chapter and are discussed in the model 
in Chapter 6, I do not repeat that discussion in this section.  Instead, I focus on the critical 
longitudinal independent variables of the Levinson Index, state environmental spending 
per capita, and state environmental conditions. 
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The Levinson Index 
The Levinson Index is the main independent variable of interest in the analysis of 
the years 1977 through 1994.  As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Levinson Index 
is created using data from the Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs and 
Expenditures (PACE) survey that details the costs to business and industry of complying 
with environmental regulations.  As the Census Bureau did not conduct the PACE survey 
in 1987, the Levinson Index does not contain data for this year.  However, using the 
available years of the index, data were imputed using linear interpolation to produce a 
value for 1987 for each state. 
The Levinson Index provides a yearly score for each state based on the PACE 
assessment of business costs.  This index is based on the amount that business and 
industry in each state spend on pollution control measures while accounting for the 
industrial composition of the state.  Thus, states are not ranked high on the index simply 
because they are home to larger numbers of polluting industries.  The industrial 
composition of the state is factored into the score assigned to each state.  This is used as a 
measure of environmental policy stringency because it is likely that business and industry 
will be forced to pay higher pollution costs if a state has more stringent environmental 
regulations.  Further, for the purposes of this study, I am specifically interested in 
whether the costs imposed on businesses to comply with environmental regulations are a 
detriment to state economic growth.  By using a variable that specifically measures such 
costs, I am able to explore the key question of interest in this dissertation. 
If the policymakers who argue that environmental regulatory stringency has a 
negative effect on business growth that in turn has a negative impact upon a state’s 
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economy are correct, I expect that there will be a negative relationship between the 
Levinson Index and growth in state total personal income and state per capita income.  
Further, there will be a positive relationship between the Levinson Index and state 
unemployment rates.  However, if those who argue that more stringent environmental 
regulations produce positive environmental conditions that serve to attract business and 
industry to a state are correct, I expect to find the opposite results.  The Levinson Index 
will be positively related to change in state total personal income and state per capita 
income and negatively related to state unemployment rates.  
State Environmental Spending 
Data collected by the Council of State Governments (CGS) and by the 
Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) on state environmental and natural resource 
spending is used as a measure of environmental policy for the second time period 
analyzed in this study.  While this measure is not an ideal measure of environmental 
policy and the stringency of environmental regulation, it does capture the general 
willingness of each state to commit budgetary resources toward environmental goals.  
While specific policies are not accounted for in this variable, it does serve as a global 
measure of state commitment to environmental goals.  This measure is used for the model 
estimates for the years from 1986 through 2003.  The CGS collected these state spending 
data in 1986, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1996, while ECOS collected these data for the more 
recent years of 2000 and 2003.   
This spending data are reported in two forms.  The total amount spent in each 
state on environmental and natural resources is available for all of the reporting years.  
The amount spent per capita in each state is available for the years 1994, 1996, 2000, and 
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2003.  Population data from the Statistical Abstract and total environmental and natural 
resource spending for each state are used to calculate state per capita environmental and 
natural resource spending for the years of 1986, 1988, and 1991.  The data are then 
imputed to provide values for the years in which the actual data are not collected. 
If policymakers who argue for stronger environmental policies in order to provide 
“clean” conditions as an enticement to businesses to locate within their borders are 
correct, I expect greater environmental and natural resources spending to be positively 
related to change in state total personal income and state per capita income.  
Unemployment rates will be negatively related to environmental and natural resource 
spending.  However, if those policymakers who worry that businesses will be deterred by 
a stricter environmental regulatory policy setting are correct, greater state spending on 
environmental and natural resources will be negatively related to growth in state total 
personal income and state per capita income.  Further, there will be a positive relationship 
between state environmental and natural resource spending and state unemployment 
rates. 
State Environmental Conditions  
Since one of the key purposes of environmental regulations is to control and/or 
reduce pollution, those states with more stringent regulations should see a benefit from 
those regulations in the existence of better (i.e., cleaner) environmental conditions.  Data 
regarding industrial chemical releases is collected annually by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).  This data is available 
for every year since 1988.  Two indicators from the TRI are used in this analysis to 
measure environmental conditions: chemical air emissions and water releases.  Data from 
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the TRI is utilized for information contained on these air and water releases.  It is 
expected that states with stricter environmental regulations would have lower numbers 
reported on their TRI.   
If officials who believe that strict environmental regulations harm a state’s 
business climate are correct, I expect environmental conditions as reflected in the TRI 
will be positively related to change in state total personal income and state per capita 
income (i.e., the higher the emissions, the greater the income growth).  Under these 
circumstances, environmental conditions will be negatively related to state 
unemployment rates.  Conversely, if those who believe that “greener” conditions create a 
better climate for business development and subsequent economic growth are correct, 
then emissions will be negatively related to state total personal income and per capita 
income (i.e., the lower the emissions, the greater the income growth) and positively 
related to state unemployment rates.    
Additional Independent Variables 
 In order to understand the relationship between state environmental policy and 
state economic growth, other variables that can have an impact upon state economic 
growth must be considered in the analysis.  A variety of factors can have an influence 
upon state economies.  These factors include business incentives offered by states to 
encourage industrial growth, the national economic climate in which the states operate, 
the internal fiscal conditions under which the states operate, state structural and 
institutional characteristics that can affect the policymaking environment, and 
demographic characteristics of the states that may make them more or less appealing as 
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siting locations to business and industry.  The variables used to measure each of these 
elements in the analysis are discussed in turn.  
State Business Policies 
 In an effort to support business and industrial development, many states actively 
engage in the adoption of pro-business policies.  Policymakers in these states believe that 
by providing incentives to businesses, they can encourage expansion of existing 
businesses and the location of new businesses within their borders.  The ultimate hope is 
that the expansion of the business sector will have a positive impact upon state economic 
growth.  Thus, businesses and industries are offered incentives by states so that the states 
can grow their economies. 
Each year Site Selection magazine (formally Site Selection and Industrial 
Development Handbook) conducts a survey of state economic officials to assess the 
legislative business climate within each state.  The magazine survey indicates whether 
each state possesses eighteen different policies to provide financial assistance for industry 
(see Appendix A).  An additive scale is created that provides a score of government 
financial assistance for each state for each year.  The higher the state score, the more 
financial assistance policies a state has in place.   
Data are not available for 1994.  To create a value for this missing year, I estimate 
1994 data based on an interpolation of data for policies in place in 1993 and 1995.  If a 
policy is (or is not) in place in both 1993 and 1995, I assume that the policy is (or is not) 
in place in 1994.  When a change does occur between 1993 and 1995, I assume that the 
change occurred in 1995.  Hence, in these cases the 1994 value is assigned the same 
value as for 1993.   
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Policymakers enact these financial assistance policies with the expectation that 
such policies will encourage business expansions and/or entice new businesses to locate 
within their states.  Thus, the enactment of these policies is done so with the expectation 
of spurring economic growth.  I expect that this variable will be positively related to the 
state income variables and negatively related to state unemployment rates.  
 Site Selection magazine also has information available on the types of tax 
incentives states offer business and industry.  Data on fifteen tax incentives are collected, 
including corporate income tax exemptions, incentives for the creation of jobs, and excise 
tax exemptions (see Appendix A).  An additive scale is created for this variable as well, 
with higher scores indicating more tax incentives offered by the state.  Once again, 1994 
data are missing for this variable.  The data are treated in the same manner as described 
for the state financial assistance variable to provide a value for the missing year.   
Similar to the financial assistance variable, state policymakers enact these tax 
incentives hoping to stimulate growth and encourage expansion within the business 
sector.  The ultimate goal of business tax incentive policies is to improve overall state 
economic growth.  Therefore, the relationship between the tax incentive variable and the 
state income variables should be positive.  The more tax incentives offered to businesses, 
the greater the growth in state total income and state per capita income.  I expect to find a 
negative relationship between the unemployment variable and the tax incentive variables.  
The more tax incentives offered, the lower the state unemployment rate. 
National Economic Conditions 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, research indicates that national economic conditions 
can have great influence upon state economic development.  States exist and operate 
 98
within the national economy, and it is likely that national economic trends will have an 
impact upon state economic growth.  While states may attempt to control the effect of 
economic conditions through the enactment of economic policies, they cannot eliminate 
the influence that the national economy will exert upon state economies. 
The first national economic variable examined is change in national real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.  This variable reflects the change in national per 
capita GDP from one year to the next.  Data are collected from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and Economic History Services websites.  I expect changes in national per 
capita GDP to be positively related to the state income variables and negatively related to 
state unemployment.  This is consistent with Brace’s (1993) findings that national 
economic conditions often have greater effects than state policies on state economic 
conditions.   
 The next national economic indicator examined is national unemployment.  This 
variable is a measure of the nation’s unemployment rate.  Data are collected from the 
Statistical Abstract.  I expect this variable will be negatively related to the state income 
variables and positively related to state unemployment. 
 While research does indicate that national economic conditions can exert a great 
deal of influence upon state economies (Brace, 1991; Garand and Hendrick, 1991), this 
effect is not necessarily consistent among all of the states.  The effects of national 
economic conditions will vary among the states.  Some states are more likely to be 
affected by national conditions than others.  For example, Louisiana is a state that is 
heavily reliant upon the oil industry for its economic performance.  While high oil prices 
may benefit Louisiana, the nation as a whole may see an economic downturn as a result 
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of rising oil prices.  Indeed, the economies of non-oil producing states can be harmed by 
an increase in oil prices.  An oil price increase can harm the national economy and states 
within that economy, while at the same time benefiting the economies of oil-producing 
states.  Thus, some states may not be as influenced by national economic conditions as 
others.  Indeed, Brace (1991) points out that states with energy resources faired better 
than the nation as a whole during the oil crises of the mid to late 1970s.  These states 
were not as susceptible to the unstable economic conditions that influenced the national 
economy. 
State Fiscal Conditions 
 The potential for state economic growth can be either limited or expanded by 
existing state fiscal conditions.  States that are heavily indebted will be forced to allocate 
resources to paying off that debt.  Instead of being able to invest dollars into areas that 
could benefit the state economically, these states must use resources to satisfy old 
obligations.  Moreover, states with heavy debt will be constrained in their ability to make 
new investments, and some proposed investments may be limited by the greater difficulty 
that states with heavy debt may face when they attempt to borrow money.  State 
economies are also affected by the level of federal dollars they receive each year.  Such 
dollars can alleviate the needs for states to use their limited financial resources in areas 
that the federal government provides assistance.  With federal monies used to cover some 
state costs, states can otherwise allocate some of their limited resources into areas 
designed to spur economic growth.  To account for such fiscal conditions, measures of 
state debt and federal aid are included in this analysis. 
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Data are collected on the total debt outstanding for each state for each year from 
the Statistical Abstract for the years 1977 to 2003.  A variable is then created that 
measures total state debt as a proportion of total state personal income.  I expect that state 
economic growth will be lower in states that have greater debt as a proportion of total 
state income.  Therefore, this state debt variable is expected to be negatively related to 
the state income variables and positively related to state unemployment rates. 
 The Statistical Abstract provides data on the total amount of federal aid received 
by each state.  These data are collected for each state for each year from 1977 to 2003.  A 
per capita measure of federal aid in each state is created for the analysis.  I am unsure 
how this variable will affect the dependent variables.  It may be that the more federal aid 
a state receives, the better it is able to increase its infrastructure and attract businesses 
which will help to increase economic performance.  If this is the case, then the federal aid 
variable will be positively related to the state income variables and negatively related to 
state unemployment.  On the other hand, receipt of greater federal aid may be a result of 
increased need due to poor state economic conditions.  If greater federal aid is a response 
to state economic need, I expect this variable to be negatively related to the state income 
variables and positively related to state unemployment rates.  
State Structural/Institutional Characteristics 
 Certain state structural or institutional characteristics have the potential to 
influence state economic growth.  State tax structure, gubernatorial power, and legislative 
professionalism can contribute both to the amount of revenues that states can collect and 
the capacity of government to make effective use of those revenues in order to stimulate 
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economic growth.  Thus, these factors must be considered in the analysis of influences 
upon state economic growth.  
Tax structure is a critical variable in the discussion of a state’s ability to affect its 
economic growth.  The manner in which a state chooses to tax its citizens has an effect 
upon the revenue received and, hence, the state economy.  As witnessed at the national 
level throughout the 1990s, there is great debate on how a tax system should be 
structured.  Some argue the benefit of a progressive income tax system while others favor 
flat tax structures.  Winters (1999) calculates the regressivity of states’ tax systems by 
measuring the “percentage of income extracted in taxes from the lowest 40 percent of 
income earners as a percentage of the percent of income extracted from the top 5 
percentage of income earners in each state” (p. 317).  A higher number reflects a state 
with a more regressive tax structure.  This measure of tax regressivity can be used as a 
measure of the state tax structure.   
Regrettably, I must point out that this is a cross-sectional variable.  Winters 
created this measure using 1991 tax data; thus, the measure does not vary over time for 
the states.  While not an ideal measure for a longitudinal analysis, the variable does 
provide some insight into the tax structure of the states, allowing for the understanding of 
the role tax structure plays in state economic growth.  Just how this variable will affect 
the economic growth variables depends upon which side of the tax structure argument is 
correct.  If proponents of sales taxes are correct, then this number should positively effect 
economic growth.  But if proponents of progressive incomes taxes are correct, then 
greater state tax regressivity should negatively effect state economic growth.  
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 Since the 1990s, gubernatorial candidates have frequently stressed their abilities 
to positively enhance state economic growth in order to demonstrate their qualifications 
for the highest office in their states.  In order for a governor to influence state economic 
conditions, he or she must possess the structural capacity to do so.  Brace (1993) notes 
that states with more powerful governors achieved greater effects on per capita income.  
Greater institutional capability allows states to have a greater influence upon economic 
growth.  Governors with the capacity to more effectively institute policies aimed at 
improving economic growth will be more successful than governors with weak 
institutional capacities.  Beyle (1999) has developed a measure of gubernatorial 
institutional power by examining six factors: gubernatorial tenure, appointment power, 
budgetary power, veto power, party control, and whether a state’s executive branch 
officials are elected separately or together.  Beyle’s score is used in this analysis.  As with 
the tax structure variable, this measure is also cross-sectional and does not vary over 
time.  However, it does provide some understanding of gubernatorial capacity for the 
purposes of this analysis.  According to this index the higher the score a state receives, 
the greater the institutional power of the state’s governor.  I expect this variable to be 
positively related to the state income variables and negatively related to state 
unemployment rates.  
While governors might like to imagine that sole responsibility for state policy lies 
in their hands, the legislature is a critical body in state policymaking.  Much research has 
focused on the increased professionalism of state legislatures and the notion that 
increased professionalism enables a legislature to better affect state policy 
(Mooney,1995; Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz, 1996; Rosenthal, 1998; Dilger, Krause, 
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and Moffett,1995; King, 2000).  King examines legislative professionalism over a thirty 
year period, providing a legislative score for each decade.  This measure is used in this 
analysis.  Since King calculates the score each decade, this variable does provide slight 
variation in the states over time.  The score for each state changes in 1983 and again in 
1993.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of legislative professionalism in the states.  
Consistent with Brace’s (1993) finding that states with more professional legislatures are 
able to affect per capita income due to greater institutional capability, I expect that 
greater legislative professionalism will be positively related to state income variables and 
negatively related to state unemployment rates.  State legislatures that have the capacity 
to enact policies designed to achieve increased state economic growth will use that 
capacity to do so.  
State Demographic Variables 
 In addition to the business policy, national economic conditions, state fiscal, and 
state structural/institutional variables, other variables that reflect demographic 
characteristics of the state have the potential to influence state economic growth.  These 
types of variables can be important factors for businesses in making site location 
decisions.  They can also be important to a state’s ability to grow its industrial sector.  
Education, manufacturing employment, political culture, agricultural strength, region, 
urbanization, and race are variables that are used frequently in state economic studies to 
account for economic differences among the states.  Thus, these demographic variables 
are included in the analysis. 
The educational attainment of a state’s citizenry can be critical is its efforts to 
court new business and industries.  Educational attainment is measured in two ways.  The 
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first variable is one that represents the percentage of a state’s population that has a high 
school diploma.  The second variable is the percentage of a state’s population that has at 
least a college degree.  These data are collected from the Statistical Abstract, the Current 
Population Reports, and the American Community Survey.  Some explanation of how 
these variables are collected and created is necessary.  Unfortunately, the Census Bureau 
has not been consistent in either how it has asked questions regarding educational 
attainment or how often it has asked these questions during the years covered in this 
study.  Prior to 1989, the Census Bureau asked respondents whether they had completed 
four years or more of high school and whether they had completed four years or more of 
college.  In 1989 the questions were changed to specifically ask whether a high school 
degree or its equivalent was attained and whether a college degree was earned.  
Obviously these questions are not providing the same information, as it is possible that a 
respondent before 1989 could have gone to either high school or college for more than 
four years without actually having attained a degree.  In addition the ages of respondents 
examined changed during the period under examination.  Prior to 1989, answers reported 
in various years were reported for the population over the age of 14, the population over 
the age of 15, the population over the age of 18, and the population over the age of 25.  
Since 1989, though, results have been consistently reported for the population over the 
age of 25.  While these represent key differences in the data collected over the time 
period, for the purposes of this analysis, the data are treated as equivalent. 
A second problem with the educational attainment data arises concerning the 
reporting years and reporting regions.  The census occurs every ten years and the 
Statistical Abstract provides data for the census years for each state.  The census years 
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covered in this analysis are 1980, 1990, and 2000.  The Current Population Reports and 
American Community Survey provide estimates of these educational attainment data 
based on samples from the states for select years.  Current Population Reports data 
available for the time period covered in this analysis are for the years 1977, 1979, 1981, 
1983, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993 to 1999.  A further complication involves the years 
1977 to 1987.  The Current Population Reports did not report the data for each state.  
Instead, regional educational attainment data is provided.  The American Community 
Survey provides the educational attainment data through the Census Bureau website for 
the years 2001 to 2003.  While complete data are available for each state from 1993 to 
2003, reporting gaps exists from 1977 to 1992.  The data are imputed to provide values 
for the missing years of 1978, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1992.  In order to 
prepare the data for imputation, I removed data for some states for some years that 
exhibited extreme outliers in the level of educational attainment. Hence the time series 
for these variables are slightly smoothed over time. 
Business and industry looking for areas in which to develop often seek out 
locations with educated workforces so that the costs of training employees will be lower.  
States with better educated citizens should be more attractive for business developers.  I 
expect these states to have an advantage in their potential for economic growth.  Further, 
since educational attainment and income achievement are linked, I expect that states 
whose citizenries possess higher levels of educational attainment will have higher levels 
of economic performance.  Thus, I expect the educational attainment variables will be 
positively related to the state income variables.  Educational attainment will be negatively 
related to state unemployment.   
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The amount of a state’s labor force that is employed in the manufacturing sector 
can also have an impact upon state economic growth.  Data are collected from the 
Statistical Abstract on the number of employees in each state that are employed in the 
manufacturing sector.  These data are used to create a variable that represents 
manufacturing employment as a proportion of the total state population.  Just as business 
and industry may want to develop in a state with a more highly educated workforce to 
keep employee training costs lower, they may be attracted to an area with a large number 
of employees who are already trained in the manufacturing area.  Such employees may be 
easier to train in industrial jobs.  States with large proportions of their population already 
employed in this sector may be more appealing to new business and industrial 
developers.  Thus, the manufacturing employment variable is expected to be positively 
related to the state income variables and negatively related to state unemployment rates. 
 Political culture is another state characteristic that can have an influence upon 
state economic growth.  Johnson’s (1976) reformulation of Elazar’s classification of state 
political culture using discriminant analysis is utilized to assign a political culture score 
to each state.  Traditional states are coded 0, individualistic states are coded 1, and 
moralistic states are coded 2.  Johnson’s categorization excluded Hawaii and Alaska.  
Multinomial logit is used to create a model of predicted political culture from the 
variables utilized in this model.  The predicted political culture model had an R2 of .594.  
Thus, the model was used to predict scores for the two missing states.  Hawaii is 
classified as a moralistic state.  Alaska is classified as an individualistic state.  
Categorization of political culture classifies moralistic states as more reliant upon 
government solutions to problems.  These moralistic states are expected to actively use 
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government means to make their states more desirable areas to live (e.g., infrastructure 
development).  Such improvements can make states more attractive to business and 
industrial development.  Such development can lead to state economic growth.  
Therefore, moralistic political culture should be positively related to the state income 
variables and negatively related to the state unemployment rate variable.    
The strength of the agricultural sector of a state can also have an impact upon 
state economic growth.  Data on the number of farms in each state is collected using both 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Statistics and the Statistical Abstract.  
These data are used to create a measure of the number of farms per capita in each state 
for each year.  Data values are missing for 1981, so the available data are imputed to 
create a value for that year for each state.  Brace (1993) suggests that since the 1970s, 
state economic development policy has “focus[ed] on the creation of new industries and 
markets and the expansion of existing ones” (p. 28).  Since so much state effort has been 
put forth to develop business and industries, the presumption appears to be that these 
sectors are most economically advantageous for the states while the agricultural sector is 
not as ripe for economic growth.  Since states with greater number of farms per capita are 
likely more reliant upon the agricultural sector, policymakers in these states may be less 
willing to adopt policies designed to increase industrial development.  Hence this variable 
is expected to be negatively related to the state income variables.  On the other hand, 
agriculture is a labor-intensive sector of the market, and an active agricultural sector may 
be a heavy employer that takes advantage of slack labor markets.  Even as a large 
agricultural sector may generate less income than other economic sectors, it may reduce 
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unemployment, albeit with lower-paying jobs.  Hence, I hypothesize that farms per capita 
will be negatively related to state unemployment.  
 Regional location is another factor that is important to the states.  As Brace (1993) 
notes, globalization has had a negative effect upon the economies of southern states.  For 
decades the southern region relied on low wages to attract industrial development.  
Globalization has made other nations, with significantly lower wage rates, more attractive 
for this purpose.  Also, southern states have traditionally been more rural-based 
economies.  As such, it is expected that their economic growth would be lower than other 
regions; though, this specific effect should be captured by the farms per capita variable.  
It is worth noting that in more recent years southern states have experienced higher levels 
of growth than in their past.  Historically, though, growth in these states has been weaker 
than in other states so southern states had more potential for growth.  This “south” 
variable is coded 1 for southern states and 0 for other states.  While an argument can be 
made for increased growth in the south, I expect the effects of globalization and the 
strength of traditional agricultural sectors to outweigh the effects of more recent growth. 
Thus, I expect this variable to be negatively related to the state income variables and 
positively related to the state unemployment variable.  
 Urbanization levels can also have an important impact upon state economic 
growth.  Data from the Statistical Abstract are utilized to develop a measure of the lagged 
urban population proportion of a state.  More urban areas are expected to possess greater 
numbers of businesses which should enhance state economic growth.  Therefore, the 
variable is expected to be positively related to the state income variables.  The 
relationship with state unemployment is less conclusive, however.  While greater 
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numbers of businesses should increase employment rates, stories are constantly told of 
the need for redevelopment in cities and the high unemployment rates of inner city 
residents.  Fieock (1991) describes the fiscal crises in the mid-1970s and economic 
downturns in the 1980s which drove cities to pursue economic development policies.  
However, he does not find evidence that local economic development initiatives 
enhanced employment rates.  Hence, it is inconclusive as to what the relationship will be 
between state urbanization levels and state unemployment.  
 A final state demographic characteristic examined in the analysis is that of racial 
composition.  This variable is a measure of the lagged black population proportion of 
each state.  Data are utilized from the Statistical Abstract to create this variable.  Minority 
areas are generally regarded as poorer areas lacking economic growth.  Stories are 
repeatedly told of the need for business development in minority neighborhoods in order 
to revitalize these areas.  Thus, this variable is expected to be negatively related to the 
state income variables and positively related to unemployment. 
Conclusion 
 The model described in this chapter explores the relationship between state 
environmental regulatory policy and state economic growth while controlling for other 
independent variables that can also have an impact upon state economic growth.  The 
purpose of this analysis is to determine whether state environmental policy does have an 
effect on state economic growth.  Specifically, I am trying to ascertain whether these 
environment policies influence the business climate within the states in a manner that 
directly effects state economic growth.  To gain a full understanding of this relationship, 
other factors that can have an impact upon state economic growth must be considered.  A 
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variety of factors can effect state economic growth.  These include elements within the 
states that can influence business decisions that have an impact upon state economies.  
They can also include elements that are external to the states, but still influence the state 
economies.  State business policies, the national economic climate, state fiscal conditions, 
state structural/institutional characteristics, and state demographic characteristics are 
included in the model.  These variables are necessary to capture the true effect that 
environmental regulatory policy has upon economic growth.  Without the inclusion of 
these control variables in the model, the accuracy of the results would be questionable.   
 Reasons for including each of the control variables are discussed in detail 
throughout this chapter.  Table 5.1 provides an illustration of the expectations of the 
relationships between the dependent state economic growth variables and all of the 
independent variables.  Two of the dependent variables are income variables and the third 
is an unemployment variable.  As is readily noticed from a quick glance at the table, these 
variables work in opposite directions.  When a positive relationship is expected with the 
income variables, a negative relationship is expected with the unemployment variable.  
Similarly, when a negative relationship is expected with the income variables, a positive 
relationship is expected with the unemployment variables.  Since growing income 
suggests a growing economy with growing employment, this is not surprising.  Income 
and unemployment should work in different ways. 
 The expected relationship between the dependent variables and the state 
environmental policy variables are illustrated as a function of the “pro-business, anti-
regulation” side of the argument.  For the purposes of this table, I assume that those who 
argue against strict environmental regulations in order to stimulate business and industrial 
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development are correct in their assertions that such regulations depress business growth, 
and hence, depress state economic growth.  As discussed earlier in the chapter, if the 
proponents of more stringent regulations are correct in their assertions that “greener” 
environments actually attract business and stimulate economic growth, then the 
relationships would run in the opposite direction from that depicted in Table 5.1.  The 
state income dependent variables would be positively related to the Levinson Index and 
state environmental spending and negatively related to the environmental conditions 
variables.  The state unemployment variable would be negatively related to the Levinson 
Index and state environmental spending variables and positively related to environmental 
conditions. 
 The relationships between the dependent variables and independent variables are 
explored in the remaining chapters.  Now that the model is prepared with the variables 
fully described, the analysis can occur.  Regressions establish the nature of the 
relationship between state economic growth and the independent variables described in 
this chapter.  The model is ready for scrutiny. 
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Table 5.1. Expectations of Relationships between Dependent and Independent Variables. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
       Change in State    Change in State   State  
       Total Personal    Per Capita    Unemployment 
       Income      Income     Rate    
       ------------------------   ----------------------  ------------------- 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Environmental Policy Variables *      
 Levinson Index      -      -      + 
 State Environmental Spending   -      -      + 
 State Environmental Conditions   
  Air Emissions     +      +      -  
  Water Emissions    +      +      - 
 
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance     +      +      - 
 Tax Incentives      +      +      - 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP   +      +      - 
 National Unemployment    -      -      + 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt       -      -      + 
 Federal Aid **      ?      ?      ? 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure **     ?      ?      ? 
 Gubernatorial Power    +      +      - 
 Legislative Professionalism   +      +      - 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree    +      +      - 
  College Degree     +      +      - 
 Manufacturing Employment   +      +      -  
 Political Culture (Moralistic)   +      +      - 
 Farms        -      -      + 
 South        -      -      + 
 Urbanization **      +      +      ? 
 Black        -      -      + 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
* For the purposes of this table, expectations of relationships between environmental policy and economic 
growth are based upon the theory that strict environmental regulations harm economic growth. 
 
** The expectation of the impact of this variable upon state economic growth is uncertain. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 In this chapter, I present the empirical results of my analysis of the relationship 
between state environmental regulatory policy and state economic growth.  The 
dependent variable examined is state economic performance and three indicators are used 
to measure this variable.  These dependent variables are change in state total personal 
income, change in state per capita income, and state unemployment rates.  The main 
independent variable of interest is state environmental policy.  I seek to discover the 
degree to which states with more stringent environmental regulations realize an economic 
penalty for such regulations.  Do states that enact tougher environmental regulations 
suffer a loss in economic growth?  By the same token, do state that enact more lax 
environmental regulations experience greater economic growth?   
 The variables used as measures of environmental policy are the Levinson Index, 
state per capita environmental spending, and state environmental conditions.  I review 
these variables briefly in the discussion of the analysis.  I include a wide range of control 
variables in the model to ensure that the results present an accurate reflection of the 
relationship between state environmental policy and state economic growth.  These 
control variables include state business policies, national economic conditions, state fiscal 
conditions, state structural and institutional characteristics, and state demographic 
characteristics.  In the presentation of the model, I also include a discussion of the effect 
of these control variables on state economic performance, though the focus of my 
discussion is on the effects of state environmental policies. 
 The models used in this analysis are estimated using observations from all fifty 
states for subsets of years from the time period from 1977 to 2003.  Because I use data 
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for state-year observations over time, my models are estimated using pooled cross-
sectional time-series (or panel) data.  In order to avoid violations of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) concerning the assumptions of homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms, my 
models are estimated using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regressions (Powell 
and Garand, 2006).  A model using FGLS regression corrects for OLS violations of 
homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms by assuming “a heteroskedastic error 
structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panel-
specific estimates of first-order autocorrelation” (p. 14).  The result is a set of regression 
coefficients and test of statistical significance that are uncontaminated by the potential 
violations of these OLS assumptions. 
The Green Index Model 
 Before presenting the results of my analysis using the Levinson Index and state 
environmental spending and environmental conditions variables, I first present a 
preliminary model using the Green Index as a predictor of state economic performance.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Green Index is a cross-sectional measure of the 
“greenness” of each state in 1991.  In developing the Green Index, Hall and Kerr (1991) 
include 256 indicators of state environmental health.  These indicators include measures 
of environmental conditions, state environmental spending, state congressional leadership 
on environmental programs, and state environmental policy initiatives.  The Green Index 
is a comprehensive examination of each state’s environmental health for the year the 
study is conducted, providing the most thorough analysis of the environmental setting of 
all fifty states.  Indeed, if this variable were available for multiple years, it would be the 
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ideal independent variable to use in my analysis.  Unfortunately, this widely used 
variable is available only as a cross-sectional variable.   
In addition to providing a score of environmental health, the Green Index also 
provides each state with a Green Policies score.  Both the Green Index and the Green 
Policies score are examined in this section.  I estimate two separate models, with the 
Green Index and Green Policies variables serving as independent variables in these 
models, respectively.  I consider the effects of each of these variables for two reasons.  
First, the overall Green Index composite score is the measure used by other researchers 
who rely on this variable as a policy measure.  I follow their example to set my analysis 
into the context of previous studies.  However, since policy is the variable I am most 
interested in examining, I estimate the model using the Green Policies score.  This allows 
me to determine whether the inclusion of non-policy related environmental measures 
have a differing affect on state economic performance.  This provides a good test for the 
validity of the policy measures utilized later in the analysis.   
The Green Index scoring is such that a higher score represents a state with poorer 
environmental health.  For example, the state of Alabama is ranked last on the Green 
Index and has an index score of 8,658.  The state of Oregon achieves the best 
environmental health and receives an index score of 4,583.  Thus, if those who advocate 
in favor of less stringent environmental regulation in order to stimulate economic growth 
are correct, I expect the Green Index and the Green Policies Index to be positively related 
to the state income variables and negatively related to state unemployment.  If those who 
argue that more stringent environmental policies enhance economic growth, I expect the 
Green Index and Green Policies Index to be negatively related to the state income 
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variables and positively related to unemployment.  I estimate two models.  The first uses 
the composite Green Index score as the main independent variable of interest, while the 
second model uses Green Policies score as the main independent variable of interest.  The 
results of these two models are presented for changes in state personal income, changes 
in state per capita income, and state unemployment rates in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, 
respectively.   
Models for Change in Total State Personal Income 
 Table 6.1 displays the FGLS estimates1 for the model of change in total state 
personal income, depicted as a function of the Green Index (Model 1) and Green Policies 
(Model 2) and the independent variables described in the model in the previous chapters.  
In Model (1) of Table 6.1, I find that the coefficient for the Green Index is negative and 
highly significant (b = -0.005, t = -6.03).  This finding suggests that a “greener” a state 
experiences higher growth in overall state total personal income.  As states enact more 
stringent environmental policies and attain “better” environmental conditions, they will 
experience positive growth in total personal income.  While the coefficient for this 
variable appears to be small, it achieves significance at the stricter .01 level.  This 
significance level lends greater confidence to the indication that a low Green Index score 
will help states attain growth in total state income. 
 Several control variables are found to have a significant effect on growth of state 
total personal income.  Indeed, four of the variables achieve significance at the .01 level.  
As expected, the national economic variables exhibit a strong effect on state total 
personal income growth, and the relationships are in the expected direction.  Change in 
national per capita GDP (b= 0.565, t = 23.23) is positively related to state total personal  
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Table 6.1. FGLS estimate for Green Index and Change in Total State Personal Income 
             (1)       (2)     
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t  
 
Intercept          0.091   7.13***   0.077   5.80***   
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Green Index [1]      -0.005  -6.03***    
 Green Policies Index [1]            -0.003  -2.07**   
 
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]     -0.006  -0.03    0.052   0.27    
 Tax Incentives       -0.007  -2.06**   -0.758 [1] -2.03** 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.565   23.23***   0.561   22.81*** 
 National Unemployment     -0.003  -7.20***  -0.003  -7.01*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.019  -1.08   -0.009  -0.53 
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.010  -3.60***  -0.011  -3.97*** 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [1]       0.026   2.31**    0.016   1.40 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.003  -1.73*   -0.006  -3.01*** 
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.280  -4.59***  -0.024  -3.58*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]     0.141   0.86    0.038   0.23   
  College Degree [1]     -0.370  -1.41   -0.080  -0.29 
 Manufacturing Employment     0.002   0.08   -0.001  -0.02 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.001  -0.77    0.002   1.29 
 Farms         -0.160  -2.13**   -0.191  -2.47** 
 South          0.005   1.79*    0.007   2.38** 
 Urbanization [1]       0.136   1.91*    0.111   1.49 
 Black [1]         0.107   0.90   -0.119  -0.94   
N             1350      1350  
Pseudo R2           0.2872      0.2745    
Wald chi-square         954.87      888.10 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000  
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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income; this suggests that state economies typically move hand-in-hand with the national 
economy.  Moreover, the national unemployment rate (b = -0.003, t = -7.20) is negatively 
related to growth in state total personal income.  Two other independent variables also 
achieved significance at the .01 level.  Federal aid (b = -0.010, t = -3.60) exhibits a 
negative relationship to total growth in total state personal income.  This indicates that 
the more federal dollars states receive, the lower their growth in total personal income.  
This is surprising, since the influx of federal funds might be expected to increase state 
economic performance, with all else being equal.  Legislative professionalism also 
attained the .01 level of significance.  However, the results are a bit curious, as a negative 
relationship emerges (b = -0.281, t = -4.59).  This indicates that the more professional a 
state legislature, the lower the growth in total personal income.  Hence, this relationship 
is not the expected direction.  I hypothesize that more professional legislatures have the 
capacity to adopt and ensure the implementation of policies to stimulate state economic 
growth.  These results do not lend much support to this hypothesis. 
 Other control variables also exhibit a significant relationship to state total 
personal income growth, though at lower levels of statistical significance.  Variables 
achieving significance at the standard .05 level are farms per capita, tax structure, state 
tax incentive policies, and gubernatorial institutional power.  As expected, a negative 
relationship exists between farms per capita and growth in total state personal income (b= 
-0.160, t = -2.13).  The model suggests that the more farms in a state, the lower the 
growth in state total personal income.  The coefficient for the tax structure variable (b = 
0.260, t = 2.31) is positive, indicating that the more regressive a state’s code, the greater 
the growth in total personal income.  More curious results are the negative coefficients 
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displayed by the tax incentive variable (b = -0.007, t = -2.06) and the gubernatorial power 
variable (b = -0.003, t = -1.73), both of which are in the unexpected direction.  The 
results indicate that offering more tax incentives to businesses and having a governor 
with greater institutional capacity leads to lower state total personal income growth.   
Two other variables achieve significance at the more relaxed .10 level of 
significance.  States with higher levels of urbanization experienced greater growth in 
state total personal income.  The southern region variable produced results contrary to 
expectations.  Southern states experienced a positive relationship to state total personal 
income.  This finding could indicate that while many southern states have lagged behind 
the rest of the nation in overall economic indicators, these states have managed to 
experience higher levels of growth than other areas.  This growth has not yet allowed 
states in the south to reflect more robust economies because these states have had much 
more “catching up” to do as compared to the economic performance of other states. 
 In Model (2) of table 6.1, I find that the Green Policies Index results share some 
of the same results as the Green Index.  In this second model, I find the Green Policies 
Index (b = -0.003, t = -2.07) is negatively related to state total personal income.  Thus, 
states with better environmental policy scores on the index exhibit greater growth in total 
personal income, indicating higher growth rates for states with more stringent 
environmental policies.  Coefficients for the controls variables in Model (2) are of similar 
magnitude and significance as in the first model.  Only two variables that achieved 
significance in the first model failed to do so in the second model.  The coefficients for 
the tax structure and urbanization variables are not statistically significant in the second 
model.  All other control variables exhibit similar results to those of Model (1). Further, 
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those variables that maintained their significance in both models had their coefficients in 
the same direction in both models – even when theses results were in an unexpected 
direction. 
Models for Change in State Per Capita Income 
 The models are estimated for the second dependent variable representing state 
economic growth, change in state per capita income.  The results of this estimation are 
presented in Table 6.2.  Model (1) presents results using the Green Index as the main 
independent variable of interest.  The Green Index (b = -0.002, t = -3.21) achieves the 
more rigorous .01 level of significance in this model.  The variable is negatively related 
to change in state per capita income, indicating that states with greater environmental 
health over the course of the time period under study achieve higher growth rates in per 
capita income.   
 In Table 6.2 Model (1), other independent variables are found to have significant 
relationships to growth in state per capita income.  National economic indicators achieve 
highly significant relationships (.01 level) to this dependent variable.  The coefficients for 
these variables are in the expected direction.  National per capita income growth (b = 
0.591, t = 27.30) is positively related to state per capita income growth, and national 
unemployment (b = -0.003, t =-7.71) is negatively related to state per capita income 
growth.  Clearly the national economy shapes economic performance, at least in most of 
the American states. 
Four variables achieve the standard .05 significance level.  The federal aid 
variable (b = -0.006, t = -2.96) is negatively related to state per capita income.  Higher 
levels of federal aid result in lower levels of growth in state per capita income.  The   
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Table 6.2. FGLS estimate for Green Index and Change in State Per Capita Income 
             (1)       (2)     
           ------------------------   ------------------------   
              b       t        b      t   
 
Intercept          0.059    6.00***   0.052   5.34***   
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Green Index [1]      -0.002  -3.21***    
 Green Policies Index [1]            -0.011  -0.99 
 
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.026   1.82*    0.292   2.03** 
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.133  -0.48   -0.177  -0.63 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.591   27.30***   0.591  27.27*** 
 National Unemployment     -0.003  -7.71***  -0.003  -7.66*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.022  -1.68*   -0.019  -1.46 
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.006  -2.96**   -0.007  -3.38*** 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [1]       0.007   0.91    0.003   0.45 
 Gubernatorial Power [1]     -0.333   0.26   -0.790  -0.61 
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.012  -2.50**   -0.009  -1.85* 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]     0.126  -1.00   -0.151  -1.20  
  College Degree [1]     -0.162  -0.80   -0.032  -0.16 
 Manufacturing Employment     0.048   2.37**    0.048   2.19** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic) [1]   -0.176  -0.17    0.966   0.98 
 Farms         -0.143   0.25    0.003   0.05 
 South          0.001   0.54    0.002   0.96 
 Urbanization [1]      -0.090  -1.74*   -0.106  -2.02**  
 Black [1]         0.046   0.53   -0.051  -0.58   
N             1350     1350 
Pseudo R2           0.3053     0.3005    
Wald chi-square         1173.83    1165.01 
Prob chi-square          0.0000     0.0000   
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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proportion of a state’s population that is employed in the manufacturing sector (b = 
0.048, t = 2.37) is positively related to growth in per capita income, indicating that the 
more manufacturing employees in a state the higher the per capita income growth rate.  
States that offer more financial assistance programs (b = 0.026, t = 1.82) for businesses, 
achieve higher growth in per capita income.  The coefficient for legislative 
professionalism (b = -0.012, t = -2.50) is in an unexpected direction.  States that have 
more professional legislatures experience lower growth in per capita income.  The 
coefficient of the urbanization variable achieves significance at the more relaxed .10 
level.  Contrary to the result for the dependent variable of change in total state personal 
income, urbanization (b = -0.090, t = -1.74) is negatively related to growth in state per 
capita income.   
 Table 6.2 Model (2) presents the results of the estimation when the Green Policies 
Index is used as the main independent variable of interest.  Green policies do not have a 
significant effect on growth in state per capita income in this model.  Hence, there is 
insufficient evidence to support the contention that state environmental policies have an 
impact upon state per capita income growth.  The coefficients of the remaining 
independent variables in Model (2) are of a similar magnitude and significance as are 
found in the first model.  The only variable that is not significant in both models is state 
debt.  The coefficient for this variable loses significance in the second model.  When 
Green Policies is the main independent variable of interest, state debt is not found to be a 
significant influence upon change in state per capita income.  On the other hand, the 
coefficient for the urbanization variable (b = -0.106, t = -2.02) achieves the standard .05 
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level of significance in Model (2).  Thus, the performance of this variable is stronger in 
the second model.   
Models for State Unemployment Rate 
In Table 6.3 I present the FGLS estimates for the two models with state 
unemployment rate as the dependent variable.  Model (1) contains the Green Index as the 
main independent variable of interest.  The Green Index (b = 0.313, t = 2.99) is found to 
be positively related to state unemployment rates.  This finding suggests that states with 
better environmental health experience lower levels of unemployment over the course of 
the time period under study than states with weaker environmental conditions.  
Other control variables are also significant in Table 7.3 Model (1).  Consistent 
with expectations, national unemployment (b = 0.905, t = 38.61) is positively related to 
state unemployment.  As national unemployment rates increase, state unemployment 
rates will also increase.  State debt (b = 3.286, t = 3.19) also has the expected positive 
relationship with state unemployment.  States with greater proportions of total state 
income that is absorbed by state debt will experience higher unemployment rates.  As 
expected, the manufacturing sector variable (b = 10.202, t =3.56) has a negative 
relationship with state unemployment.  States with more employees in the manufacturing 
sector have lower levels of unemployment.  Further, as expected, the farms per capita 
variable (b = -34.809, t = -5.52) is negatively related to state unemployment.  State 
unemployment decreases as the number of farms increase.  Once again, the coefficient 
for legislative professionalism (b = 2.496, t =4.40) confounds expectations and is 
positively related to unemployment suggesting that states with more professional 
legislatures have higher unemployment rates.   
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Table 6.3. FGLS estimate for Green Index and State Unemployment Rate 
             (1)       (2)    
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t   
 
Intercept          2.203658   7.13*     3.126921  2.36**  
  
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Green Index [1]       0.313   2.99** 
 Green Policies Index [1]             0.047   0.28  
 
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance       0.003   0.19   -0.002  -0.14 
 Tax Incentives        0.015   0.66    0.008   0.35 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP    -0.614  -0.69   -0.734  -0.83 
 National Unemployment      0.905   38.61***   0.899   38.36*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt         3.286   3.19***   3.408   3.23*** 
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.195  -1.09   -0.203  -1.12 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure       -0.001  -1.03   -0.402 [1] -0.32 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.304  -1.32    0.018   0.07 
 Legislative Professionalism     2.496   4.40***   1.820   2.85*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree     -0.022  -1.71*   -0.019  -1.49  
  College Degree       0.003   0.12   -0.003  -0.12 
 Manufacturing Employment    -10.202  -3.56***  -12.054  -3.73*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.017  -0.09   -0.300  -1.74* 
 Farms         -34.809  -5.52***  -28.978  -4.58*** 
 South         -0.353  -1.08   -0.600  -1.70* 
 Urbanization       -0.162  -2.03**   -0.012  -1.45 
 Black          0.009   0.66    0.034  2.30**   
N             1350      1350   
Pseudo R2           0.5532      0.5202  
Wald chi-square         2191.18     2158.50 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000 
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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Two other demographic variables are important in this model.  Urbanization (b =  
-0.162, t = -2.03) is negatively related to state unemployment, suggesting that state-year 
cases with higher levels of urbanization experience lower levels of unemployment.  High 
school educational attainment (b = -0.022, t =-1.71) is negatively related to state.  The 
larger the percentage of a state population with a high school degree, the lower the 
unemployment rate in that state.     
In Model (2) in Table 6.3 I present estimates for the model with the Green 
Policies Index utilized as the main independent variable of interest.  The Green Policies 
variable fails to achieve significance in this model.  It appears that environmental policy 
is not related to state unemployment rates.  Other independent variables perform very 
much as in the first model, achieving similar magnitudes and significance levels.   
Though, two other variables achieve statistical significance in the second model as well.  
The coefficient for the black variable (b = 0.034, t = 2.30) has a positive relationship to 
state unemployment.  As the proportion of the state population that is black increases, 
state unemployment rates increase.  This result is significant at the .05 level.  Finally, as 
expected, states with a moralistic political culture (b = -0.300, t = -1.74) experience lower 
levels of unemployment.   
 The Green Index is significant to the economic growth measures in all three 
models.  Further, the coefficient for all three sets of results suggests that states which are 
more environmentally healthy experience greater economic growth.  This supports the 
argument of those who advocate for more stringent environmental policies in order to 
enhance economic growth.  However, when the Green Index is stripped of all non-policy 
related indicators, the results are less conclusive.  The Green Policies Index only achieves 
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significance in one model (Table 6.1, Model (2)).  The results of this model do support 
the results of the Green Index estimations since the .05 level of significance is achieved.  
It is interesting, though, that there is no indication that environmental policy has an effect 
upon change in state per capita income and change in state unemployment.  Other results 
of particular note are that the national economic variables consistently show a strong 
relationship to the state economic variables.  National economic conditions appear to 
have a great effect upon state economies.  Another consistent, and surprising, result is 
that of the institutional variables.  In particular, legislative professionalism continuously 
exhibits a negative relationship with economic growth.  These preliminary models 
suggest that more professional legislatures do nothing to enhance state economic growth. 
Summary 
In this section I begin my analysis by exploring the effects of environmental 
quality and environmental policies on state economic performance.  I estimate separate 
models for change in state personal income, change in state per capita income, and state 
unemployment rates, with environmental quality the key independent variable in one set 
of models and environmental policy the key independent variable in a second set of 
models.  Overall, the results suggest that environmental quality has a consistent effect on 
state economic performance, controlling for the effects of other independent variables. 
The effect of environmental policy on economic performance is somewhat less consistent 
across models. 
I estimate these models in order to make explicit comparisons with the findings of 
previous research that uses the Green Index and Green Policies Index to predict state 
economic performance.  However, it is important to note that the empirical results from 
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these models are somewhat limited, since the Green Index and Green Policies Index are 
measured for only one year.  Hence the coefficients for these two variables indicate the 
mean state economic performance levels across the time frame under study for different 
levels of environmental quality and policy, controlling for the effects of other 
independent variables. 
What is necessary is to measure state environmental policy and quality for each 
state over time.  Having such a measure would permit me to estimate directly the effect 
of these independent variables on state economic performance, with state environmental 
quality and policy in one year linked explicitly to state economic performance in a given 
year.  Without having such data, the preceding analyses are not definitive but rather are 
suggestive. 
The Levinson Index Model 
 As explained in Chapter 5, the Levinson Index is used as a measure of 
environmental stringency.  This is a measure of the cost to industry of compliance with 
pollution abatement regulations for each state-year case during the time period from 1977 
to 1994.  The industrial composition of the state is factored into the score assigned to 
each state so that states are not ranked high on the index simply because they are home to 
larger numbers of polluting industries.  This measure is particularly appealing as a 
measure of environmental stringency because it gets to the core of the theory driving this 
study.  The Levinson Index is a measure of how much compliance with environmental 
regulations costs industries in each state over time.  Thus, the analysis reveals whether 
states that put a higher price tag on pollution abatement suffer an economic loss as a 
result of policies that put these regulatory costs into place.  The model is estimated 
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separately for each of the three dependent variables representing state economic 
performance.   
Model of Change in Total State Personal Income 
 Table 6.4 presents the results of the model using change in total state personal 
income as the dependent variable, depicted as a function of the Levinson Index.  The 
index coefficient (b = -0.005, t = -1.99) is in the expected negative direction and is 
significant at the .05 level.  Hence, it appears that environmental stringency is negatively 
and significantly related to change in total personal income.  A higher score on the 
Levinson Index results in a decrease in total state personal income growth.  States with 
regulations that impose the highest costs on businesses to comply with pollution 
abatement measures exhibit a decline in total personal income growth.  This finding 
supports the position of those who contend that stricter environmental policy will harm 
the efficiency and performance of states’ economies.  The finding suggests that when 
environmental regulatory costs increase, states will see a decline in economic growth. 
The business incentives policy variables produce interesting results in this model.  
Included in this estimation is a variable for pollution control incentives2 offered by states 
to businesses.  This variable is taken from an annual survey from Site Selection magazine.  
An additive index is created based on nine pollution control incentives.  The survey was 
discontinued in 1994, so this measure is only available from the years 1977 to 1993.  The 
pollution control incentives variable (b = -0.001, t = -2.57) is highly significant, reaching 
the .01 level of significance.  A negative relationship is found between pollution control 
incentives and total state personal income growth.  States that offer more incentives for 
pollution control measures experience a decrease in total personal income growth.  This  
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Table 6.4. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in Total State Personal Income 
       
              b        t      
 
Intercept          0.088     5.11***     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Levinson Index      -0.005   -1.99**    
               
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]     -0.066   -0.27     
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.236   -0.51    
 Pollution Control Incentive    -0.001     -2.57***       
  
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.573      21.77***    
 National Unemployment     -0.002   -3.23***    
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.034   -1.20    
 Federal Aid [1]        0.001    1.54    
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure  [1]      -0.044   -0.32    
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.006   -2.50**    
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.022   -2.81***    
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]    -0.168   -0.62      
  College Degree       -0.001   -1.52    
 Manufacturing Employment    -0.018   -0.44    
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.001    0.60     
 Farms         -0.459   -4.24***    
 South          0.011    2.53**     
 Urbanization [1]       0.222    2.10**     
 Black [1]        -0.340   -2.27**      
N      768          
Pseudo R2    0.3260        
Wald chi-square  717.64         
Prob chi-square   0.0000       
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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result seems counterintuitive.  These pollution control incentives are not required 
regulations of the states.  It is a policy which is dependent upon voluntary compliance.  In 
return for voluntary compliance, the states reward businesses for their good 
environmental behavior.  Even if the argument that environmental policies create costs 
that harm economic growth is correct, I do not expect a negative relationship between 
this variable and economic growth.  Compliance is voluntary.  If businesses choose to 
accept the costs through voluntary compliance, it seems odd that they would then move 
out of a state because of those increased costs.  Thus, the results for this variable are a bit 
curious.  While the coefficient for the pollution control variable produces surprising 
results, the other two business policy variables fail to achieve significance in this model.  
Thus, there is no evidence that financial assistance programs and tax incentives have an 
impact upon change in total state personal income.  
The coefficients for national economic indicators are extremely significant in this 
and in the expected direction.  Growth in the national GDP (b = 0.573, t = 21.77) is 
positively related to total state personal income.  As national GDP increases, state 
personal income will also increase.  National unemployment rates (b = -0.002, t = -3.23) 
are negatively related to total state personal income growth.  If national unemployment 
increases, then growth in total state personal income will decrease.  National conditions 
assert a great deal of influence over total state personal income growth.  There is no 
evidence, though, that state fiscal variables effect change in total state personal income.  
These variables fail to achieve significance in this model. 
Once again, the structural/institutional characteristics are highly significant, with 
coefficients performing in the opposite directions than expected.  The coefficient for the 
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legislative professionalism variable (b = -0.022, t = -2.81) attains significance at the more 
rigorous .01 level.  This variable is negatively related to total state personal income 
growth.  This suggests that states with more professional legislatures experience declines 
in total personal income growth.   Further, the coefficient for the gubernatorial power 
variable (b = -0.006, t = -2.50) is significant at the standard .05 level.  States that have 
governors with greater executive powers have decreased growth in total state personal 
income. 
Some of the demographic characteristics of the states influence total personal 
income growth.  The number of farms per capita variable (b = -0.459, t = -4.24) is highly 
significant and in the expected direction.  States with more farms per capita have 
decreased growth in total personal income.  The coefficients for the level of state 
urbanization (b = 0.222, t = 2.10) and the lagged proportion of the population that is 
black (b = -0.340, t = -2.27) are significant at the .05 level and perform in the expected 
direction.  The urbanization variable is positively related to total state personal income 
growth, indicating that greater urbanization leads to greater growth.  The black 
population percentage variable is negatively related to total personal income growth, 
indicating that as black population increases, total personal income growth decreases.   
The variable for the southern region (b = 0.011, t = 2.53) also reaches the .05 level of 
significance, but the coefficient is in an unexpected direction.  There is a positive 
relationship between location in the south and growth in total state personal income.  
Southern states attain greater growths rates for this dependent variable than do non-
southern states.  
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Model of Change in State Per Capita Income 
Estimates of the effects of the independent variables on growth in state per capita 
income are presented in Table 6.5.  The Levinson Index (b = -0.003, t = -1.52) does not 
have a statistically significant effect upon change in state per capita income.  While the 
coefficient is in the expected negative direction, no conclusions can be drawn about the 
relationship between these two variables since the coefficient fails to achieve 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
National economic conditions are highly significant and in the expected direction.  
Change in per capita GDP (b = 0.604, t = 26.80) has a positive relationship with state per 
capita income growth.  As national GDP increases, state per capita income also increases.  
National unemployment (b = -0.002, t = -3.71) performs in the expected negative 
direction.  When national unemployment levels increase, states will experience declines 
in per capita income growth.   
The demographic variables produce interesting results in this model.  The 
coefficient for the farms per capita variable (b = -.0134, t = -1.71) reaches the .05 level of 
significance.  As expected the greater the farms per capita in a state, the lower the growth 
in per capita income.  The coefficient for college attainment (b = -0.789, t = -2.39) also 
achieves significance at the .05 level in this model.  However, the coefficient is in an 
unexpected direction.  The proportion of the state population that attains a college degree 
is negatively related to change in per capita income.  Contrary to expectations, this 
finding indicates that states with more highly educated citizens experience decreases in 
per capita income growth.  Also performing in an unexpected direction is the coefficient 
for legislative professionalism (b = -.010, t = -1.88).  Though the significance reached  
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Table 6.5. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in State Per Capita Income 
       
              b        t      
 
Intercept          0.047     3.78***     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Levinson Index      -0.003   -1.52    
               
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.193    1.09     
 Tax Incentives [1]       0.205    0.61    
 Pollution Control Incentive [1]   -0.503     -1.47         
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.604       26.80***    
 National Unemployment     -0.002   -3.71***    
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.020   -1.01    
 Federal Aid [1]        0.006    1.05    
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure  [1]      -0.004    -0.39    
 Gubernatorial Power [1]     -0.442   -0.29    
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.010   -1.88*    
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]    -0.117   -0.59      
  College Degree [1]     -0.789   -2.39**    
 Manufacturing Employment     0.029    1.06    
 Political Culture (Moralistic) [1]    0.148    0.11     
 Farms         -0.134   -1.71*    
 South          0.005    1.72*     
 Urbanization [1]      -0.017   -0.25     
 Black [1]        -0.143   -1.41      
N      768  
Pseudo R2    0.3436 
Wald chi-square  969.89  
Prob chi-square   0.0000      
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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is at the more relaxed .10 level, these results indicate that when a state has a more 
professional legislature, it will have lower growth in per capita income.  The southern 
states coefficient (b = 0.005, t = 1.72) also performs in the opposite direction than 
expected, but at the more relaxed .10 level of significance.  Southern states are more 
likely to have an increase in per capita income growth.   
Model for State Unemployment Rate 
In Table 6.6 I present the results of the model with state unemployment utilized as 
the dependent variable for economic growth.  The coefficient for Levinson Index (b = 
0.634, t = 4343) is both positive and highly significant in this model, reaching the .01 
level.  Clearly there is a positive relationship between the Levinson Index and state 
unemployment.  As states score higher on the Levinson Index, state unemployment rates 
increase.  Similar to the findings presented in Table 6.4, these results suggest that 
environmental regulations can have a negative impact upon state economies.  The results 
of Table 6.6 indicate that when business costs for pollution abatement activities increase 
in a state, that state will notice an increase in unemployment rates. Thus, increased 
environmental regulatory stringency imposes costs on a given state economy.  This 
finding lends support to those who argue in favor of the enactment of less stringent 
environmental policies in order to stimulate economic growth.  
Other independent variables exert significant influence upon state unemployment 
rates.  As expected, national unemployment (b = 0.933, t = 31.02) is positively related to 
state unemployment.  When national unemployment rates increase, state unemployment 
rates also increase.  This relationship is significant at the .01 level.  Reaching a similar 
level of significance are the state fiscal variables.  As expected, the coefficient for state 
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Table 6.6. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and State Unemployment 
       
              b        t      
 
Intercept          2.440      1.50     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Levinson Index       0.634    4.43***    
               
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]     0.128   0.01     
 Tax Incentives       0.449   0.15    
 Pollution Control Incentives    0.166   0.42        
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP    -0.555   -.049       
 National Unemployment      0.933   31.02***     
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt         8.890     4.35***       
 Federal Aid        -0.002   -3.18***    
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure  [1]      -0.847   -0.61       
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.404   -1.36    
 Legislative Professionalism     2.254    2.72*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment      
  High School Degree       0.002    0.11 
  College Degree       0.012    0.31   
 Manufacturing Employment    -12.628   -3.33***    
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.147   -0.86     
 Farms         -22.929   -2.95***  
 South         -0.879   -1.83*     
 Urbanization       -0.192   -1.75*     
 Black          0.497    2.54**      
N      768      
Pseudo R2    0.4334       
Wald chi-square  1361.15  
Prob chi-square   0.0000      
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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debt (b =  8.890, t = 4.35) is positively related to state unemployment, indicating that 
states that have larger proportions of total state personal income absorbed by debt have 
greater unemployment rates.  Federal aid (b = -0.002, t = -3.18) is negatively related to 
state unemployment.  States that receive a greater per capita amount of federal aid 
experience lower unemployment rates.  Once again, the coefficient for the legislative 
professionalism variable (b = 2.254, t = 2.72) performs in an unexpected direction.  A 
positive relationship is present indicating that states with more professional legislatures 
have higher unemployment rates.    
 State demographic variables also display evidence of significant relationships to 
state unemployment rates.  The coefficients for the manufacturing employment (b =         
-12.628, t = -3.33) and farms per capita (b = -22.929, t = -2.95) variables are both 
negative and significant at the .01 level of significance.  Hence, both variables exhibit a 
negative relationship to state unemployment.  As expected, states with greater numbers of 
people employed in the manufacturing sector have lower levels of unemployment.  Also 
as expected, the coefficient for farms per capita is negative.  States with higher numbers 
of farms have lower unemployment rates.  Achieving significance at the .05 level, the 
black population variable (b = 0.497, t = 2.54) is positively related to state 
unemployment.  States with greater proportions of the population that are black have 
higher unemployment rates.  Two other variables achieve significance at the more 
relaxed .10 level.  States in the south (b = -0.879, t = -1.83) and states with more 
urbanization (b = -0.192, t = -1.75) exhibit a negative relationship to unemployment.  The 
model indicates that southern states have lower unemployment rates.  This may indicate 
that southern states are experiencing “catch-up” growth and as a result have larger 
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numbers of citizens in their states employed.  States that have greater proportions of the 
population in urban areas also exhibit lower unemployment rates.  Thus, cities appear to 
have greater opportunities for employment than more rural areas. 
Summary 
 Results from the models estimated using the Levinson Index as the measure of 
environmental policy point to different effects of environmental policy than the results of 
the Green Index models.  In two of the models, the Levinson Index produced results 
indicating that states that increase the pollution abatement regulatory burden on 
businesses experience a negative impact on economic growth.  States with higher scores 
on the Levinson Index have systematically decreased total state personal income growth 
and higher rates of unemployment.  These results lend support to the argument of those 
who hold that the enactment of strict environmental regulations is a detriment state to 
economic performance.  Other findings of note include the strength of the national 
economic conditions variables.  These variables consistently exert a strong effect upon 
state economic conditions.  It appears that state economies are heavily influenced by 
national conditions.  Another variable continues to produce confounding results.  State 
legislative professionalism appears to be a deterrent to state economic growth.  While the 
significance varies in the models, the legislative professionalism variable continues to 
produce coefficients in the direction opposite to expectations.  However, caution is 
necessary in the interpretation of the results of this variable.  The variable is somewhat 
cross-sectional, only changing at three points in time for the time period I examine.  
Thus, the observations do not change each year and the results may not be an accurate 
reflection of the true effect of legislative professionalism.  Overall, the Levinson Index 
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models indicate that state environmental policies that add to the pollution abatement costs 
of businesses may lead to a decline in the economic performance of the states.  
Environmental Spending Models 
 The careful reader will note that I have estimated the models of state economic 
performance during a limited time frame. Even though data on state economic growth 
and unemployment are available until the present, it is perhaps surprising that I am 
unable to estimate a model of environmental effects for the entire time period for which 
economic data are available.  The Census Bureau discontinued the survey used to create 
the Levinson Index, so this variable is only available for the years 1977 to 1994.  
Conclusions based on results that are focused on these years alone should be met with 
caution.  The 1970s was a time of extreme environmental regulation.  The federal 
government and the states became very active regulators for pollution control efforts.  
Prior to this high regulatory period, business and industry were not mandated to spend 
large amounts for environmental regulations.  Thus, when regulations did change, one 
can speculate that the initial costs to business and industry were high.  Since 
environmental compliance costs are not inexpensive to business and industry, the effects 
of these initial costs may have lasted for an extended period.   
 It is necessary to extend the analysis further than the 17 years covered by the 
Levinson Index.  At the initiation of the environmental regulatory movement, businesses 
may have let regulations become a large part of their site location decision making 
calculus.  However, once business and industry adjusted to the “start-up” costs of 
environmental regulation and these costs became routine, the effects of regulatory costs 
to businesses may have changed.  It is quite conceivable that such an adjustment reduced 
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the importance of environmental regulation to business costs.  Thus, focusing on the first 
years of heavy regulation may produce results that are skewed by the initial shocks felt to 
business and industry.  It is necessary to extend the years of analysis in order to 
determine if the effects found in the Levinson Index models are constant over time.  
Since the Levinson Index is only available through 1994, I use two other measures of 
environmental policy to continue the analysis.  Separate models are estimated using state 
environmental spending and state environmental conditions as measures of state 
environmental policy.  Clearly, the results of this analysis are not directly comparable to 
those based on the Levinson Index, but they may be suggestive about the effects of 
environmental stringency beyond the time period for which the Levinson Index is 
available. 
 The importance that government places on a policy area can often be determined 
by the resources it is willing to allocate toward that initiative.  Without the proper funds 
to implement a policy, the goals of a given program are unlikely to be realized.  The 
amount of money that states spend on environmental programs indicates the level of 
commitment the states have towards addressing environmental issues.  States that devote 
significant budgetary resources toward environmental programs have placed a priority on 
environmental goals relative to other possible targets of those funds.  Thus, state 
spending on environmental programs is used as a proxy measure of environmental policy 
stringency.  As described in detail in Chapter 4, data on state environmental and natural 
resource spending are available for the years from 1986 to 2003.  I estimate separate 
models for each of the three dependent variables of economic growth for these years 
using environmental spending as the main independent variable of interest.   
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Two models are estimated for each dependent variable.  The first model includes 
all the years for which the spending data are available.  The second model includes all of 
the same independent variables as the first model, but I also include the variable for the 
index on the state business policy offering pollution control incentives to business.  Data 
on this business policy is collected until 1993, but these data are not available after that 
date.  Given this, the first model includes the years from 1986 to 2003 and the second 
model includes the years from 1986 to 1993.   
Models for Change in Total State Personal Income 
 In Table 6.7 I present the results for the first model of state economic 
performance, using state environmental spending as the measure of state environmental 
policy.  Change in total state personal income growth is the dependent variable.  For 
Model (1), the coefficient for state environmental spending (b = 0.425, t = 1.71) is 
statistically significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.  The relationship between 
environmental spending and change in total personal income growth is positive, 
indicating that as state environmental spending increases growth in total personal income 
increases.  This model lends limited support to those who argue that strong environmental 
regulations enhance economic growth, though caution should be used in drawing this 
conclusion since this represent a very different measure of state environmental 
stringency. 
As expected, national economic variables have a highly significant effect on the 
dependent variable in this model.  The coefficients for both variables attain significance 
at the .01 level.  Change in national per capita GDP (b =  0.781, t = 18.57) is positively 
related to change in total state personal income growth, indicating that as national per  
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Table 6.7. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Spending and Change in Total State 
Personal Income                     
             (1)       (2) 
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t   
 
Intercept           0.462  2.67***   -0.007  -0.28  
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Environmental Spending [1]     0.425   1.71**     0.131  3.16***    
              
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.163   0.68    0.348  1.22  
  
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.498  -1.05     0.081  0.13 
 Pollution Control Incentive           -0.001  -2.15** 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.781  18.57***   0.872   18.19*** 
 National Unemployment      -0.026  -3.68***   0.002   2.35** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.046  -2.25**   -0.108  -4.03*** 
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.011  -3.83***  -0.002  -0.27 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure  [1]       0.009  0.68   -0.013  -0.68 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.005  -2.22**   -0.005  -1.77* 
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.018  -2.63***  -0.029  -3.12** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]     0.068  0.30    0.443   1.21 
  College Degree [1]      0.163  0.56   -0.471  -0.90 
 Manufacturing Employment     0.076  2.10**    0.172   2.96*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.003  1.90*   -0.104 [1] -0.04 
 Farms         -0.213  -2.30**   -0.598  -4.07*** 
 South          0.007  1.89*    0.011   2.13** 
 Urbanization [1]      -0.001  -0.01    0.121   0.88 
 Black [1]        -0.130  -1.0   -0.297  -1.56 
N             900       400 
Pseudo R2           0.2857      0.2377 
Wald chi-square         562.06      490.85 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000    
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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capita GDP increases growth in total state personal income also increases.  National 
unemployment (b = -0.026, t = -3.68) has a negative relationship with total state personal 
income.  As national unemployment rises, growth in total state personal income declines.  
Based on these results, it is clear that most state economies march in lockstep with the 
national economy. 
 The state fiscal and institutional/structural variables also exhibit an impact upon 
total personal income growth, though; the relationships are not always in the expected 
direction.  The coefficient for state debt (b = -0.046, t = -2.25) has a negative relationship 
with dependent variable; as state debt becomes a larger proportion of total state personal 
income, the growth in total state income is lower.  The coefficient for the federal aid 
variable (b = -0.011, t = -3.83) attains the .01 level of significance and has a negative 
relationship to growth in total state personal income.  States that receive larger amounts 
of federal aid have lower growth in total personal income.  Contrary to expectations, but 
consistent with earlier models described in this chapter, state institutional variables are 
negatively related to total state personal income growth.  States with greater gubernatorial 
power (b = -0.005, t = -2.22) and greater legislative professionalism (b = -0.018, t =         
-2.63) exhibit lower growth in total state personal income.  Though, because of the cross-
sectional nature of these last two variables, I am cautious in my interpretation of these 
results. 
 Some of the coefficients for state demographic characteristics were also 
significant.  The coefficients for manufacturing employment (b = 0.076, t = 2.10) and 
farms per capita (b = -0.213, t = -2.30) are both in the expected direction and achieve 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  As state employment in the manufacturing 
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sector increases, growth in total state personal income increases.  The more farms a state 
has per capita, the lower the growth in total personal income.  The coefficients for state 
political culture and southern location are both statistically significant.  The model 
provides limited evidence that moralistic (b = 0.003, t = 1.90) states and southern states 
(b = 0.007, t = 1.89) having higher growth in total state personal income. 
 The results in Table 6.7 Model (2)  are quite similar to those from Model (1).  
There are a few differences worthy of discussion, however.  The coefficient for state 
spending on environmental and natural resources (b = 0.131, t = 3.16) becomes highly 
significant when the pollution abatement policy index is included in the analysis, though 
the magnitude of the coefficient is much smaller that in Model (1).  Model (2) provides 
greater confidence of the effect that environmental spending has upon growth in total 
state per capita income, though the magnitude of the effect is considerably smaller.  The 
results indicate that as state environmental spending increases growth in total state per 
capita also increases, supporting the contentions of those who argue that stringent 
environmental policies stimulate economic growth.  Here again, one must urge caution 
because of the differences in measures for state environmental stringency. 
The state pollution control incentives index coefficient (b = -0.001, t = -2.15) 
performs in the opposite direction as expected and is significant at the .05 level.  These 
results indicate that states offering more incentives to business to engage in pollution 
abatement measures have lower total state personal income growth.  The national 
economic variables remain highly significant reinforcing the results of earlier models.  
While the coefficient for the state debt variable (b = -0.108, t = -4.03) achieves a greater 
level of significance in Model (2), the federal aid variable (b = -0.002, t = -.027) loses its 
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significance in this model.  Once again the coefficients of the state institutional variables 
perform in the opposite direction from expectations, though; both variables lose some of 
their significance in this model.  With the exception of political culture, all other 
demographic variables that were significant in the first model remain so in the second 
model.   
Models for Change in State Per Capita Income 
Table 6.8 presents the estimates for the model using change in state per capita 
income as the dependent variable.  In Model (1) the coefficient for state environmental 
spending (b = 0.034, t = 1.89) is positive and significant at the more conventional levels.  
As state environmental spending increases, change in growth in state per capita income 
increases as well.  This model provides support for the argument that strict environmental 
policies result in improved economic growth. 
As is the case for my other models, national economic conditions are strongly 
related to state economic performance.  State per capita income growth increases as 
national per capita growth (b = 0.761, t = 21.17) increases, while increases in national 
unemployment rates (b = -0.004, t = -7.30) generate declines in state per capita income 
growth.  Also significant in the model are the coefficients for the state fiscal variables.  
The coefficients for state debt (b = -0.037, t = -2.51) and federal aid to states (b = -0.008, 
t = -3.57) both exhibit negative relationships with state per capita income.  Growth in 
state per capita income decreases as both state debt and federal aid increase.  The 
financial assistance index (b = 0.373, t = 2.26) achieves the .05 level of significance and 
has a positive relationship to state per capita income, as expected.  The more financial  
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Table 6.8 FGLS estimate for State Environmental Spending and Change in State Per 
Capita Income       
             (1)       (2)    
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t   
 
Intercept          0.648   5.38***    0.362   2.22**  
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Environmental Spending [1]     0.034   1.89*    0.181   2.95*** 
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.373   2.26**    0.487   2.44**   
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.097  -0.30   -0.135  -0.35 
 Pollution Control Incentive [1]           0.089   0.24 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.761   21.17***   0.832   21.21*** 
 National Unemployment     -0.004  -7.30***    0.057   0.08 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.037  -2.51**   -0.068  -3.27*** 
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.008  -3.57***  -0.004  -0.61 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [1]       0.013   1.49    0.023   1.97** 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.001  -0.93   -0.002  -1.08 
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.006  -1.22   -0.195  -3.64*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]    -0.374  -2.41**   -0.337  -1.39 
  College Degree [1]      0.207   1.03   -0.242  -0.72 
 Manufacturing Employment     0.694   2.77***   0.110   2.91*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.003   2.26**    0.003   1.73* 
 Farms          0.042   0.66   -0.100  -0.96 
 South [1]        -0.869  -0.38    0.373   0.11 
 Urbanization [1]      -0.201  -3.16***  -0.129  -1.38 
 Black [1]         0.006   0.07    0.068   0.55 
N             900       400 
Pseudo R2           0.3274      0.3154 
Wald chi-square         897.77      762.84 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000   
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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assistance programs states offer to business, the greater the level of growth in state per 
capita income. 
 Four state demographic variables have significant effects on the dependent 
variable in Model (1).  Manufacturing employment (b = 0.694, t = 2.77) and political 
culture (b = 0.003, t = 2.26) have coefficients that are both significant and in the expected 
direction.  As manufacturing employment increases in a state, growth in state per capita 
income also increases, while states with a moralistic political culture have higher growth 
in per capita income.  Variables with coefficients performing contrary to expectations are 
the variables for high school educational attainment (b = -0.374, t = -2.41) and level of 
urbanization (b = -0.201, t = -3.16).  These results suggest that as more citizens of a state 
receive a high school degree, state per capita income growth decreases.  This finding is 
troublesome.  Conventional wisdom holds that states with better educated citizenries have 
better economies.  This result suggests just the opposite.  The urbanization variable also 
produces unexpected results, suggesting that states with higher levels of urbanization 
have lower levels of economic growth. 
 Table 6.8 Model (2) provides the results of the analysis with the inclusion of the 
pollution control incentives index variable.  In this second model, the coefficient for the 
environmental spending variable (b = 0.181, t = 2.95) is both positive and significant.  
The results indicate that as state environmental spending increases, growth in state per 
capita income increases.  This finding supports the contention that states with more 
stringent environmental policies experience greater economic growth.  It should be noted 
that the magnitude and statistical significance of the state environmental spending 
coefficient is greater in Model (2) than in Model (1). 
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 Similarities in the two models are that the coefficients of the variables for 
financial assistance programs (b = 0.487, t = 2.44), change in national GDP (b = 0.832, t 
= 21.21), state debt (b = -0.068, t = -3.27) and manufacturing employment (b = 0.110, t = 
2.91) all retain their direction and significance in Model (2).  The coefficient for the 
political culture variable (b = 0.003, t = 1.73) is again positive and statistically 
significant.  Differences in Model (2) include the lack of significance of variables that are 
found to have an effect upon state per capita income growth in the first model.  National 
unemployment, federal aid, high school attainment, and urbanization all lose significance 
in Model (2).  The coefficients of two structural/institutional variables reach significance 
in the second model, though.  Tax structure (b = 0.023, t = 1.97) has a positive effect on 
state per capita income growth.  This finding indicates that states with more regressive 
tax policies have higher growth in per capita income.  Legislative professionalism (b =      
-0.195, t = -3.64) achieves significance at the .01 level and, as in earlier models, has a 
coefficient in the opposite direction as expected.  This suggests that states with more 
professional legislatures exhibit lower levels of growth in state per capita income.  
Though, once again, as this variable is cross-sectional in nature, caution is used in the 
interpretation of this result. 
Models for State Unemployment Rates 
 The relationship between state unemployment rates and the independent variables 
is explored in Table 6.9.  Model (1) does not show a significant relationship between 
state environmental spending and state unemployment.  There is no evidence in this  
model that environmental spending has an effect on state unemployment.  National 
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Table 6.9. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Spending and State Unemployment  
             (1)       (2) 
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t   
 
Intercept          7.826   6.96***  10.334   6.45***  
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Environmental Spending    -0.700 [1] -0.52    -0.005  -2.36** 
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance       0.007   0.55    0.006   0.37 
 Tax Incentives       -0.095  -1.49   -0.123  -3.36*** 
 Pollution Control Incentive            0.223   4.90*** 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP    -1.548  -1.15   -1.820  -0.94 
 National Unemployment      0.781   27.57***    0.800  17.50*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt          3.238   2.87***   3.748   2.69*** 
 Federal Aid [1]        0.131   0.91   -0.330  -0.71 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure        0.001   1.19    0.005   2.83*** 
 Gubernatorial Power      0.263   1.47   -0.066  -0.25 
 Legislative Professionalism     1.943   3.53***   3.125   3.75***  
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree     -0.678  -5.31***  -0.094  -4.17*** 
  College Degree      -0.004  -0.25    0.047   1.31 
 Manufacturing Employment    -18.496  -7.19***  -30.598  -7.10*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.205  -1.65*   -0.129  -0.69 
 Farms         -23.827  -3.97***  -15.536  -1.77** 
 South         -0.233  -0.90   -0.648  -1.40  
 Urbanization       -0.018  -2.53**   -0.026  -2.25** 
 Black          0.016   1.41    0.013   0.68 
N             900       400 
Psuedo R2           0.4978      0.3515 
Wald chi-square         1484.78     600.71 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000   
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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unemployment (b = 0.781, t = 27.57) rates have a highly significant relationship to state 
unemployment; state unemployment rates increase (decrease) as national unemployment 
rates increase (decrease).  The coefficient for state debt (b = 3.238, t = 2.87) also exhibits 
a strong positive relationship with state unemployment rates.  This indicates that 
increases in state debt result in increases in state unemployment rates; conversely, lower 
rates of state debt are associated with lower state unemployment rates.  The coefficient 
for legislative professionalism (b = 1.943, t = 3.53) is highly significant, but in the 
unexpected direction.  This suggests that states with more professional legislatures have 
higher unemployment rates; though the cross-sectional nature of this variable may have 
an impact on this result. 
 State demographic variables also have a noticeable effect upon state 
unemployment rates.  At least three demographic variables have coefficients that are both 
in the expected direction and statistically significant; high school educational attainment 
(b = -0.678, t = -5.31), manufacturing employment (b = -18.496, t = -7.19), and farms per 
capita (b = -23.828, t = -3.97).  These results suggest that states with larger proportions of 
their citizens attaining high school degrees have lower unemployment rates.  States with 
greater numbers of citizens employed in the manufacturing sector have lower 
unemployment rates.  Further, states with greater numbers of farms per capita also exhibit 
lower unemployment rates.  The coefficient for the urbanization variable (b = -0.018, t = 
-2.53) is both negative and significant at conventional levels.  This suggests that higher 
levels of urbanization are associated with lower levels of unemployment.  The final 
variable with a significant coefficient is for political culture, (b = -23.827, t = -1.65), 
though, the level of significance is marginal at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.  Thus 
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there is some support for the finding that states with moralistic political cultures have 
lower unemployment rates. 
 I also estimate a revised version of this model to include pollution control 
incentive as an independent variable.  The results are presented in Table 6.9 Model (2).  
The coefficient for state environmental spending (b = -0.005, t = -2.36) does exhibit a 
significant effect on state unemployment in this model.  The relationship reaches the 
standard .05 level of significance and the coefficient is negative.  This coefficient 
indicates that as states spend more on environmental and natural resources programs, 
unemployment rates will decrease.  Thus, the model provides support to those who 
contend that more stringent environmental regulation stimulates economic growth.   
 Other results of note in Model (2) include the highly significant relationship of 
two of the business policy variables.  The coefficient for tax incentive policies variable 
(b= -0.123, t = -3.36) displays a negative relationship to state unemployment.  As 
expected, the more tax incentives that states offer to businesses, the lower the state 
unemployment rate.  However, the coefficient for pollution control policies variable (b = 
0.223, t = 4.90) has a positive effect on state unemployment.  States that offer more 
incentives to business to engage in pollution control display higher levels of 
unemployment.   
 There are other differences evident in Model (2).  The coefficient for the tax 
structure variable (b = 0.005, t = 2.83) becomes highly significant in the second model.  
The results indicate that states with more regressive tax structures have higher levels of 
unemployment.  The coefficient for the farm variable (b = -15.536, t = -1.77) is 
approximately one-third smaller in magnitude and the level of statistical significance for 
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farms per capita is weaker.  The political culture variable appears to have no effect on 
state unemployment in Model (2).   
Summary 
 The results of the models using state environmental spending as a measure of 
environmental policy stringency provide mixed results.  The strength of the relationship 
between spending and economic growth is enhanced in the models which take into 
account pollution control incentive policies.  However, the models estimated that include 
this variable (Model (2) in Tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9) capture a shorter time period than the 
models that exclude this variable.  Thus, these models may not be capturing all of the 
variability in the measures needed to fully understand their relationship with state 
economic growth.  When the models are estimated using the longer time period (Model 
(1) in Tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9), state environmental spending exhibits only a weak 
relationship to growth in total state personal income and growth in state per capita 
income.  The relationship is significant at the more relaxed .10 level in these models.  No 
statistically significant relationship is detected between state environmental spending and 
state unemployment (Table 6.9 Model (1)).  Thus, the models do not provide conclusive 
evidence of the relationship between state environmental spending and state economic 
growth.  When meaningful significance is detected in this relationship, it comes as a 
result of using fewer observations.  Consequently, these models may be missing 
important elements in the analysis.  
State Environmental Conditions Models 
 States that enact more stringent environmental regulations are pursuing policy 
goals indicative of the desire for healthier environmental conditions.  These states enact 
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regulations to control in a more effective manner the pollution levels within their 
jurisdictions.  A result of these more stringent regulations should be an improvement in 
environmental conditions.   
It is important to consider the possibility that state environmental conditions have 
an effect on state economic performance.  Stringent environmental policies may help to 
lure some individuals and industries to a given state, but I suspect that it is a pristine 
environment that has a greater capacity of drawing individuals and industries. In order to 
estimate the effect of environmental conditions on state economic performance, I use the 
data reported annually in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) as a measure of 
environmental policy.  TRI data on industrial chemical air emissions and water releases 
are often used as a measure of state environmental conditions.  These measures provide 
an indication of the environmental hazard present in each state.  TRI data are collected 
for the years of 1988 to 2003. 
Models for Change in Total State Personal Income 
 Table 6.10 presents the results of the model estimated for environmental 
conditions and total state personal income growth.  The model provides no evidence that 
state environmental conditions effect total state personal income growth.  Neither the 
variable for chemical air emissions nor the variable for water emissions produces a 
statistically significant coefficient.  These results hold constant in both Model (1) and (2).  
The inclusion of pollution control incentive policies does not change the relationship 
between environmental conditions and growth in total state personal income.  Thus, no 
conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between environmental conditions and 
state economic growth from the results of this model estimation.  It appears that this 
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Table 6.10. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Conditions and Change in Total State 
Personal Income  
             (1)       (2) 
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t   
 
Intercept         0.061   3.79***    0.029   1.33  
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Air Emissions [1]      -0.005  -1.27    -0.006  -1.44    
 Water Emissions [1]      -0.052  -0.55    0.006      0.70     
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [2]      0.172   0.75    0.279   1.02 
 Tax Incentives       -0.001  -2.64***  -0.001     -2.12** 
 Pollution Control Incentive  [2]          -0.826  -1.59    
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.784  18.63***  .829  20.69*** 
 National Unemployment     -0.003   -3.85***  .006  5.40*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.022   -1.26   -0.017  -1.01 
 Federal Aid [2]       -0.011   -4.81***  -0.012  -1.91 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [2]       0.017   1.36    0.026   1.45    
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.004  -1.83*   -0.002   -0.63 
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.012  -1.97**   -0.018  -2.48**  
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [2]    -0.020  -0.10   -0.248  -0.70 
  College Degree [2]      0.025   0.10   -0.386  -1.00 
 Manufacturing Employment     0.018   0.53    0.082   1.53 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.004   2.40**    0.006   2.42** 
 Farms         -0.137  -1.64   -0.472  -3.61*** 
 South          0.006   1.95*    0.006   1.59  
 Urbanization [2]      -0.002  -0.47   -0.009  -1.64 
 Black [2]        -0.040   3.79   -0.024  -0.15    
N             798       300 
Psuedo R2           0.3265      0.3356 
Wald chi-square         604.94      670.42 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000   
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 100,000,000 to facilitate interpretation 
[2] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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dimension of state economic growth is unaffected by state environmental conditions. 
 State business policies, national economic conditions and state fiscal variables 
display statistically significant effects on state economic growth in Table 6.10.  Tax 
incentives offered to businesses (b = -0.001, t = -2.645) do have a highly significant 
relationship to growth in total state personal income.  Contrary to expectations, states that 
offer more tax incentives to businesses experience a decline in total state personal income 
growth.  The effect is evident in both models.  National economic conditions are found to 
have strong effects upon growth in total state personal income.  Model (1) indicates that 
as national per capita GDP growth (b = 0.784, t = 18.63) increases, state growth in total 
personal income increases.  National unemployment (b = -0.003, t = -3.85) has a negative 
effect upon the dependent variable.  When national unemployment rates increase, growth 
in total state personal income decreases.  The strong effects of the national economic 
variables are constant in both Model (1) and Model (2).  The coefficient for the federal 
aid receipts variable (b = -0.011, t = -4.81) also exerts a highly significant negative effect 
upon growth in total state personal income in the first model estimated.  States that 
receive more federal aid per capita experience lower growth.  However, this effect is not 
evident in Model (2). 
 Defying expectations, the state institutional variables are negatively related to 
growth in total state personal income.  In both models, states that have more professional 
legislatures experience lower growth in total state personal income.  Gubernatorial power 
(b = -0.004, t = -1.83) exerts a weak effect on the dependent variable in the first model, 
but this effect is not evident in the Model (2).  Though, once again it should be noted that 
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these variables are cross-sectional measures and this may have an impact on these 
counterintuitive results. 
 State demographic variables display some differences in the two models estimated 
in Table 6.10.  The effect of political culture is significant at conventional levels and the 
relationship is positive in both models.  States with a more moralistic political culture 
have greater growth in total state personal income.  In Model (1), the coefficient for the 
southern regional variable (b = 0.006, t = 1.95) is significant at the .10 level.  Thus, there 
is limited support for the view that southern states have higher levels of growth in total 
state personal income, though this finding is not reproduced in the second model.  While 
not significant in Model (1), the coefficient for the variable for farms per capita is highly 
significant in Model (2).  The second model indicates that states with more farms per 
capita (b = -0.472, t = -3.61) have lower growth in total state personal income. 
Models for Change in State Per Capita Income 
 The results for the model estimation of economic conditions and growth in state 
per capita income are presented in Table 6.11.  The findings are very similar to those of 
the total state personal income model.  No statistically significant relationship is found 
between state environmental conditions and state per capita income growth.  This result is 
consistent in both models.  Thus, there is not support for the contention that state 
environmental conditions have any effect upon state per capita income growth. 
 State business policy variables and national economic variables display 
significant relationships with change in state per capita income in both model estimations 
in Table 6.11.  Financial assistance policies exert highly significant positive effects upon 
state per capita income growth.  States that offer more financial assistance to business 
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and industry experience higher growth in state per capita income.  Tax incentive policies 
display a negative relationship with per capita income growth.  States that offer more tax 
incentives to business and industry have lower growth in state per capita income.  
Though, the significance of this particular relationship is weak in Model (1), reaching 
significance at the .10 level.  Moreover, the coefficient for change in national per capita 
GDP is highly significant and positive in both models.  These results indicate that as 
national per capita GDP increases, growth in state per capita increases.  National 
unemployment exerts a highly significant negative effect in Model (1).  This suggests that 
increases in the national unemployment rate result in decreases in state per capita income 
growth.  The relationship is not significant in Model (2), however. 
Other variables produce notable effects as well.  In Model (1), the coefficient for 
the variable for federal aid (b = -0.004, t = -2.62) has a highly significant negative effect 
upon growth in state per capita income.  States with greater amounts of federal aid have 
lower levels of growth in per capita income.  The high school educational attainment 
variable produces unexpected results in both models.  The results indicate that the more 
citizens in a state with high school degrees, the lower state per capita income growth.  
Manufacturing employment (b = 0.052, t = 1.99) reaches the .05 significance level in 
Model (1), suggesting that states with more employees in the manufacturing sector 
experience greater growth in per capita income.  This result is not duplicated in Model 
(2).  Political culture displays weak significance in Model (1) and strong significance in 
Model (2).  Both sets of findings indicate that states with a moralistic political culture 
have higher growth in per capita income.  Model (1) presents an unexpected positive 
significant relationship between farms per capita (b = 0.1485631, t = 2.37) and growth in  
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Table 6.11. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Conditions and Change in State Per 
Capita Income  
             (1)       (2) 
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t   
 
Intercept          0.058   4.77***  0.045   2.90***  
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Air Emissions [1]       0.100   0.33   -0.008  -0.29 
 Water Emissions [1]       0.060  -0.80   -0.051  -0.90  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [2]      0.510   3.01***   0.722   3.56*** 
 Tax Incentives        -0.580 [2]   -1.68*   -0.001  -2.29** 
 Pollution Control Incentive [2]          -0.416  -1.20 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.759  20.45***   0.820  23.58*** 
 National Unemployment     -0.004  -8.09***   0.001   1.34 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt         0.007   0.62    0.017   1.26 
 Federal Aid [2]       -0.004  -2.62***   0.0007   0.15 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [2]       0.003   0.34    0.017   1.39    
 Gubernatorial Power [2]     -0.130  -0.09    0.699   0.37 
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.005  -1.03      -0.011  -1.60  
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [2]    -0.396   -2.48**   -0.694  -2.80*** 
  College Degree [2]      0.016   0.08   -0.302  -1.04 
 Manufacturing Employment     0.052   1.99**    0.060    1.56 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.002   1.93*    0.004    2.41** 
 Farms          0.149   2.37**    0.072    0.71 
 South          0.001   0.57   -0.001  -0.36  
 Urbanization [2]       0.0009   0.26    0.005  -0.30    
 Black [2]        -0.014   -0.16    0.223   1.78*      
N             798       300 
Pseudo R2           0.3510      0.3745 
Wald chi-square         859.45      819.30 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000   
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 100,000,000 to facilitate interpretation 
[2] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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per capita income.  States with more farms per capita have higher per capita income 
growth.  This relationship is not present in Model (2).  Finally, Model (2) offers weak 
evidence that the greater proportion of a state’s population that is black (b = 0.223, t= 
1.78), the greater the growth in state per capita income.  Though, this result is significant 
at the relaxed .10 level, is not evident in Model (1), and has a coefficient in the different 
direction in Model (1). 
Models of State Unemployment Rates 
 The final model using environmental conditions as a measure of environmental 
policy is estimated in Table 6.12.  State unemployment rate is the dependent variable in 
this model.  As one can see, this model estimates suggest the only significant relationship 
between environmental conditions and economic growth.  In both models of Table 6.12 
the air emissions variable is positive and highly significant (.01 level), indicating that 
there is a positive relationship between air emissions and state unemployment.  These 
results suggest that states with higher industrial air emissions experience higher levels of 
unemployment; conversely, unemployment is lowest in those state-year cases with lower 
levels of air emissions.  This lends support to the contention that more stringent state 
environmental policy—which, presumably, leads to higher levels of environmental 
quality—results in stronger economic performance in terms of state unemployment.   
State business policies produce different results in the two models.  No significant 
relationship between business policies and state unemployment is evident in the first 
model.  On the other hand, there is a strong negative relationship between tax incentives 
and state unemployment, coupled with a highly positive relationship with the pollution 
control incentives variable in Model (2).  Thus, states that offer more business tax  
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Table 6.12. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Conditions and State Unemployment  
             (1)       (2) 
           ------------------------   ------------------------  
              b       t     b      t   
 
Intercept          6.005   6.41***   8.506   5.94***  
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Air Emissions [1]       0.007   3.30***   0.007   3.41*** 
 Water Emissions [1]       0.044   0.95    0.016     0.23  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [2]      0.421   0.04   -0.010  -0.68 
 Tax Incentives       -0.009  -0.34   -0.080  -2.12** 
 Pollution Control Incentive            0.162   3.89*** 
 
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP    -1.494  -1.11   -3.621  -1.90* 
 National Unemployment      0.735  25.38***   0.773   13.80*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt         4.668   4.28***   3.174   2.89*** 
 Federal Aid [2]        0.004   2.52**    0.038   0.09 
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure        0.021 [2]  0.02    0.003   1.83* 
 Gubernatorial Power      0.071   0.49   -0.498   -2.16** 
 Legislative Professionalism     1.241   2.66***   1.100   2.90***  
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree     -0.045  -3.63***  -0.063  -2.80*** 
  College Degree      -0.035  -2.19**   -0.004  -0.11 
 Manufacturing Employment    -17.303  -8.06***  -27.728   -7.10*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.262  -2.62***  -0.172  -1.01 
 Farms         -21.282  -3.55***   0.515      0.05    
 South         -0.397   -1.68*    -0.766  -1.98**  
 Urbanization [2]      -0.810  -2.16**   -0.120  -0.18    
 Black          0.014   1.53    0.008   0.56    
N             798       300 
Pseudo R2           0.5286      0.3582 
Wald chi-square         1173.94     410.15 
Prob chi-square          0.0000      0.0000   
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000,000 to facilitate interpretation 
[2] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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incentives (b = -0.080, t = -2.12) experience a decline in unemployment rates, while 
states that offer more pollution control incentives (b = 0.162, t = 3.89) to businesses 
experience an increase in unemployment rates. 
 National and state fiscal conditions also influence state unemployment rates.  In 
both models I find that national unemployment rates have a highly significant positive 
effect upon state unemployment rates.  These results indicate that when national 
unemployment rates increase, state unemployment rates also increase.  This finding is 
consistent with all other models estimated in this chapter.  Moreover, state debt produces 
a highly significant positive effect in both models.  States that have higher levels of state 
debt as a proportion of total personal income have higher unemployment rates.  The 
coefficient for federal aid (b = 0.004, t = 2.52) is significant at the .05 level in Model (1).  
This model indicates that the more federal aid a state receives the greater the state 
unemployment rate.  This significant result is not duplicated in Model (2).   
 State structural/institutional variables produce mixed results.  Legislative 
professionalism has a consistent, highly significant and positive effect in both models.  
This finding suggests that the more professional the state legislature, the higher the state 
unemployment rate.  The gubernatorial power variable produces particularly confusing 
results.  Although not statistically significant in Model (1), the coefficient for the variable 
is in the positive direction.  However, in Model (2) the coefficient for gubernatorial 
power (b = -0.498, t = -2.16) is in the expected direction and achieves significance at 
conventional levels.  This indicates that states that have governors with greater 
institutional powers have lower state unemployment rates.  Though, the results for both 
of these institutional variables must be interpreted with caution since they are cross-
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sectional measures.  State tax structure (b = 0.003, t = 1.83) achieves a lower level of 
significance in Model (2) providing some support that states with more regressive tax 
structures have state lower unemployment. 
 The state demographic variables also produce mixed results across both models.  
The coefficients for state high school educational attainment, manufacturing 
employment, and location in the south are all negative and statistically significant in both 
models.  The results suggest that the higher the high school educational attainment level 
of a state the lower the unemployment rate.  States with higher numbers of workers 
employed in the manufacturing sector have lower unemployment rates.  Southern states 
exhibit significantly lower unemployment rates in both models.  None of the other 
demographic variables display a significant effect in Model (2).  In Model (1) the 
coefficients for college educational attainment, political culture, farms per capita, and 
urbanization are statistically significant.  As expected, states that have citizens with 
higher levels of college attainment (b = -0.035, t = -2.19) have lower levels of 
unemployment.  States with a moralistic political culture (b = -0.262, t = -2.62) are more 
likely to have lower unemployment.  As expected, states with more farms per capita (b = 
-21.28182, t = -3.55) exhibit lower unemployment rates.  The findings of Model (1) also 
suggest that higher level of urbanization in a state (b = -0.810, t = -2.16) leads to lower 
unemployment levels.   
Summary 
 The results of the model estimations using state environmental conditions as a 
measure of state environmental policy do not provide strong evidence that environmental 
policy has any effect upon economic growth.  State environmental conditions have a 
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statistically significant relationship with only one of the dependent variables.  Table 6.12 
shows that state industrial air emissions exhibit a positive relationship with state 
unemployment rates.  However, the second environmental policy measure in this model 
(water emissions) does not have a statistically significant effect on state unemployment.  
Even within this model there is not strong evidence of a relationship between state 
environmental conditions and state economic growth.  Thus, the model estimated using 
environmental conditions as a measure of state environmental policy does not provide 
evidence that state economic growth is affected by state environmental policy. 
Levinson Index and State Environmental Spending Models 
 The preceding estimations provide conflicting results regarding the effect that 
environmental regulatory policies have on state economic performance.  The impact of 
these policies is dependent upon which measurement tool is used to represent 
environmental policy.  Estimations utilizing the Levinson Index as a measure of 
environmental policy provide support for the contention that strict environmental policies 
have a negative impact on state economic performance.  Conversely, estimations that 
utilize environmental spending as a measure of environmental policy provide support for 
the contention that strict environmental regulations have a positive impact on state 
economic performance.   
Limitations in the availability of data for both measures make estimations over the 
entire period of enhanced environmental regulation impossible.  However, there is a 
small range of years for which data for both the Levinson Index and state environmental 
spending are available.  Models are estimated for each of the state economic performance 
dependent variables for these years.  These models “tease out” the effects that each of the 
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environmental policies measures have on state economic performance.  By including both 
measures of environmental policy, the estimation provides a more complete 
understanding of the effect these variables have on the state economic variables.   
Data are available for both The Levinson Index and the state environmental 
spending measures for the time period from 1986 to 1994.  The model estimations for 
each of the dependent variables are presented in Tables 6.13, 6.14, and 6.15.  For the sake 
of brevity, I focus the discussion in this section on the two main independent variables of 
interest—the Levinson Index and state environmental spending.  The remaining control 
variables are discussed in detail in the preceding sections and are not reviewed again in 
this stage of the analysis3.   
In Table 6.13 I present the results of estimation of the effects of the Levinson 
Index and state environmental spending on change in total personal income.  The 
coefficient for environmental spending (b = 0.184, t = 2.91) is positive and highly 
significant.  The result indicates that states that spend more on environmental and natural 
resource programs have higher growth in total state personal income.  This is consistent 
with the earlier model that did not include the Levinson Index (Table 6.7).  In contrast, 
the coefficient for the Levinson Index is not statistically significant in this model.  This 
result is different from the earlier model that did not include state environmental 
spending (Table 6.4).  In the original model without state spending, the Levinson Index 
exhibited a negative relationship to change in total state personal income.  While this 
negative relationship is still evident, the lack of statistical significance in Table 6.13 
means that I cannot conclude that the Levinson Index has a negative effect on change in 
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Table 6.13. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and 
Change in Total State Personal Income, Years 1986 - 1994  
              
            b       t     
 
Intercept          0.010    6.71***     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Levinson Index       -0.002   -0.65 
 Environmental Spending [1]     0.184    2.91***  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.264     0.97 
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.848   -1.47  
  
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.835   18.04***  
 National Unemployment      0.002    2.38** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.85   -2.60***  
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.011   -1.52  
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [1]       0.007     0.40 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.005   -2.00***  
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.226   -2.75*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]     0.718    2.11*** 
  College Degree [1]     -0.862   -1.80*  
 Manufacturing Employment     0.084    1.79*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.004    1.57 
 Farms         -0.484   -3.60*** 
 South          0.009     1.76*   
 Urbanization [2]      -0.002   -0.30  
 Black          0.046    0.25  
N             384 
Pseudo R2           0.2867       
Wald chi-square         458.74 
Prob chi-square          0.0000    
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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total state personal income.  The results of this estimation provide support for those who 
contend that strict environmental policies stimulate state economic growth 
A similar finding is evident in Table 6.14.  Once again the coefficient for the 
environmental spending variable (b = 0.120, t = 2.55) is positive and highly significant.  
Thus, it appears that states that spend more on environmental and natural resource 
programs experience higher growth in state per capita income.  This result is consistent 
with the results of Table 6.8, which present the estimation of the effect of environmental 
spending on change in per capita income, excluding the Levinson Index.  The coefficient 
for the Levinson Index in Table 6.14 has similar results to the earlier model estimating 
the effect of the Levinson Index on state per capita income growth, excluding the state 
spending variable (Table 6.5).  Neither model produces a statistically significant 
relationship between the Levinson Index and change in state per capita income.  Thus, the 
Levinson Index does not have an affect upon change in state per capita income.  These 
results also lend support to the proponents of stricter state environmental regulations who 
argue that environmental stringency will enhance economic performance. 
The estimation for the effects of the Levinson Index and state environmental 
spending on state unemployment rates is presented in Table 6.15.  Immediately evident is 
the strong, positive relationship between the Levinson Index (b = 0.443, t = 3.02) and 
state unemployment rates.  States that have higher scores on the Levinson Index—states 
that impose higher pollution abatement costs on industries—have higher unemployment 
rates.  This finding, including the magnitude of the effect, is similar to that of the original 
Levinson Index-state unemployment estimation in Table 6.6 that did not include the  
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Table 6.14. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and 
Change in State Per Capita Income, Years 1986 - 1994  
              
            b       t     
 
Intercept          0.018    1.14     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Levinson Index [1]       0.624    0.26 
 Environmental Spending [1]     0.120    2.55***  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.568     3.09*** 
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.734   -2.00***  
  
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.788   21.68***  
 National Unemployment  [1]     0.422    0.60 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.022   -1.02  
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.006   -1.11  
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [1]       0.019     1.84* 
 Gubernatorial Power [1]      0.377    0.22  
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.018   -3.61*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]    -0.280   -1.26 
  College Degree [1]     -0.507   -1.69  
 Manufacturing Employment     0.133    4.84*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.003    1.77**  
 Farms [1]         0.592    0.01 
 South          0.001     0.36   
 Urbanization [1]       0.0001    0.03  
 Black [1]         0.150    1.33  
N             384 
Pseudo R2           0.3281 
Wald chi-square         721.06 
Prob chi-square          0.0000    
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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variable for state environmental spending.  On the other hand the environmental spending 
variable produces somewhat mixed results in the different models.  The coefficient for 
the environmental spending variable (b = -0.060, t = -1.75) in Table 6.15 has a negative 
relationship to state unemployment rates.  Since I expected a positive relationship 
between these variables, a two-tailed test is applied and the significance of the 
relationship is at the more relaxed .10 level.  Thus, limited support for an effect of state 
environmental spending on state unemployment rates is found.  Once again, a model 
produces somewhat mixed results.  The strong positive relationship between the Levinson 
Index and state unemployment rates supports the contention that more stringent 
environmental policies are a detriment to state economic performance.  However, the 
negative relationship between state environmental spending and state unemployment 
lends support to those who hold the position that more stringent state environmental 
policies stimulate state economic performance.  Though, since the state spending variable 
is significant at the more relaxed .10 level, the evidence supporting this relationship is 
weaker than that of the Levinson Index.  
Overall, the models that include the Levinson Index and state environmental 
spending in the calculus appear to indicate that the two variables have differing effects on 
different aspects of state economic performance.  The state environmental spending 
variable consistently exerts a positive effect on the state income growth variables.  In all 
the estimations I consider in this analysis, greater state spending on state environmental 
and natural resource programs is associated with greater growth in total state personal 
income and state per capita income.  The Levinson Index has a similar consistently  
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Table 6.15. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and 
Unemployment, Years 1986 - 1994  
              
            b       t     
 
Intercept          8.266    5.56***     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Levinson Index        0.443    3.02*** 
 Environmental Spending    -0.006   -1.75*  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance       0.010     0.63 
 Tax Incentives       -0.057   -1.52  
  
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP    -3.523   -1.55  
 National Unemployment      0.744   15.95*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt         8.981    3.87***  
 Federal Aid [1]        0.280    0.58  
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure        0.003     2.11*** 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.109   -0.52  
 Legislative Professionalism     2.456    3.53*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree     -0.079   -3.64*** 
  College Degree      -0.024   -0.72  
 Manufacturing Employment    -18.22   -6.19*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.027   -0.18  
 Farms         -17.861   -2.24*** 
 South         -0.337    -0.91   
 Urbanization       -0.002   -1.98***  
 Black          8.266    5.56***  
N             384 
Pseudo R2           0.4042  
Wald chi-square         581.86 
Prob chi-square          0.0000    
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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significant effect upon state unemployment rates.  In all of the models estimated, the 
Levinson Index exerts a strong positive effect on state unemployment.  States that score 
higher on the Levinson Index have higher unemployment rates.  Thus, higher pollution 
abatement costs for business and industry is associated with higher levels of state 
unemployment.  While state environmental spending sometimes exerts an effect on state 
unemployment and while the Levinson Index sometimes exerts an effect on the state 
income growth variables, these results are not consistent in all the models estimated.  
Thus, the evidence seems to support both sides of the environment vs. economy 
debate, depending upon which economic indicator is used.  When examining the effects 
of environmental policy on change in state income measures, I find that greater state 
spending on environmental and natural resource programs is associated with greater 
growth in total state personal income and greater growth in state per capita income.  
However, when I focus on the effect that environmental policy has on state 
unemployment rates, I find that states that impose greater pollution abatement costs on 
business and industry have higher levels of unemployment.  Though, I am cautious in 
making such generalizations since the time period that allows me to study the effects of 
both variables at the same points in time is somewhat limited.  Data are only available for 
these estimations for eight years. 
Conclusion 
 The results of the models examining the relationship between state environmental 
policy and state economic growth provide mixed results.  My inferences about the effects 
of state environmental policy depend upon the measurement tool used to represent this 
independent variable.  First, many previous studies have used the Green Index as a 
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measure of state environmental conditions and Green Policies as a measure of state 
environmental policy, so I begin by estimating my models of state economic performance 
with these two variables as independent variables. When the Green Index and Green 
Policies are used to measure environmental policy, the evidence supports the contention 
that more stringent state environmental regulations enhance state economic growth.  This 
would seem to fit with the contention of many observers that state economies benefit 
from policies that result in a pristine environment. Unfortunately, the Green Index and 
Green Policies scale are cross-sectional variables that do not show change in policy over 
the time period examined.  Hence the appropriate interpretation of the coefficients for 
these variables is the effect of the Green Index and Green Policies on the average level of 
economic performance over the time frame being studied, controlling for the effects of 
other independent variables. Ultimately, one must view the findings from the models 
using the Green Index and Green Policies with great caution.   
In order to account for this variability in state environmental policy over time, a 
longitudinal measure of this concept is used.  When the Levinson Index is used to 
measure environmental policy, the exact opposite relationship occurs than when the 
Green Index is utilized.  The Levinson Index models support the contention that more 
stringent state environmental regulations have a negative impact upon state economic 
growth.  This is especially evident when the dependent variable under consideration is 
state unemployment rates.  However, when state environmental spending and state 
environmental conditions are used as measures of environmental policy, there is 
somewhat weak evidence that stringent environmental policy has a positive effect upon 
state economic growth.   
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The results of the models using environmental spending and environmental 
conditions variables are often at odds with the findings of the Levinson Index models.  
These estimations provide support for the assertion that more stringent state 
environmental regulations enhance state economic growth.  Though, such support is more 
strongly evident in the models which utilize environmental spending, rather than 
environmental conditions, as a measure of environmental policy.  Further, such support is 
more strongly evident when examining the state income dependent variables.  Evidence 
points to a consistent positive relationship between state environmental spending and 
state income growth.  However, no such consistent link is found to exist with state 
environmental spending and state unemployment levels. 
 Clearly, the model estimations provide inconsistent results, and this begs the 
question of why.  On the one hand, it is possible that these various indicators represent 
different components of environmental stringency and quality.  If so, it would not be 
surprising that models estimated separately for each indicator would yield different 
results.  For instance, the Levinson Index represents regulatory costs imposed on the state 
economy.  Of course regulation requires some spending to administer and monitor, but 
not all environmental spending goes for administering, monitoring, and enforcing 
compliance with environmental regulations.  I have assumed that regulatory costs and 
environmental spending both represent the stringency of environmental policy in a given 
state, but it is possible that these two variables represent different components of 
environmental stringency.  
 On the other hand, it is possible that other factors than just the measurement tools 
themselves are causing these conflicting results.  Because of the limitations in data 
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availability, the models using the Levinson Index and the environmental spending and 
conditions variables represent different time periods.  The Levinson Index estimates are 
for the years 1977 to 1994, while the state environmental spending models provide an 
analysis of time period from 1986 to 2003.  The state conditions models are estimated 
using data from 1988 to 2003.  It is possible that the effects of environmental regulations 
upon economic growth changed over the course of these years.   
The initial impact of environmental regulations may have had heavy costs 
associated with them.  These costs could have had a very real impact upon businesses, 
and thus, overall economic growth when first enacted.  As business and industry adjusted 
to these regulations and these regulations became a part of the routine costs to business, 
the effect of the regulations may have dwindled.  This could explain why the Levinson 
Index models produce a strong negative effect of environmental policy on state economic 
performance.  The Levinson Index covers the period that produced the first “shocks” of 
the environmental regulations upon businesses.  The environmental spending and 
environment conditions models start in 1986.  By this point business and industry may 
have adjusted to the costs of these regulations.  It may be that environmental regulations 
are now a routine operating cost and as such no longer have as strong of an economic 
impact upon businesses.   
Thus, the mixed results produced in these different model estimations may not be 
in conflict.  The Levinson Index models may accurately reflect a negative impact of 
environmental regulation upon economic growth during the years estimated in those 
models.  The weaker positive impact of environmental regulation upon economic growth 
in the environmental spending and environmental conditions estimations may reflect the 
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changing role of regulation upon the economy.  When states begin putting more financial 
resources into environmental programs, the states themselves may stimulate positive 
economic change.  Though, I am cautious about reading too much into these findings.  
The mixed findings produced in these models may be as a result of the changing dynamic 
of environmental regulations.  However, it is also possible that, as mentioned earlier, the 
different measurement tools are responsible for the differences in results.  They may not 
all be “equal” in their measurement of environmental policy. 
Another finding of note in this analysis includes the consistently strong effect that 
national economic conditions have upon state economic growth.  In all of the models 
estimated, at least one – and generally both – of the national economic conditions 
variables exhibited a statistically strong effect upon state economic growth.  The national 
economy does matter to the states.  When national economic trends are positive state 
economic growth is evident.  Increases in national per capita GDP correspond to 
increases in state growth in total personal income and state growth in per capita income.  
Increases in state unemployment will follow increases in national unemployment.  My 
estimations indicate that national economic conditions exert great influence upon 
economic growth in the states.  Though, this finding is debated in the literature.  Different 
researchers note the effect of national economic conditions on state economies is variable 
over time (Brace, 1991; Hendrick and Garand, 1991, Brace, 1993; Crain, 2003). 
However, in my analysis, the evidence regarding the influence of environmental 
policy upon state economic growth is not as consistent.  No clear pattern is discernable.  
When a cross-sectional measure is used for environmental policy, evidence supports the 
positive impact that state environmental regulation has upon state economic growth.  
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When longitudinal measures are used, this finding is not consistent.  Longitudinal 
measures produce mixed results in the time periods examined.  The Levinson Index 
provides support for the argument that environmental regulation has a negative impact 
upon state economic growth.  During the time period covered by the Levinson Index, the 
initial shock of increased regulation may have had a detrimental effect to state 
economies.  Models estimated for the more recent years of 1986 to 2003, indicate that 
state environmental spending and state environmental conditions have a weak positive 
impact upon state economic growth.  Thus, the effects of environmental policy upon state 
economic growth appear to change over time. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. The xtgls command in Stata does not produce an R2 for the FGLS regression.  
Thus I estimate a pseudo R2 as the square of the correlation coefficient for the 
predicted and observed values. 
2. The Levinson Index models are estimated with the pollution control incentives 
excluded.  As the results are quite similar to the models in which they are 
included, the models with the variables excluded are not reported here.  The 
results for these models are presented in Appendix B. 
3. Separate models are also estimated with the inclusion of the pollution control 
index variable.  These models are presented in Appendix C. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation I examine the relationship between state environmental policy 
and state economic growth.  I determine that measurement tools are critical to 
understanding this relationship and that there is deficit in the available data that makes it 
difficult to arrive at firm conclusions.  When using the Levinson Index—a measure of the 
costs to businesses of complying with pollution abatement measures in the states—as the 
measure of environmental policy, there appears to be a negative relationship between 
environmental regulatory stringency and state economic performance.  States with more 
stringent environmental policies experience lower total state personal income growth and 
higher unemployment rates.  However when using state per capita environmental 
spending as the measure of environmental policy, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between environmental policy and state economic performance.  States that 
spend more on environmental programs exhibit higher rates of total state personal income 
and per capita income growth and lower unemployment rates.  The tool used to measure 
environmental policy stringency is crucial to the results attained. 
 The Levinson Index is the variable that most directly approximates the concept I 
seek to measure.  The focus of my research is on the effect that state environmental 
policies have on state economies.  More specifically I have tried to ascertain whether 
environmental regulatory stringency causes states to lose (or never attain) businesses that 
contribute to overall state economic health.  The Levinson Index measures the costs to 
businesses of complying with pollution abatement efforts in each state over time.  Thus, 
the Levinson Index captures the costs of regulations to businesses.  If more stringent 
environmental regulations place a higher compliance cost on businesses and if these 
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higher costs of compliance do play a part in site location or expansion decisions of 
businesses, the Levinson Index should account for this effect. 
 Models that I estimate using the Levinson Index as the measure of environmental 
policy indicate that states that impose greater pollution abatement costs upon business 
and industry experience lower rates of total personal income growth and higher 
unemployment rates.  Models based on the Levinson Index provide strong support for the 
contention that states that adopt strict environmental policies will suffer a detrimental 
economic consequence.  More stringent environmental policies that impose greater costs 
on business and industry are associated with lower economic growth and higher 
unemployment in the states that impose these regulatory burdens.  This result comes from 
estimations that use the policy measurement tool that is the more direct measure of how 
environmental policies effect business costs—the Levinson Index.  Thus, I find evidence 
of a negative economic effect of environmental stringency. 
 My analysis does not stop with the Levinson Index, though, and this is where the 
results become a bit muddled.  The Levinson Index is only available for the years 1977 to 
1994.  In order to study the effects of state environmental policy on state economic 
performance over a longer period of time, it is necessary for me to use another measure 
for environmental policy.  I use two different alternate measures of environmental policy: 
state per capita spending on environmental and natural resource programs and state 
environmental conditions.  I do not find much evidence that state environmental 
conditions have an effect on state economic growth.  However, the state spending 
measurement tool produces results contradictory to those of the models using the 
Levinson Index.   
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 In the model estimations in which I use state per capita environmental spending as 
a measure of environmental policy, I find that state environmental spending has a positive 
relationship to state economic growth.  States that allocate more of their resources toward 
environmental programs are associated with higher levels of total state personal income 
growth and higher per capita income growth.  Further, I find that states that have higher 
levels of environmental spending experience lower unemployment rates.  However, I am 
cautious about reading too much into these results.  While I am confident that the 
Levinson Index captures the costs associated with environmental regulatory stringency, I 
am not as confident that state environmental spending is a good proxy for the same 
concept.   
States that spend more on environmental and natural resource programs may be 
states that have more money to spend, i.e. states that have strong economies.  The 
estimations using state spending as the measure of environmental policy may have a 
problem of endogeneity.  It is possible that the results I find in these models may not truly 
reflect that greater state environmental spending leads to better state economic 
performance.  Instead, the accurate relationship may be that states with stronger 
economies spend more on environmental programs.  Thus, the direction of the 
relationship is in question. 
In order to better understand the mixed results from the Levinson Index and state 
spending models, I estimate models with both of these variables included as measures of 
state environmental policy.  These models do not necessarily lend clarity to my analysis.   
The models indicate that state environmental spending has a very strong positive effect 
upon the income dependent variables.  Greater state environmental spending is associated 
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with greater growth in total state personal income and greater growth in per capita 
income.  However, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, I am cautious of these 
results since the spending and income growth variables may be endogenous.  These final 
sets of models do not indicate that state environmental spending has a strong impact on 
state unemployment rates.  While a negative relationship is found, it is at the weaker .10 
level of significance.  The Levinson Index, though, exhibits a very strong effect on state 
unemployment rates in these models.  The higher a state scores on the Levinson Index—
the greater the pollution abatement costs to industry in a state—the higher the state 
unemployment rates.  However, the Levinson Index does not exhibit a relationship with 
the state income growth variables.  This final set of models seems to indicate that state 
environmental spending and the Levinson Index effect different aspects of state economic 
performance. 
There are two possible explanations for the conflicting results achieved in the 
models estimated.  First, the three measures I use for environmental policy may simply be 
measuring different things.  The Levinson Index, state environmental spending, and state 
environmental conditions may not be interchangeable policy variables. By definition 
these variables are not the same – they measure different aspects of states’ environmental 
efforts.  Thus, the differing results achieved in the models may simply be a reflection of 
this variety in the measurement tools.  The models produce differing results because the 
policy variables measure different concepts.     
Secondly, the results may be in conflict because the variables cover different time 
periods.  The Levinson Index is only available from 1977 to 1994.  The state 
environmental spending data is available from 1986 to 2003.  The state environmental 
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conditions data has been collected annually since 1988.  The conflicting results in the 
models may be as a result of changes in the regulatory environment in the time period 
from 1977 to 2003.  The time period covered by the Levinson Index is the period in 
which the first serious efforts of the federal government to regulate the environment 
occurred.  The initial cost to business of compliance with “new” federal and state laws 
was probably very severe.  Since data for the Levinson Index begins in 1977, the height 
of this regulatory period, this variable may include start-up costs that had a major impact 
on the costs of business operations.  The Levinson Index data is not available after 1994.  
By this point in time, businesses may have started to adjust to these costs and 
environmental compliance costs were just another operating expense.  Thus, the negative 
economic impact that the Levinson Index exhibits may be a result of the “growing pains” 
of a new regulatory push.   
By the same token, data availability for the environmental spending and 
conditions variables begin in the late 1980s.  These variables are from a time period when 
the regulatory “growing pains” may have subsided.  The somewhat positive economic 
effect that is evident in these models may be due to the acceptance by business and 
industry of these environmental regulations after having time to adjust.  Thus, the models 
may present somewhat conflicting results because the business reaction to environmental 
regulations has changed over time. 
While the models do display some contradictory findings, I am more confident in 
the results of the Levinson Index models.  This variable is the best measure for 
understanding the cost of environmental regulatory compliance to business and industry.  
My study is focused on how state environmental stringency affects state economic 
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growth.  The typical argument revolves around the notion that environmental regulations 
increase operating costs to business and these businesses will leave an area (choose to 
operate elsewhere) if operating expenses are too high.  When businesses leave, states will 
suffer a negative economic impact.  The Levinson Index provides a measure that captures 
the cost of compliance to businesses.  Thus, this variable measures the concept closest to 
the theory driving my research.   
There is a key drawback associated with the Levinson Index, though.  As 
mentioned, the Levinson Index is only available from 1977 to 1994.  This limitation of 
the data calls into question the generalizability of the results.  The estimations indicate 
that from 1977 to 1994 states that have higher pollution abatement costs imposed on 
business and industry experience a negative impact on state economic performance.  
However, since the Levinson Index is not available after 1994, it cannot be said with 
certainty that this effect holds true today.  Simply because such a negative effect was 
evident from 1977 to 1994, it cannot be assumed that this effect reaches past 1994.  Even 
with this limitation, though, the Levinson Index models do provide a better understanding 
of the relationship between state environmental policy stringency and economic growth 
during the time period examined. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, limitations of data availability have 
created difficulties in my ability to reach firm conclusions regarding the impact of state 
environmental regulations on state economic performance.  While researchers have 
developed specific environmental policy measures, these are all cross-sectional in nature.  
In order to study state environmental policy in each state over time, accounting for 
variability in the states, it is necessary to find another measure of environmental policy.  
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Available longitudinal measures capture some aspect of state environmental policy 
without actually specifically measuring state environmental policy.   
One weakness of using these longitudinal measures is that none of them are 
available for the entire time period I examine.  Thus, I cannot be sure that when I 
estimate the models with these different measures of policy that I am consistently 
measuring the same concept in these models.  As mentioned with regards to the Levinson 
Index, this calls into question the generalizability of my results.  Further, the state 
environmental spending variable may not be adequately capturing the concept I hope to 
measure – the level of commitment to environmental efforts by the states.  This variable 
may need to be reformulated as a proportion of total state personal income in order to 
truly be able to account for whether some states spend more on environmental programs 
simply because they have stronger economies, and thus, have more money to spend on 
such programs.  An effort must be made to resolve the possible endogenous relationship 
between the state environmental spending and state income growth variables.   
Future research should also try to resolve some of the curious results of the 
control variables.  In particular, the state institutional variables and the state educational 
variables often produce confounding results in the modes I estimate.  The cross-sectional 
nature of the institutional variables may be responsible for results that are often at odds 
with expectations.  Since these measures do not vary over time, they may not be able to 
accurately capture the change in state economic performance that could occur as a result 
of legislative professionalism and gubernatorial power.  In addition, the state educational 
attainment results are not consistent throughout the models estimated.  The results 
frequently defy the conventional wisdom that a better educated citizenry can aid in a 
 183
state’s economic performance.  As detailed in chapter 5, the educational attainment data 
suffers from three major flaws.  First, the data is not consistently available for the years 
1977 to 1988.  Second, when reported in these years, the data is sometimes reported 
regionally, sometimes reported by state.  Finally, the question wording changed in 1989 
from a question asking about years of school completed to actual degree attained.  These 
inconsistencies in the raw data may account for the incongruous results often found in the 
models estimated.  Thus, future research needs to account for problems with the control 
variables, as well as the environmental policies variables. 
Taking into account all of the measurement issues mentioned above, my research 
indicates that when businesses spend more on pollution control efforts, state economies 
do experience a negative impact on economic growth.  Total state personal income is 
lower and unemployment is higher in states that impose greater pollution abatement 
compliance costs on business and industry.  This effect is especially strong on state 
unemployment rates.  While this effect may be waning as business and industries come to 
consider pollution abatement as a normal operating expense, I am cautious about drawing 
such a conclusion until a better environmental policy measurement tool is available. 
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APPENDIX A: 
DESCRIPTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TAKEN FROM 
SITE SELECTION HANDBOOK: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR INDUSTRY, TAX 
INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY, AND POLLUTION CONTROL INCENTIVES FOR 
INDUSTRY 
 
State Industrial Aid (Financial Assistance for Industry) 
1. State Sponsored Industrial Development Authority 
2. Privately Sponsored Development Credit Corporation 
3. State Authority or Agency Revenue Bond Financing 
4. State Authority of Agency General Obligation Bond Financing 
5. City and/or County Revenue Bond Financing 
6. City and/or County General Obligation Bond Financing 
7. State Loans for Building Construction 
8. State Loans for Equipment, Machinery 
9. City and/or County Loans for Building Construction 
10. City and/or County Loans for Equipment, Machinery 
11. State Loan Guarantees for Building Construction 
12. State Loan Guarantees for Equipment, Machinery 
13. City and/or County Loan Guarantees for Building Construction 
14. City and/or County Loan Guarantees for Equipment, Machinery 
15. State Financing Aid for Existing Plant Expansion 
16. State Matching Funds for City and/or County Industrial Financing Programs 
17. State Incentive for Establishing Industrial Plants in Areas of High Unemployment 
18. City and/or County Incentive for Establishing Industrial Plants in Areas of High 
Unemployment 
 
Tax Incentives for Industry 
1. Corporate Income Tax Exemption 
2. Personal Income Tax Exemption 
3. Excise Tax Exemption 
4. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Land, Capital Improvements 
5. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Equipment, Machinery 
6. Inventory Tax Exemption on Goods in Transit (Freeport) 
7. Tax Exemption on Manufacturers Inventory 
8. Sales/Use Tax Exemption on New Equipment 
9. Tax Exemption on Raw Materials Used in Manufacturing 
10. Tax Incentive for Creation of Jobs 
11. Tax Incentive for Industrial Investment 
12. Tax Credits for Use of Specified State Products 
13. Tax Stabilization Agreements for Specified Industries 
14. Tax Exemption to Encourage Research and Development 
15. Accelerated Depreciation of Industrial Equipment 
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Pollution Control Incentives for Industry 
1. Corporate Income Tax Exemption 
2. Personal Income Tax Exemption 
3. Excise Tax Exemption 
4. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Land, Capital Improvements 
5. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Equipment, Machinery 
6. Inventory Tax Exemption on Goods in Transit (Freeport) 
7. Tax Exemption on Manufacturers Inventory 
8. Sales/Use Tax Exemption on New Equipment 
9. Tax Exemption on Raw Materials Used in Manufacturing 
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APPENDIX B: 
LEVINSON INDEX  
ADDITIONAL MODELS 
 
Table B.1. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in Total State Personal Income 
       
              b        t      
 
Intercept          0.088     5.28***     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Levinson Index      -0.005   -2.08***    
               
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]     -0.013   -0.05     
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.577   -1.32    
          
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.570      21.98***    
 National Unemployment     -0.002   -3.05***    
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.052   -1.93**    
 Federal Aid [1]        0.011    1.52    
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure  [1]      -0.009   -0.71    
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.008   -3.27***    
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.030   -3.78***    
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]    -0.222   -0.85      
  College Degree [1]     -0.611   -1.39    
 Manufacturing Employment    -0.018   -0.47    
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.003    1.65*     
 Farms         -0.420   -4.04***    
 South          0.008    2.02**     
 Urbanization [1]       0.260    2.47**     
 Black [1]        -0.246   -1.63      
N      816          
Pseudo R2    0.3255           
Wald chi-square  727.94         
Prob chi-square   0.0000       
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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Table B.2. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in State Per Capita Income 
       
              b        t      
 
Intercept          0.047     3.90***     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Levinson Index      -0.002   -1.31    
               
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.287    1.65*     
 Tax Incentives [1]       0.065    0.21    
   
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.594       26.42***    
 National Unemployment     -0.001   -3.29***    
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.024   -1.24    
 Federal Aid [1]        0.002    0.28    
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure  [1]      -0.004   -0.39    
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.001   -0.65    
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.011   -2.21**    
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]    -0.149   -0.78      
  College Degree [1]     -0.688   -2.19**    
 Manufacturing Employment     0.032    1.20    
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.001    0.93     
 Farms         -0.097   -1.27    
 South          0.005    1.86*     
 Urbanization [1]      -0.010   -0.15     
 Black [1]        -0.129   -1.28      
N      816 
Pseudo R2    0.3390  
Wald chi-square  940.77  
Prob chi-square   0.0000      
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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Table B.3. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and State Unemployment 
       
              b        t      
 
Intercept          2.84      1.88*     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 The Levinson Index       0.559    4.37***    
               
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]     0.786   0.05     
 Tax Incentives       0.010   0.05    
       
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP    -0.428   -.039       
 National Unemployment      0.929   31.87***     
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt         7.892     3.99***       
 Federal Aid        -0.001   -3.10***    
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure  [1]      -0.233   -0.18       
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.423   -1.51    
 Legislative Professionalism     2.213    2.67*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment      
  High School Degree       0.004    0.22 
  College Degree       0.001    0.03   
 Manufacturing Employment    -13.144   -3.94***    
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.127   -0.81     
 Farms         -27.382   -3.59***  
 South         -1.014   -2.21***     
 Urbanization       -0.023   -2.24***     
 Black          0.050    2.70***      
N      816     
Pseudo R2    0.4409          
Wald chi-square  1489.94  
Prob chi-square   0.0000      
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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APPENDIX C: 
LEVINSON INDEX/ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING 
ADDITIONAL MODELS 
 
Table C.1. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and 
Change in Total State Personal Income, Years 1986 – 1994, Including Pollution Control 
              
            b       t     
 
Intercept         -0.011   -0.42     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Levinson Index [1]      -0.393   -0.12 
 Environmental Spending [1]     0.194    2.79***  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.315     1.12 
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.447   -0.73 
 Pollution Control [1]     -0.937   -1.78*   
  
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.838   16.84***  
 National Unemployment      0.002    2.05** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.068   -1.94***  
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.011   -1.25  
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [1]       0.001     0.06 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.004   -1.53  
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.019   -2.21*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]     0.707    1.95** 
  College Degree [1]     -0.913   -1.82*  
 Manufacturing Employment     0.126    2.32*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.001    0.47 
 Farms         -0.606   -4.20*** 
 South          0.011     2.21***   
 Urbanization       -0.002   -0.19  
 Black [1]        -0.132   -0.71  
N             336 
R2             0.2675   
Wald chi-square         431.72 
Prob chi-square          0.0000    
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10  [1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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Table C.2. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and 
Change in State Per Capita Income, Years 1986 - 1994, Including Pollution Control  
              
            b       t     
 
Intercept          0.015    0.84     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Levinson Index        0.001    0.43 
 Environmental Spending [1]     0.163    3.13***  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance [1]      0.548     2.84*** 
 Tax Incentives [1]      -0.642   -1.69* 
 Pollution Control [1]      0.247    0.71  
  
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP     0.808   21.34***  
 National Unemployment  [1]     0.047    0.07 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt        -0.029   -1.26  
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.005   -0.80  
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure [1]       0.031     3.05*** 
 Gubernatorial Power [1]     -0.073    0.04  
 Legislative Professionalism    -0.020   -4.38*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree [1]    -0.230   -0.98 
  College Degree [1]     -0.540   -1.76*  
 Manufacturing Employment     0.133    4.84*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)     0.002    1.15  
 Farms         -0.34   -0.33 
 South          0.464     0.16   
 Urbanization [1]       0.002    0.46  
 Black          0.169    1.49  
N             336 
R2             0.3368 
Wald chi-square         832.27 
Prob chi-square          0.0000    
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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Table C.3. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and 
Unemployment, Years 1986 - 1994 Including Pollution Control  
              
            b       t     
 
Intercept          7.850    4.83***     
 
Environmental Policy Variable      
 Levinson Index        0.433    3.02*** 
 Environmental Spending    -0.006   -1.81*  
            
Business Policy Variables 
 Financial Assistance       0.009     0.56 
 Tax Incentives       -0.135   -3.54*** 
 Pollution Control       0.176    3.92***  
  
National Economic Variables 
 Change in Per Capita GDP    -3.188   -1.43  
 National Unemployment      0.747   15.77*** 
  
State Fiscal Variables 
 State Debt         7.413    3.12***  
 Federal Aid [1]       -0.056   -0.09  
  
Structural/Institutional Variables 
 Tax Structure        0.004     2.43*** 
 Gubernatorial Power     -0.669   -0.28  
 Legislative Professionalism     2.60    3.14*** 
  
State Demographic Variables 
 Educational Attainment 
  High School Degree     -0.076   -3.23*** 
  College Degree      -0.001   -0.01  
 Manufacturing Employment    -24.872   -7.10*** 
 Political Culture (Moralistic)    -0.067   -0.40  
 Farms         -11.473   -1.39 
 South         -0.444    -1.06   
 Urbanization       -0.002   -1.89**  
 Black          0.011    0.61***  
N             336 
R2             0.3786 
Wald chi-square         576.26 
Prob chi-square          0.0000    
***prob < .01 
**  prob < .05 
*    prob < .10 
 
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation 
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